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The existence of cultural diversity in a connected world is paradoxical given that all 
individuals constantly interact and share information, and that individuals are all part of one 
giant network of connections. In the long term, it seems logical to assume that everybody 
should hold the same cultural information and, therefore, the same culture. Yet cultural 
diversity is still manifest around the globe. Cultural diversity as a phenomenon becomes even 
more puzzling when we take into account how it survives catastrophic events which regularly 
befall societies, such as invasions, natural disasters, and civil wars. In this thesis, agent-based 
computer simulations are employed to study this phenomenon of emergence and resilience of 
cultural diversity. 
The paradox of cultural diversity has been explored with different formal and computational 
models before. This is the first time institutions are introduced into these models. Moreover, 
previous models as well as my institutional model are extended in this thesis by the addition 
of events such as decimation, foreign settlement and institutional conversion, all of which 
can be used to test the resilience of cultural diversity. Combination of these events enables 
the approximation of real-life catastrophes; examples of possible applications is given in the 
form of case studies with a variety of sources of information. The three case studies 
presented correspond to different moments in the history of the Maya population: the so-
called Classic Maya Collapse (~800AC), the Spanish invasion of the Maya highlands area 
(15th century), and the Guatemalan Civil War (1960s-1980s). 
This thesis contributes to the literature by (a) demonstrating that institutions and mechanisms 
associated to them (democracy, propaganda), play a role in the emergence of cultural 
diversity in computer simulations; (b) offering a novel framework to study cultural diversity 
in computational models, including tools to introduce and combine events that target cultural 
information in the system; and (c) showcasing that cultural diversity, as portrayed in the 
simulations, is resilient to catastrophic events. The value of agent-based models to the field 
of cultural studies is illustrated by the parallels that are drawn between results from 
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Ten years ago, when I worked as a United Nations volunteer in Guatemala, I was amazed by 
the vibrancy of the different cultural groups of the Maya peoples; more than twenty different 
languages are spoken by different groups in Guatemala and many of the groups are well 
represented. I felt fortunate of having the opportunity of experiencing this cultural diversity 
in an era where globalization and cultural homogenization are taking over.  
The more I learned about the Guatemalan civil war, the more I wondered how it was possible 
that the diversity inherent in the Maya peoples’ social organization survived after all the 
atrocities committed against the Maya by the government. These atrocities have even been 
labeled acts of genocide against the Maya population. 
The civil war can be linked to an unresolved racial issue that started long ago, when the 
Spanish arrived in Guatemala. This arrival in itself constitutes another devastating page in 
Maya history that involved violent conflicts, imported plagues, and the destruction and 
aberration of Maya institutions.  
Even before the Europeans arrived, another chapter of Maya history also tells of catastrophic 
events that befell both the population and its institutions. During my stay in Guatemala, I had 
the opportunity to explore numerous Maya archeological sites, from which I learned that 
almost all major Maya cities declined or were abandoned around ~AC800. Many scholars 
have attempted to explain this sudden collapse of an entire civilization, with scenarios that 
include a combination of drought, natural disasters, warfare, revolutions, or epidemic 
diseases. Whichever theory may be true, in terms of the Maya peoples’ cultural resilience, it 
is once again astonishing that this collapse, which represents an extreme transformation in, 
and devastation of political systems, and which must have had major repercussions for the 
Maya culture, did not manage to eradicate the cultural diversity manifested in the different 
artistic traits of the cities. 
These events, and the questions that they pose, have motivated my work and culminated in 
the creation of this thesis, which attempts to shed light on the mechanisms of human 




Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
This chapter will provide definitions and theories that are relevant for the 
contextualization of the following chapters. The first section provides a definition of 
culture, explains how cultural diversity is understood within the thesis, and introduces the 
idea that emergence of groups is possible under social influence. The second section 
introduces agent-based models in the context of complex systems, and how different 
models from the literature and the present thesis fit into this category. The third section 
summarizes the literature on cultural diversity and cultural drift, and some mechanisms 
that have been used in the past in simulations to preserve cultural diversity against 
perturbations. The fourth section explores the role of institutions in the preservation of 
culture on a theoretical level. The fifth section contextualizes all previous sections and 
following chapters by introducing the concept of cultural resilience.  
1.1 Emergence of cultural diversity under social influence 
The ubiquity of different cultural groups around the globe has previously raised questions 
among researchers about the emergence of cultural diversity under social influence. Here, 
social influence refers to the process in which one individual transmit information to 
another individual; culture is the information that can be transmitted between individuals 
(i.e. what social influence influences); and a cultural group refers to individuals that share 
the same cultural traits (e.g. Spanish language, salsa music) in their respective cultural 
features (i.e. language, music). Depending on the context, culture may be also used 
instead of cultural group, in which case it specifically refers to the common set of traits 
(information) that a cultural group shares (and can transmit); thus, culture does not lose 
its original meaning, but it is applied to only a particular group.  Finally, cultural diversity 
refers to the number of cultural groups or cultures that exist in the system.  
It is intuitively appealing to believe that if people constantly influence each other, then 
sooner or later, everyone will end up with the same information. Indeed, the globalization 
process has been attributed to an increase in communication (Wolf, 2014). This intuition 
also finds ground in formal (mathematical) models, which have demonstrated that 
everyone should, in the long term, converge to the same opinions when all individuals are 




Abelson, 1964). But although global converge is intuitive, diversity does exist, and, to 
give an illustrative example, bipolarization of opinions such as political left wing versus 
right wing, is very common. This suggests that a mechanism of group formation is at 
work. Abelson (1964) proposed three ideas that amend the outcome of universal 
agreement in mathematical models (pp. 153).  
First, he considered that the network might indeed be disconnected. For our purposes, this 
idea can be disregarded, as in the modern world most barriers have arguably disappeared; 
indeed, studies on the phenomenon of six degrees of separation suggest we live in a 
small-world network (Gurevitch, 1961). Also, diversity does obviously emerge even in 
interconnected groups, as the case of the Maya illustrates.  
Second, Abelson suggested that an initially moderate negative persuasive effect could 
develop into disconnect due to a boomerang effect, i.e. constant feedback in each opposite 
direction until extreme states are reached (Hovland, Harvey, & Sherif, 1957; Sherif & 
Hovland, 1961). Later on, this idea was proven effective by Schelling (1969, 1971), who 
used a model in which a small “dislike” of an agent for a dissimilar neighbor led to 
bipolarization. These models helped explain the at the time predominant segregation of 
black and white people in the United States, but lacked enough dimensionality to explain 
cultural diversity.  
Finally, Abelson pointed out previous literature that suggested that social influence occurs 
generally among individuals who hold similar opinions anyhow (Coleman, 1957; 
Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950). A long list of theoretical models used the latter idea 
with partial success, for example Carley (1991) or Epstein & Axtell (1996), but it was not 
until Axelrod (1997) that a model able to generate various stable cultural groups was 
published. Axelrod’s model introduced the idea that social influence depends on the 
similarity of multiple distinctive cultural features at the same time, and that the 
alternatives of the features (i.e. cultural traits) are categorical (not continuous) and bigger 
than two (multidimensional). This mechanism is henceforth known as homophily, the 
principle that “like attracts like” (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). 
1.2 Agent-based models and complexity 
Many of the models used to explain the emergence of cultural diversity can be classified 
as agent-based models; i.e. computational models that simulate interactions between 




the emergent collective behavior associated with complex systems (Gilbert & Troitzsch, 
2005). The emergence of cultural diversity in Axelrod’s model is only one of many 
examples. Any model can be implemented as a software program in order to run 
simulations; in other words, a simulation is an instance of a model. A model usually 
comprises multiple parameters; a specific configuration of those parameters is called 
scenario. A set of simulations that belongs to exactly the same configuration of 
parameters are called repetitions, which are used to calculated averaged results when the 
model includes random variables.  
Agent-based models and simulations have proven to be a successful paradigm for 
modeling complex systems (Niazi & Hussain, 2013). A commonly accepted definition of 
what constitutes a complex system (or, even more fundamentally, complexity) has not so 
far been proposed. Johnson (2007), however, has offered a useful definition for 
complexity science, stating that it is "the study of the phenomena which emerge from a 
collection of interacting objects" (pp 3-4). Based on this definition, I propose to define a 
complex system as a collection of components that in interaction produce the emergence 
of macro-scale phenomena. And based on this, furthermore, complexity can be then 
defined as the collection of interactions between components and the underlying logic 
that is needed to explain how these interactions originate the emergence of macro-scale 
phenomena.  
One of the most interesting observations in complex systems has been that the 
interactions between the components tend to be very simple, and that the emergent 
phenomena relies on the large amount of interactions. It is therefore common to build 
networks of components to analyze and understand these interactions. All agent-based 
models indirectly depend on one of these kind of networks as communication plays a big 
role in these models. 
Although the agent-based model term appeared around the late 90s, it is possible to trace 
models back to the origin of computers with the self-replication machine, the idea of a 
machine that is able to replicate itself (Von Neumann & Burks, 1966), who used the term 
(cellular) automaton to describe this type of system (Von Neumann, 1951). One of the 
early examples that illustrate the potential of the approach is John Conway’s Game of 
Life, a cellular automaton that generates macro-behaviors out of very simple rules of 
birth, reproduction and death of organisms (Gardner, 1970). While Conway used a 




checkerboard for his segregation model with its simple sociological rules (Aydinonat, 
2006). In both these models, each cell of a two dimensional grid represent an individual, 
called agent, which makes them examples of agent-based models. Although, a two 
dimensional grid is not strictly necessary, (for an example, see Ulloa & Froese, 2016), it 
can be useful to define underlying social networks that are based on geographical 
proximity. This particular type of agent-based models has been named artificial societies 
(Epstein & Axtell, 1996), and it is the type of model used in the presented thesis. In 
particular, the models are extensions of Axelrods model (1997), as Axelrod’s work has 
been judged as the seminal model in generating cultural diversity. 
1.3 Cultural drift and the limits of culture diversity 
Certain parallelisms between biology and culture have been pointed out in the literature. 
For example, the way information travels across generations has been called cultural 
evolution, although the mechanisms used to explain cultural evolution are more akin to 
Lamarck’s ideas than Darwin’s (Boyd & Richerson, 1985; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 
1981; Richerson & Boyd, 2004).  
While the models presented in this thesis do not transcend generations, and transmission 
happens on an individual basis, among the same generation, similarities to biological 
models are still relevant, as the information flows between neighboring individuals. A 
concept such as cultural drift, which in cultural sciences is used analogously to genetic 
drift, is therefore applicable. Genetic drift is defined as the change in the frequency of a 
gene variant in a population due to random sampling of organisms (Wright, 1929), 
whereas cultural drift is the fluctuation in the frequency of cultural traits in a population 
due to random variations in the transmission of traits (Hahn & Bentley, 2003). Genetic 
drift can, for example, explain the spread of mutations across populations or, conversely, 
the disappearance of gene variants from the population (Kimura, 1968), in similar way 
that cultural drift can explain spread of innovations or the disappearance of cultural traits 
from the population. Cultural traits have been called memes in the past, as they share the 
property of self-replication with genes (Dawkins, 1976). Extending the concept of genetic 
drift analogously to culture, i.e. cultural drift is therefore not more far-fetched than 
aligning concepts such as biodiversity and cultural diversity.  
Axelrod's artificial societies model of social influence and homophily provided a 




However, it was later found to be sensitive to cultural drift, which was modeled in the 
way of mutations (also termed noise, or perturbations). Mutations are represented in the 
simulation as random changes in an agent's cultural features (Klemm, Eguíluz, Toral, & 
Miguel, 2003; Klemm, Eguíluz, Toral, & San Miguel, 2003). Klemm et al. (2003) found 
that even tiny mutation rates produced a convergence towards a monoculture without any 
diversity (globalization), while large rates produced a state of anomie. Anomie was first 
introduced by Durkheim (1951, 1982) to describe a state in which each individual is 
culturally different from all its neighbors, which he hypothesized would lead to a break of 
communication (and eventually, degradation of society). 
Ever since Axelrod’s model was shown to be unstable under drift conditions, many 
studies have addressed the robustness of the emergence of cultural diversity against 
perturbation, using a variety of approaches. Researchers have proposed a dynamic social 
network where individuals are able to adjust their ties to others (Centola, González-
Avella, Eguíluz, & Miguel, 2007), they have attempted to integrate Boyd & Richerson’s 
idea of a frequency bias (Boyd & Richerson, 1985), by making social influence 
multilateral, i.e. interactions happen between several individuals at once (Parisi, Cecconi, 
& Natale, 2003), instead of being dyadic, i.e. just between two individuals (Axelrod), and 
they have combined frequency bias and homophily in one model (Flache & Macy, 2011). 
1.4 The role of institutions  
In chapter 2, I will present a novel approach to stabilize Axelrod’s seminal model in the 
presence of noise, theoretically extending the current theory on emergence of cultural 
diversity to include another cornerstone of human interactions: the institutions that 
emerge from these interactions (Ulloa, Kacperski, & Sancho, 2016).  
The role institutions play in the social domain has been increasingly acknowledged, 
possibly due to the fact that human interaction is now understood to mostly dependent on 
explicit and implicit rules, such as the ones that are assumed to be affected by the cultural 
traits in Axelrod’s model. Based on this understanding, a novel definition of institutions 
as "systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social interactions" has 
been proposed by Hodgson (2006, p1), building on previous ideas put forth by Jack 
Knight (1992) and Alan Wells (1971, p3), who claimed that “social institutions form an 




Already at the beginning of the 19th century, institutions had been theoretically 
scrutinized and defined as a subtype of social structure that can influence individuals’ 
preferences and purpose, and potentially change them (Thorstein & Stuart, 1912; 
Commons, 1990). Ultimately, the earliest hypothesis of institutional influence that these 
ideas are based on seems to stem from the 18th century philosopher Emile Durkheim, who 
hypothesized that institutions play a large role in group formation, and who predicted 
anomie on a sociological level upon the annihilation of institutions (Durkheim, 1951, 
1982). 
Thus, while a good foundation exists to analyze institutions in terms of social interactions 
and social structures, surprisingly few theoretical foundations can be found in terms of 
impact of institutions on cultural diversity, though attempts have been made to discuss 
diversity in terms of political, religious and educational institutions (Banks, 2015; Parekh, 
2002; Reilly, 2008). Empirical research on the impact of institutions on culture and its 
underlying processes of social influence is also rare. To the best of our knowledge, just a 
few agent-based models exist, studying authoritarian regimes (institutions), integration of 
information repositories, institutional effectiveness (Bhavnani, 2003; Makowsky & 
Rubin, 2013; Suárez & Sancho, 2011) and mass media influence (Shibanai, Yasuno, & 
Ishiguro, 2001), the latter the only one to focus on cultural diversity, and some 
methodologically similarities with my institutional model introduced in Chapter 2.  
The role of institutions raises questions about another process, one which is largely driven 
by institutions: globalization (Held, 1999; Robertson, 1992). Globalization and cultural 
diversity run, in many ways, counter each other – though globalization has been claimed 
to reduce minority discrimination due to a variety of factors such as reduction of poverty, 
social unrest and economic insecurity (Vadlamannati, 2008), some have argued that 
globalization does not actually reduce discrimination; when it seems like it does, it 
instead reduces the existence of minorities by homogenizing their opinions and cultural 
expressions into those of the majority, harming the cultural diversity as in many cases of 
indigenous peoples (Azarya, 2004; Daes, 2004; Dunklin, 2005; Rothkopf, 1997; Smith & 
Ward, 2000). One particular case that will be the focus of this thesis is the fate of the 
Maya. Institutions have explicitly attempted to implement a unification through the Pan-
Maya movement. This movement has achieved its goals with only limited success, as 




1.5 Resilience of cultural diversity 
As previously discussed, cultural diversity has been extensively investigated with regards 
to its tolerance against different perturbations, such as mutations and selection error 
(Flache & Macy, 2011; Klemm, Eguíluz, Toral, & Miguel, 2003), as Axelrod’s original 
model (1997) was shown to be particularly sensitive to them. These perturbations have 
always been integrated in constant values, and in relatively small doses. 
Cultural diversity can also be tested against another force: events which occur in 
catastrophic proportions, and in a sudden manner. In this thesis, cultural resilience will 
refer to the capability of a world (in the simulation, the geographical grid) to retain its 
cultural composition after the application of a sudden, catastrophic event. Here, cultural 
composition refers to the distribution of the cultural traits among the individuals. 
Therefore, composition includes geographical location, size and content of each cultural 
group. Ultimately, cultural resilience is the main focus of this thesis; in particular, I will 
study and analyze the resilience of cultural diversity, i.e. how multiple cultural groups are 
able to endure disturbances caused by large-scale events which are capable of altering the 
information within the system in a sudden and all-encompassing manner. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 will all, in their own way, address this question. In Chapter 1, I will 
introduce an agent-based model that extends the existing frameworks of cultural diversity 
through the introduction of institutions. In Chapter 2, I will present CulSim, the cultural 
simulator, a computational framework that includes tools which allow the introduction of 
events to existing models such as Axelrod’s (1997) and Flache’s (2011) models, and the 
institutional model from Chapter 1. Events proposed can be used to target both agents or 
institutions. Finally, Chapter 3 will propose an application of the CulSim software to 
three case studies. Cultural diversity and cultural resilience will be tested in the context of 
three catastrophic events that befell the Maya: the so-called Classic Maya collapse 
(Webster, 2002), the Spanish Invasion of the Guatemalan Highlands (Lovell, 2005; 
Restall & Asselbergs, 2008) and the Guatemalan Civil War/Genocide (Historical 
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Chapter 2  
2 Institutions and Cultural Diversity: Effects of Democratic 
and Propaganda Processes on Local Convergence and 
Global Diversity 
In a connected world where people influence each other, what can cause a globalized 
monoculture, and which measures help to preserve the coexistence of cultures? Previous 
research has shown that factors such as homophily, population size, geography, mass 
media, and type of social influence play important roles. In the present paper, we 
investigate for the first time the impact that institutions have on cultural diversity. In our 
first three studies, we extend existing agent-based models and explore the effects of 
institutional influence and agent loyalty. We find that higher institutional influence 
increases cultural diversity, while individuals' loyalty to their institutions has a small, 
preserving effect. In three further studies, we test how bottom-up and top-down processes 
of institutional influence impact our model. We find that bottom-up democratic practices, 
such as referenda, tend to produce convergence towards homogeneity, while top-down 
information dissemination practices, such as propaganda, further increase diversity. In our 
last model – an integration of bottom-up and top-down processes into a feedback loop of 
information – we find that when democratic processes are rare, the effects of propaganda 
are amplified, i.e. more diversity emerges; however, when democratic processes are 
common, they are able to neutralize or reverse this propaganda effect. Importantly, our 
models allow for control over the full spectrum of diversity, so that a manipulation of our 
parameters can result in preferred levels of diversity, which will be useful for the study of 
other factors in the future. We discuss possible mechanisms behind our results, 
applications, and implications for political and social sciences. A brief introduction 
suggested here. 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 Models of culture and social influence 
In light of inherent tensions in international integration (James, 2006) and a contemporary 
trend towards cultural policy (D’Angelo, Vesperini, & Europe, 2000; McGuigan, 2004), 
factors that impact cultural globalization and the preservation of diversity have been a 
recent focus in computational modeling. The question how diversity, i.e. the co-existence 




globalization has been explored with various approaches (Abelson, 1964; Axelrod, 1997; 
Hegselmann & Krause, 2002; Macy, Kitts, Flache, & Benard, 2003; Mäs, Flache, & 
Helbing, 2010). Culture is here construed as the information which is transmitted between 
individuals in a social manner (such as music, customs, and language). The process of 
transmission is also known as social influence (Festinger, Back, & Schachter, 1950). 
Formal mathematical models of social influence illustrated that, when everyone in a 
network is connected, a global monoculture is inevitable – all cultures converge to a 
global consensus and become homogenous (Abelson, 1964; French, 1956; Harary, 1959). 
Cultural simulations, among them artificial societies (Axelrod, 1997; Epstein & Axtell, 
1996), have since then been adopted to facilitate the study of patterns of cultural 
transmission. They have enhanced our understanding of how diversity and global 
consensus emerge in societies, and how societies can fluctuate between one and the other, 
exploring these dynamics by introducing various factors to social influence to find ways 
by which diversity can be preserved.  
One example of a social process that has yielded valuable insights is homophily, the 
principle of "like attracts like": the higher the similarity between two individuals, the 
more likely they are to influence each other (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954; McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001). Schelling used this idea to show that a small "dislike" for a 
dissimilar neighbor could lead to complete segregation in an agent-based model 
(Schelling, 1969, 1971). Following this, Axelrod's seminal paper (Axelrod, 1997) 
introduced an agent-based model that integrated both, the proposed network structure of 
previous models (Abelson, 1964) and homophily (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954), but 
instead of looking at segregation by movement like Schelling (Schelling, 1971), he 
studied segregation by attitude change, in particular the question: when individuals 
change their values and opinions based on similarities with each other, do cultures 
become more alike or more diverse? 
He found that cultural diversity emerges and persists under homophily, because groups of 
agents with similar characteristics grow more similar inside each group, until the groups 
do not share any common characteristics. Once complete dissimilarity between two 
groups is reached, they no longer interact. Initial parameters, such as population size, 
neighborhood interaction size, and number of cultural features and traits, impacted the 




diversity, while an increase in neighborhood size increased cultural homogeneity 
(Axelrod, 1997; Greig, 2002).  
In recent research, mass media has been shown to increase cultural diversity when the 
mass media messages are strong enough, whereas weaker messages were more likely to 
lead to global homogeneity (González-Avella, Cosenza, Eguíluz, & Klemm, 2007; 
Shibanai, Yasuno, & Ishiguro, 2001). A change in geography, such as modelling 
mountains that minimize contact between groups of agents, increased levels of diversity 
as well (Parisi, Cecconi, & Natale, 2003). The types of interaction between agents have 
been also explored: while in Axelrod’s original model, interactions were of dyadic nature, 
i.e. individuals interacted with and influenced each other on one-on-one basis, Parisi et al 
(Parisi et al., 2003) and Flache et al (Flache & Macy, 2011) implemented multilateral 
social influence models based on Richardson et al (Boyd & Richerson, 1985), in which 
agents consider opinions of multiple neighbors around them (instead of just one), before 
changing their traits. 
Finally, Axelrod’s original idea of testing the model against random noise was 
implemented, in the form of "mutation rates" (Klemm, Eguı́luz, Toral, & Miguel, 2005; 
Parisi et al., 2003), and later, “selection error” (Flache & Macy, 2011). Klemm et al 
(Klemm, Eguíluz, Toral, & Miguel, 2003; Klemm et al., 2005) introduced various rates of 
noise into Axelrod's model finding that the model quickly destabilized and converged into 
a monoculture (without any diversity) even at very small rate of noise, while, at a larger 
rate of perturbation, it devolved into anomie, the complete cultural isolation of each 
individual from their neighbors (E. Durkheim, 1982; É. Durkheim, 1951). The “selection 
error”, which is based on the assumption of an occasional perception error of a neighbor’s 
similarity (or dissimilarity), was added to cultural drift as another level of noise, and 
produced a similar instability (Flache & Macy, 2011).  
By integrating multilateral social influence with Axelrod’s original postulation of 
homophily, Flache et al (Flache & Macy, 2011) proposed, to the best of our knowledge, 
the thus far most successful model, facilitating the emergence of cultural diversity and 
stabilizing Axelrod’s original model (Axelrod, 1997) against the two sources of noise. It 




2.1.2 Models of institutions 
Following cultural drift, limited communication, terrain effects, technology and 
broadcasting, with the present paper, we would like to introduce a novel question to 
extend Axelrod’s original model: what role do institutions play in the emergence and 
resilience of diversity? 
First analyses of institutional influence supposed that a diminishing impact of social 
institutions on values and behavior would increase individualistic tendencies and could, in 
extreme cases, lead to anomie (É. Durkheim, 1951). Since then, much research into social 
institutions has investigated their effects in terms of social networks (L. C. Freeman, 
White, & Romney, 1991; L. Freeman & White, 1993) and theory of games approaches, 
such as prisoner’s dilemma and coordination games (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Snidal, 
1985; Wagner, 1983). Very little research has looked at the impact of institutions on 
culture and its underlying processes of social influence. To our knowledge, only three 
major projects have used agent-based models in this context: (1) one study showcases 
how individuals hide their true beliefs in authoritarian regimes (institutions), and how the 
regimes are affected by this (Makowsky & Rubin, 2013);  (2) one platform exists that 
allows an integration of information repositories, and lets researchers analyze patterns of 
cultural dynamics (Suarez & Sancho, 2010), and (3) a line of research exists that 
investigates mass media influence (González-Avella et al., 2007; Shibanai et al., 2001; 
Quattrociocchi, Caldarelli, & Scala, 2014), which can be interpreted as institutional 
influence and shows several methodological similarities to ours. 
The addition of institutions to an agent-based model of cultural patterns, as we propose, 
can add insight into processes of cultural diversity emergence and resilience by for 
example analyzing the impact of varying levels of institutional influence and institutional 
loyalty on culture. Furthermore, we can analyze the way in which individuals and 
institutions interact with each other inside different political systems, for example through 
means of democratic processes (like referenda), or organized dissemination of 
information (like propaganda), and then explore how this impacts the system’s 
composition. 
In agent based models, the idea of "central authorities" has been mostly excluded from 
the methodology so far. This might be due to the assumption that they can only play the 




contrary, we would like to establish that central authorities and institutions do not denote 
the same concept. At the center of institutional research lies the exchange between human 
autonomy, i.e. the agency in human behavior; and social structure, i.e. influences derived 
by institutions in society (Bourdieu, 1977). Axelrod (1997) explicitly excludes powerful 
authorities from his model because of their absolute coordinating impact on culture 
(where an authority influences individuals’ beliefs and values, but is not in turn 
influenced in any way). An example of a previous implementation of central authority is 
the inclusion of geography, such as a mountain range (Parisi et al., 2003). It impacts 
agents’ behavior (by preventing interaction between neighborhoods of agents), but cannot 
be impacted by agents itself.  
However, authorities are not necessarily absolute. With our present work, we aim at a use 
of institutions which exert influence on individuals and govern people's behavior and are 
in turn influenced by individuals, especially in their creation (Berger & Luckmann, 2011). 
We speak of institutions in terms of information centers, i.e. mechanisms of political, 
economic or social interactions (North, 1991). They can be more formal, such as 
governments, marriage, organized religion, or informal agreements, such as 
vegetarianism or spiritual beliefs.  
In general, the space in which shared information is stored does not need to be tangible, 
but in artificial representations, there is a need to conceptualize a second level of 
information that lies beyond first level individual interaction patterns. This idea has been 
previously applied in cultural algorithms (a branch of evolutionary algorithms) in the way 
of “belief spaces” (Reynolds, 1994). Belief spaces inherit cultural knowledge; they are the 
storage of agents’ shared beliefs, and are updated as those beliefs change. At the same 
time, belief spaces have an impact on how the agents evolve alongside each other; they 
impact who interacts with who and who is influenced in what way. In agent-based 
models, this particular kind of belief space has been termed a "cultural repository" 
(Suarez & Sancho, 2010). 
In order to illustrate the relationship of these two levels of information storage, let us 
assume, for example, that Romeo interacts with Juliet, discussing the value of certain 
types of music. In Axelrod’s model (Axelrod, 1997), there is only one level: through 
homophily and social influence, Romeo can be convinced by Juliet that salsa music is 
better than hard rock, and Romeo and Juliet would then share a common "trait". In our 




belief space that represents the two different institutions that they belong to, for example 
their respective familial units, House Montague and House Capulet (Figure 1). When 
Romeo interacts with Juliet, he is not only aware of their interpersonal similarity and their 
own traits, he is also pressured by how representative his institution (i.e. his family) is of 
him, and how much influence this has on him. The level of institutional influence that 
Romeo perceives can prevent him from liking salsa music. He needs to check whether his 
family approves of salsa music, and if it does not, whether his homophily with Juliet is 
strong enough to ignore his family.  
 
Figure 1. Model of institutions, Romeo and Juliet example. "R" represents agent Romeo, "J" 
represents agent Juliet, "M" and "C" their respective houses, Montague and Capulet. Agents from 
one cultural region (e.g. yellow, blue) are connected to the institution that they belong to (also 
colored yellow and blue). 
If Romeo does change his trait, because he likes Juliet better than his family, he can then 
also choose to change his institution, i.e. see if becoming a Capulet will suit him better 
than being a Montague, as Juliet’s family, the Capulets, might be more representative of 
who he is than his own family. This choice will depend on Romeo's loyalty towards his 
family, i.e. how willing he is to give up his family name and connections. 
The different levels of institutional influence and agent loyalty can be exemplified by 
different types of institutions. For example, there are institutions that promote strong 
identification and exert a lot of influence, such as families or nationalities, or those that 
do less so, such the school one went to, or the TV channels one watches. Individuals can 
feel varying levels of loyalty to their institutions as well, for example when someone is 
part of a political party because it has always been this way in their family 





With all these considerations in mind, we would like to propose our initial research 
questions: How is the diversity of a system impacted by varying amounts of influence that 
institutions exert on individuals? How is the system impacted by varying amounts of 
loyalty that institutions demand from their followers? And how does the inclusion of 
institutional influence and agent loyalty to an agent-based cultural dissemination model 
compare with results obtained by Axelrod (Axelrod, 1997) and Flache et al (Flache & 
Macy, 2011)? 
2.1.3 Referendum and propaganda 
Our previous research questions look at the impact of various levels of influence and 
loyalty on cultural diversity in a way in which institutions only prevent possible cultural 
changes (the influence is indirect). An additional focus of our work are the two directions 
in which social influence can function between low level interactions (individuals) and 
high level interactions (institutions) (Berger & Luckmann, 2011; Bourdieu, 1977), and 
how this impacts cultural dissemination; on one hand, influence can be exerted in a 
bottom-up trend, on the other hand, it can be exercised in a top-down manner. Thus, 
conceptually, the processes of institutional influence we propose can be understood as a 
feedback loop of information.  
These two forms of direct influence have found translation into forms of governance 
employed in political systems. Common bottom-up influences upon institutions are 
voting, and mechanisms of direct democracy such as referenda or plebiscites (Kollman, 
Miller, & Page, 1998), while a common form of top-down influence by institutions is the 
use of information dissemination, such as campaign advertising or propaganda (Jowett & 
O’Donnell, 2014). Some previous agent-based models have looked at the impact of a 
feedback loop of influence on cultural diversity and have related this procedure to mass 
media coverage on a global population level (Shibanai et al., 2001) or differentiated by 
predetermined local neighborhoods (González-Avella et al., 2007). However, those 
models do not differentiate between top-down and bottom-up processes, and they lack a 
validation against noise levels, which have been shown to greatly impact system stability 
(Klemm et al., 2005).   
By reason of this, we would like to propose another line of investigation, subdivided into 
three specific research questions. We will first individually explore a bottom-up process, 




the execution of referenda, and see how this process impacts the composition of 
institutions, their influence, and therefore, the emergence and persistence of diversity 
within the system. Then we will explore a top-down process in the same manner, in 
which individuals adapt their traits due to institutional pressures, similar to the 
employment of propaganda. Lastly, we will combine the two in one system to show the 
effects of the feedback loop of social influence. We will also see how a variety of 
frequencies of occurrence of these processes affect system stability under noise. 
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1 Agent-based models 
Agent based models are a popular tool for empirical testing of realistic concepts in 
complex systems. Initial models were common in economy and biology (Föllmer, 1974; 
Gardner, 1970; Wolfram, 1983) and have since then permeated many knowledge fields 
ranging from psychology to physics. In the social sciences, Epstein & Axtell popularized 
their use with their sugarspace model (Epstein & Axtell, 1996).   
Models commonly include a two-dimensional grid, which serves as the “world”. It is 
inhabited by agents, which can be interpreted as individuals, tribes or villages/towns. 
How agents interact with each other and their world environment is based on the rules of 
any given model. This type of abstraction allows a representation of a variety of patterns 
and ideas, such as cultural patterns, while not applying it to any specific, named culture.  
In our model, we follow and expand the arrangement of Axelrod’s original converging 
diversity model (Axelrod, 1997) with the following units: 
1. Individual agents: Each individual agent is an autonomous entity that holds a 
certain amount of information, its culture. In the simulation, this culture is 
represented by a string of features, such as for example music, cuisine, language, 
etc. Each agent exhibits a preference on each feature, which is called a trait; an 
agent might like salsa music, Mexican food and Spanish language. In simulations, 
these traits are represented by integer values. Based on Flache et al (Flache & 
Macy, 2011), we used 5 features and 15 possible traits per feature. An agent a can 
be represented as follows: [2, 4, 12, 9, 14], in which af  refers to the trait on feature 




2. Institutional repositories: Each institution is a second layer "agent" that represents 
a belief space. It is denoted by a string of features and their trait exhibits are based 
on integer values, exactly as individual agents. However, unlike individual agents, 
institutions are not attached to a grid and they also can have empty features 
(features without an assigned trait), internally represented with -1. An agent a can 
only belong to one institution at a time, denoted ia, and it follows that iaf will 
represent the trait for feature f of a's institution. Every individual agent is initially 
associated with an institution with all empty features. The agent can then, in 
interaction and agreement with another agent, overwrite one feature. An agent can 
also switch their institutional association to be associated with a different 
institution instead.  
3. Grid environment: Agents are arranged on a two-dimensional lattice. We follow 
Flache et al (Flache & Macy, 2011) in selecting three varying sizes for the lattice, 
10x10, 32x32, and 100x100, making up world populations of 100, 1024 and 
10000 agents. Although human populations are generally much bigger, 10000 
agents can be a representation of a town, or, according to Axelrod (1997), each 
agent can be representative of one village. By studying different sizes, we can 
observe whether our patterns will stay consistent across various population sizes 
(bigger populations than 10000 agents were difficult to study due to high 
computational demands). Neighborhoods are defined as the areas within which 
agents can interact. We define a Von Neumann neighborhood within a distance of 
6, meaning each agent can interact with a maximum of 84 agents (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Two possible von Neumann neighborhoods with distance 6. Two example 
neighborhoods on a 15x15 grid. Left: central agent (dark blue) with 84 neighboring agents (light 
blue) that it can interact with. Right: border agent (dark blue) with 27 neighboring agents (light 
blue). 
The environment is represented as a non-toroidal world, so agents have fewer 




trait combination on all their features and are located next to each other in the grid 
are considered to be of the same culture. All agents that belong to the same culture 
determine a "cultural region". Diversity is defined as at least two existing trait 
variations, e.g. cultural regions, existing at the same time. Anomie indicates that 
there are as many cultural regions as there are agents; conversely, complete 
globalization denotes that there is only one cultural region. 
4. Rules: The model integrates dynamical rules which allow agents to interact based 
on probabilities associated to cultural similarity. Cultural similarity is the number 
of cultural traits that are equivalent on two vectors of agents or institutions.  
There are three types of probabilities working in the model: (1) agent similarity, which is 
the similarity between two agents (i.e. homophily); (2) internal institutional similarity, 
which exists between an agent and its own institution, and (3) external institution 
similarity, which exists between an agent and the institution of a neighbor.  
Institutions impact agent interactions based on these cultural similarities, and based on 
two factors: institutional influence and agent loyalty. Agents impact institutions when 
they create institutions, or when they join an existing institution and the institution’s 
"active feature" is empty.  An "active feature" denotes the one particular feature that is 
being discussed when two agents interact. 
Table 1 presents an overview over the most important rules that we are including in our 
simulations, and the combinations in which they were implemented in previous research. 
Table 1 Overview over previous models and their included parameters, and our model. The 
first column identifies models by author. The second to sixth column indicate different rules that 
have been tested in the different models. 








Axelrod 1997 Yes No No No No 
Klemm 2003 Yes Yes No No No 
Flache 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Ours Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Firstly, Axelrod's original model (Axelrod, 1997) generated cultural diversity by using 
homophily to regulate dyadic social influence. Secondly, Klemm et al (Klemm et al., 
2003) showed that various rates of mutations destabilize Axelrod's cultural diversity, with 




Finally, based on work by Parisi et al (2003), Flache et al (2011) introduced multilateral 
social influence to Axelrod's homophily. 
We are adopting the same conceptualization of social influence (directed by homophily) 
as Axelrod (Axelrod, 1997). Homophily of agents a and n determines whether an 
interaction occurs or not, based on the number of equivalent traits in both agents, so we 










Here, F is the total amount of features and the δ(i,j) function refers to the Krockener 
delta: 
𝛿(𝑖, 𝑗) = {
1,   𝑖 = 𝑗
0,   𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
 
(2) 
We will conceptualize noise in the same way Flache et al (Flache & Macy, 2011) did: an 
instance of mutation (Klemm et al., 2005) occurs when the trait of an agent, after a 
possible interaction, is randomly selected and set to a new feature. A mutation occurs 
with probability m. An instance of selection error (Flache & Macy, 2011) occurs after the 
initial interaction outcome has been decided based on homophily, and it reverses the 
initial decision to interact (or not). A selection error occurs with probability s. In order to 
simplify the study we will keep m = s across all the experiments, as Flache et al (Flache 
& Macy, 2011) did. 
We also decided to integrate the selection error into the homophily rule, resulting in one 
formula, which we call Perceived Homophily (PH(a,n)):  
𝑃𝐻(𝑎, 𝑛) = (1 − 𝑠)𝑆𝑖𝑚(𝑎, 𝑛) + 𝑠(1 − 𝑆𝑖𝑚(𝑎, 𝑛) 
(3) 
Our Perceived Homophily rule is equivalent to Flache et al's approach of applying 
homophily first, and selection error second (Flache & Macy, 2011).  
Finally, our response variable will be the number of cultural regions remaining after the 
final agent interaction iteration. We decided on a different response variable than Flache 
et al. (2011) due to the different outcomes that we are analyzing. Flache et al. used the 




towards a monoculture or globalization in a system, with the assumption that this measure 
does reflect diversity, without the need to explicitly state the number of cultures. We have 
chosen to examine the number of cultures, since we are interested in cultural diversity per 
se as it emerges and is preserved by manipulation of different institutional factors, so our 
measure is more fitting and expressive of our purposes. It will be normalized through 
division by the total number of agents (denoted N) in the given simulation, to best 
showcase similarities across different population sizes. 
𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 =  




For a comparison of the two response variables in question and how they affect our 
results, please refer to Appendix 1. 
2.2.2 Baseline: Models of institutional influence and loyalty 
The main purpose of our investigation of institutions is their impact on cultural patterns 
reflected in Axelrod’s model of dyadic social influence. For our baseline model we 
integrate institutional influence into our combination of dyadic social influence with 
homophily (Axelrod, 1997), mutation (Klemm et al., 2003, 2005), and selection error 
(Flache & Macy, 2011). For this intent, we use the institutional influence function 
(Inf(a,n)):  
𝐼𝑛𝑓(𝑎, 𝑛) =
𝛼 ∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑚(𝑎, 𝑖𝑎)
(1 − 𝛼) ∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑚(𝑎, 𝑛) +  𝛼 ∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑚(𝑎, 𝑖𝑎)
 , where 𝛼 𝜖 [0,1] 
(5) 
Institutional influence is exerted as a combination of agent similarity, (Sim(a,n)) and 
institutional similarity Sim(a,ia). We define institutional similarity in the same way as the 
original homophily formula of similarity. As the formula expresses, the probability of 
trait change decreases as the agent’s similarity to its own institution increases. Moreover, 
the alpha parameter (α) controls the amount of institutional influence. This same value is 
applied to all the agents in the simulation. The bigger the α, the more importance agents 
give to their institutions, and therefore the less likely it is that a trait change will occur. 
Institutional influence, Inf(a,n), is applied only when there is an institutional conflict, i.e. 
a situation in which the agent a currently holds the same trait as its own institution, ia, but 
the "active trait" (i.e. the agent’s to-be-adopted trait by social influence) is different from 
the trait that the institution ia holds. The agent is "being tempted" into dissimilarity from 




In the case where there is no institutional conflict, the formula for Perceived Homophily 
PH(a,n) is used instead, and no institutional influence is exerted.  
Because of constant interactions with neighbors, an agent’s cultural vector can turn out to 
be more similar to its neighbor’s institution than its own. In this case, after the interaction 
with its neighbor, the agent checks if a change of institutions is favourable. We determine 
whether an agent a will remain loyal to its own institution ia when confronted with the 
institution ia of the neighbor n by applying the agent loyalty function Loy(a,n):  
𝐿𝑜𝑦(𝑎, 𝑛) =
𝛼′ ∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑚(𝑎, 𝑖𝑎)
(1 − 𝛼′) ∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑚(𝑎, 𝑖𝑛) +  𝛼′ ∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑚(𝑎, 𝑖𝑎)
 , where 𝛼′ 𝜖 [0,1] 
(6) 
The α' parameter controls the agent's loyalty to its current institution and applies 
identically to all agents: the higher the α' parameter, the higher the agent's loyalty towards 
its original institution, and the less likely an institutional change. We introduce the 
agent’s similarity to the neighbor’s institution, Sim(a, in),  into the denominator's 
function, so that the probability of institutional change increases as the agent’s similarity 
to its neighbor’s institution increases. 
2.2.3 Extensions: Models of referenda and propaganda 
After investigating the stability and diversity values of our baseline model, we will 
investigate the influence processes between agents and institutions in two ways.  
The first extension is a bottom-up process that resembles a democratic process, e.g. a 
referendum. Agents can influence their institutions with the intention of aligning the 
institution towards the agents' traits. When many individuals in a population manifest 
disagreement with their institution’s current stance on a particular issue, they can force 
the institution to change towards the popular opinion. In our model, we adopt this 
extension by selecting one institutional trait that is the least popular among the given 
population at the time; then we allow agents to “vote” to change it to that trait which the 
majority approves. We can control the prevalence of democracy by specifying the number 
(X) of interaction opportunities that each agent has with another agent before they are 
allowed to act together in a voting process. This is called the frequency of democracy, fd, 
and it is the reciprocal of X, i.e. 1/X.   
The second extension is a top-down process that resembles a propaganda campaign of an 




more of the agents' traits towards itself. In our model, we adopt this extension by allowing 
the institution to try and push its traits onto each of its affiliated agents. Whether an agent 
allows the propaganda to change its trait depends on how similar this agent a already is to 
its own institution, i.e. Sim(a, ia). We control the prevalence of propaganda the same way 
we did for democracy, i.e. by a certain number (Y) of interaction opportunities between 
agents, and define the frequency of propaganda, fp, as the reciprocal of Y, i.e. 1/Y. 
We will also combine the two extensions in our last model to analyze the results of a 
combination of both bottom-up and top-down processes together, in the form of a 
feedback loop of institutional influence. 
We summarize all formal rules which we are adopting for our six model variations 
inTable 2. Rules are constructed based on Axelrod's model (A), to which we add our 
baseline (B, institutional influence and agent loyalty), and which we then extend by 
adding a democratic process (D, e.g. a referendum), or a propaganda process (P, e.g. 
advertisement campaigns), or both combined.   
Table 2. Formal rules of presented models. The first column indicates the rules inherent in each 
step of a given model. The second to fifth column indicate the model to which they apply (A: 
Axelrod, B: Our Baseline, D: Democracy extension, P: Propaganda extension). The star symbol 
(*) indicates a specific value of a variable. 
Step A B D P 
1. At random, pick one agent a and one of its neighbors n from a’s possible 
neighbors, as defined by a radius r 
X X X X 
2. Randomly select a feature f* (of those features that have differing traits of a 
and n). Then, select t* = nf*  
X X X X 
3. (Institutional conflict) If the current trait of the agent's institution iaf* (1) is 
not undefined (iaf* ≠ -1), and (2) it is equal to the agent's existing trait af* (i.e. 
iaf* = af*), and (3) if the institution's trait iaf* is different to the to-be-adopted 
trait t* (iaf* = t*),  then 
 X X X 
 3.1. (Perceived Homophily + Institutional Influence) Agent a accepts the trait 
t* for f* with a probability of trait change Ptc equal to Inf(a, n) 
 X X X 
 3.2. (Agent loyalty) If agent a accepts the trait t*, then a changes its 
institution to in  with a probability of institutional change Pic equal to Loy(a, n)  
 X X X 
 3.3. If the agent a changes its institution to in, and if in does not yet have a 
trait on the selected feature f*, then assign t* to inf. 
 X X X 
4. (Perceived Homophily) If the conditions in the previous step were not met 
or for a model without institutions; then the agent a accepts the trait t* with a 
probability of trait change Ptc equal to PH(a, n) 
X X X X 
5. (Mutation) With probability m, randomly change one of the features of 
agent a to randomly selected trait 
X X X X 
6 (Democracy) After fd × N (N is the population size) repetitions of steps 1 to 
5, initiate a Democratic process. For each institution i: 
  X  




 6.2 All agents in D cast a vote containing their current trait for each of their 
features. A voting matrix V, is generated, where Vft corresponds to the number 
of votes that trait t received for feature f, i.e. Vft =  Σd∈ D  δ(df, t) 
  X  
 6.3 A matrix W is defined by Wft = Vft - Vfc, where c is the current trait for the 
feature f of the institution i. This matrix holds the differences on popularity 
(votes) between the current traits of the institution and their alternatives. 
  X  
 6.4 Create a subset FT of pairs (f, t) in which Wft is maximal in D and bigger 
than zero. This subset contains the traits that comprise the biggest differences 
between each institution and its agents. 
  X  
 6.5 Randomly select a pair (f*,t*) from FT and replace if with t*   X  
7. (Propaganda) After fp × N (N is the population size) repetitions of steps 1 to 
5, initiate a Propaganda process. For each institution i: 
   X 
 7.1. A subset P containing all the agents belonging to i is created. For each 
agent a in P: 
   X 
  7.1.1 Calculate the similarity between agent a and i, and set this as the 
probability of trait change, i.e. Ptc = Sim(a, i) 
   X 
  7.1.2. For each feature f, change af = if with probability of trait change Ptc     X 
2.2.4 Experimental Design 
We are exploring the effects of institutional influence and agent loyalty, and comparing 
some results with Axelrod and Flache et al by replicating their models with our code. We 
are also integrating democratic processes, propaganda processes, or both together into 
simulations. We are therefore presenting the results of six different experiments, called 
experiments A to F. For all six experiments, we hold certain factors constant. Results are 
presented across the three chosen population sizes (10x10, 32x32, 100x100), and for six 
chosen levels of noise (10-n, where e n ∈ {6,5,4,3,2,1}). Agents hold 5 features (F), 15 
traits (T), and between 27 and 84 neighbors (depending on their position on the grid and a 
Von Neumann neighborhood of 6). All these values were chosen based on Flache et al 
(Flache & Macy, 2011). The number of agent interaction iterations is set at 100000 
possible interactions on average per agent, which has previously been shown to be the 
number at which a population can be expected to have converged to a stochastically 
stable state (Axelrod, 1997). Please find results that validate an equilibrium state after 
100000 interactions for our model in Appendix 5. Since each simulation is non 
deterministic (e.g. agent traits, social and institutional influences depend on probabilities), 
every run can, and often does, produce different results even when undergoing the exact 
same treatment (i.e. when we run the simulation with the same combination of factors 
levels). Therefore, we repeat each treatment 50 times, and our response variable is the 
average of the 50 results, with each result being one normalized number of cultural 




For an overview over the contrasting factors for experiments A to F, please refer to Table 
3.  For the sake of readability, unless explicitly specified by the formula (Inf(a,n)), 
institutional influence will from now on be referred to as the alpha parameter (α) and 
agent loyalty, (Loy(a,n)), as the alpha prime parameter (α'). Notation to identify specific 
models will be population/α/α', for example 10x10/0.8/0.95 for the smallest population 
with institutional influence of 0.8 and agent loyalty set at 0.95. 
Table 3. Contrasting factors for experiments A to F. The first row identifies the letters 
assigned to each of our experiments (A to F), the second row is a brief description of the models. 
The first column identifies all the factors involved in each experiment. Remaining columns 
display the values that were chosen in the respective models. 
 A B C D E F 



















































N/A N/A N/A N/A 1/1, 1/3, 1/5 1/1, 1/3, 1/5 
For the first three experiments, A, B and C, we are exploring the effects of varying values 
of institutional influence and agent loyalty on cultural diversity: for experiment A, we 
manipulate institutional influence α, from 0.5 to 1.0 to test its impact on cultural diversity, 
while holding agent loyalty, α', constant at 0.5. Experiment B replicates Axelrod's model 
(Axelrod, 1997) and Flache's model (Flache & Macy, 2011) to directly compare their 
results with the values that achieved the most similar results to Flache et al in experiment 
A, i.e. α = 0.8 and α = 0.9. 
For experiment C, we are manipulating agent loyalty by applying extreme values of 0.05 
and 0.95, and comparing this to the 0.5 baseline value from experiments A and B.  We 
also select three different α values for the three given populations: 0.85 for 10x10, 0.8 for 
32x32, and 0.75 for 100x100. We do this in order to showcase that the subsequent results 
are not dependent on one particular value of influence, and because they provide some 
variance in initial cultural diversity (higher for smaller populations, and lower for bigger 




moderate rate is valuable in our study of others factors; if the institutional influence 
chosen induces too much diversity to start with, we might not be able to see whether 
loyalty values increase diversity as well.  
Experiments D and E manipulate the frequency of democratic and of propaganda 
processes by changing the number of interaction opportunities that each agent has with 
another agent; for democracy, these values are set at 1/10,1/100,and 1/1000, for 
propaganda  at 1/1,1/3 and 1/5.  
Experiment F combines democracy (at frequency 1/10,1/100 and 1/1000) and propaganda 
(at frequency 1/1,1/3,and 1/5) with their above described frequencies, and investigates the 
interaction of both. 
2.3 Results 
The following section is subdivided into two parts: we will first explore and discuss the 
effects of our two main model parameters, institutional influence and agent loyalty, on 
diversity, and compare them against results obtained in two previous models, i.e. 
Axelrod's and Flache's, in experiments A to C. We will then in the second section provide 
the results of our democratic model, of our propaganda model, and the integration of both 
democracy and propaganda in one model, i.e. experiments D to F, and discuss the 
implications inherent in those extensions.  
2.3.1 Results: Experiment A to C 
2.3.1.1 Experiment A: Institutional influence 
In our first experiment, we manipulated institutional influence while holding agent loyalty 
constant (α' = 0.5). We explored all institutional influences from 0 to 1.0, but we found 
no relevant results for values for α < 0.7. For those values, the model was highly sensitive 
to low levels of noise, and, for populations of 10x10 and 32x32, we found very small 
differences in cultural diversity, even in a configuration with almost no noise. 
In Figure 3 we present values for which we found relevant results of institutional 
influence, i.e. α = 0.5, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9 and 0.95, and we show how they affect our three 





Figure 3. Cultural diversity for varying levels of institutional influence. X-axis displays levels 
of noise; Y-axis displays normalized cultural diversity. Each line symbol denotes one α of 
institutional influence. 95% confidence intervals are displayed only when exceeding the size of 
the line symbol. Data points are averages of 50 repetitions per territory with 100,000 iterations per 
agent. 
 Based on the graphic representation of our results, we can identify that cultural diversity 
varies greatly depending on institutional influence, in particular when levels of noise are 
very low (<= 0.001). In this range of noise, we found that the more institutional influence 
was exerted, the more diversity was found across the entire population. While for low 
noise (<= 0.01), high values of alpha (α >= 0.7) did still sustain diversity, we observed 
that under the highest level of noise (0.1), only higher values of alpha (α >= 0.8) were 
able to sustain diversity. Lower values of noise (<= 0.7) induced a state of anomie.   
These results are similar for all three population sizes, and similarity increase with an 
increasing α value. We found no significant effect that would suggest differences based 
on population size, with F(2, 882) = 0.17, p = 0.85, when we input all population sizes 
and noises as factors in an ANOVA and calculated differences for α = 0.95.When we 
compared 32x32/>=0.7/0.5 and 100x100/>=0.7/0.5 in an ANOVA (with noise <= 0.01), 
we also found no significance effect between them, with F(1, 1960) = 1.41, p = 0.23. For 
further details on the performed ANOVA calculations, please refer to Appendix 1. 
Since we normalized the number of cultural regions by population, a proportional 
diversity by population means that calculated by absolute values, on average, the bigger 
the given population, the more cultural regions remain after the last interaction. 
Consequently, on average, reported normalized cultural regions tend to be of the same 




models at the lowest level of noise (0.000001). Especially for the higher alphas (α >= 
0.8), a linear relationship is visible, as we perceived an increase of cultural regions by a 
factor of 10, in linear relation with the increase of the population size by a factor of 10. 
Table 4. Number of cultures and institutions (cultures / institutions) per population size over 
alpha values 0.5 to 0.95. Averages of 50 repetitions, after 100000 iterations per agent, with noise 
level at 0.000001. 
 100 (10x10)  1024 (32x32) 10000 (100x100) 
0.5   1.14 / 10.9     1.02 / 48.00 1219.46 / 102.98 
0.7   4.98 /  7.94 106.12 / 76.98 1073.12 / 691.68 
0.8 17.32 /  8.28 139.88 / 55.50 1210.38 / 462.92 
0.9 30.38 /  6.92 212.98 / 31.58 1944.98 / 243.5 
0.95 34.82 /  6.32 367.28 / 41.98 3647.70 / 370.98 
Table 4 also displays the total number of institutions and its similar linear relationship 
with population size. For all data, there was a strong positive correlation between the 
population and the number of institutions, r = 0.53, p < 0.0001. This correlation increased 
for higher alphas, e.g. for α  >= 0.9, r = 0.84, p < 0.0001. At this point (α >= 0.9), there 
was a very strong positive correlation between the number of cultures and the number of 
institutions, r = 0.93, p < 0.0001. We can observe in Table 3 that for most data points, 
more cultures than institutions exist, with the only exceptions at lower alphas (i.e. at 
32x32/0.5/0.5, and at 10x10/0.7/0.5). 
2.3.1.2 Experiment B: Replication of Axelrod's and Flache's models  
In order to compare the results of our first experiment with other models, we replicated 
Axelrod's (Axelrod, 1997) and Flache's models - experiments 1 and 3, p.978 & p.984 in 
Flache & Macy (2011); using an implementation with our own code. For a detailed 
comparison of the implementations, please see Appendix 6, in which we also include 
graphs for all our results with the response variable Smax/N, i.e. normalized size of largest 
region, as used by Flache et al (2011). 
Qualitatively, the replications exhibited an equivalent behavior to the originals, especially 
regarding stability against noise. Statistically, we do not find a significant difference 
between the model implementations of Axelrod's model, with F(1, 1176) = 0.007, p = 
0.935. However, we find a significant difference between the model implementations of 
Flache's model, with F(1, 1176) = 80.491, p < 0.0001, as our code resulted in slightly 
higher levels of diversity in our implementation of Flache's model, compared to their 




From experiment A, we chose institutional influence α = 0.8 and 0.9 f or the graphs 
presented in Figure 4, and compared them with our implementation of Axelrod's and 
Flache's models at various levels of noise, with our values otherwise equivalent to Figure 
3. 
 
Figure 4. Cultural diversity for different models (Axelrod's, Flache's, and ours). X-axis 
displays levels of noise; Y-axis displays normalized cultural diversity. Each colored line symbol 
denotes one of three models, i.e. Axelrod's (continuous red), Flache's (continuous blue), ours with 
α = 0.9 and α' = 0.5 (dotted black) and ours with α = 0.8 and α' = 0.5 (dotted gray). 95% 
confidence intervals are displayed only when exceeding the size of the line symbol. Data points 
are averages of 50 repetitions per territory with 100,000 iterations per agent. 
Consistent with previous research (Flache & Macy, 2011; Klemm et al., 2003, 2005), in 
our replication, Axelrod's model was highly sensitive to noise (and the threshold where 
monoculture turns to anomie decreased for bigger populations), while Flache's did not 
display this high sensitivity to noise, just as in the original research (Flache & Macy, 
2011). Our model exhibited a similar robustness at higher studied levels of institutional 
influence, α >= 0.8 (except in model 100x100/0.8/0.5 and noise level at 0.1).  
In terms of the number of cultural regions, while for α <= 0.8, our diversity generally fell 
below the levels researched by Flache's model, at a high institutional influence α >= 0.9, 
our model was able to sustain more diversity than Flache's across all levels of noise and 
population sizes, as is evident from Figure 4. 
2.3.1.3 Experiment C: Agent loyalty 
For experiment C, we chose three different values of institutional influence: α = 0.85 for 




results obtained by manipulation of agent loyalty (α') in addition to the just mentioned α 
values that we chose as institutional influence.  
Unlike in the previous figures, a visual analysis of the graphs does not provide a clear 
overview over the effects, however, a statistical analysis yields some information: across 
all populations, low values of loyalty (α' = 0.05) (compared to the baseline (α' = 0.5)) did 
significantly reduce the level of diversity, F(1, 1764) = 32.57, p < 0.0001. This is 
particularly visible in Figure 5 for the medium and large populations and noise <= 
0.0001. An analysis of high values of loyalty (α' = 0.95) produced an effect in the other 
direction, i.e. an increase of diversity, however, we only found significate differences for 
32x32/0.8 and noise <= 0.01, F(1, 490) = 12.31, p = 0.00049; and for 100x100/0.75, F(1, 
588) = 109.87, p < 0.0001. In general, effects were stronger for bigger populations and 
lower institutional influences. Detailed explanations of the calculated F-values and 
significance levels can be found in Appendix 2. 
 
Figure 5. Cultural diversity for different levels of agent loyalty. X-axis displays levels of 
noise; Y-axis displays normalized cultural diversity. Each line symbol denotes one alpha prime of 
agent loyalty. 95% confidence intervals are displayed only when exceeding the size of the line 
symbol. Data points are averages of 50 repetitions per territory with 100,000 iterations per agent. 
2.3.1.4 Discussion: Experiments A to C 
The first three experiments extend on previous institutional research [26-36] by directly 
modelling the effects of institutions on social influence processes and diversity. Our 
primary findings establish that institutional influence is successful in preserving cultural 
diversity by allowing multiple cultural regions to exist simultaneously in a stable system. 
Agents' loyalty to their institutions did play a small role in the preservation of diversity; 




favorably with previous results obtained by Axelrod (1997) and Flache et al. (2011) in 
terms of stability and diversity.  
Extending on the main result obtained in experiment A, we found that various amounts of 
institutional influence (α >= 0.7) impact the extent of diversity that can be obtained and 
can be used to control the number of cultural regions that will emerge. It is important to 
consider the implications of the values that are presented in our model: an institutional 
influence α < 0.5 reflects that agents are giving more importance to their neighbor's 
opinion than to that of their institution. Probabilistically speaking, if an institutional 
influence value of α < 0.5 privileges the neighbor's influence, it is unsurprising that our 
results converge towards results obtained in Axelrod's original model, in which the 
neighbor's influence (regulated by homophily) is the only factor that matters. Notice that 
our model with α = 0 implies removing homophily from Axelrod's model, a scenario 
where the neighbor's influence is extreme. Thus, values around α = 0.7 are not in reality 
as high as they might first appear. 
We found adequate and stable results for values of α between 0.7 and 0.95, and 
experiment B clarifies that our model with high levels of institutional influence (α >= 0.9) 
was able to sustain even more diversity than Flache's model of multilateral social 
influence (Flache, 2011), which, to our knowledge, had yielded the best results so far in 
terms of diversity and stability. Additionally, for high levels of institutional influence, our 
model proved to be resilient when tested against the same levels of noise as Flache's 
model. 
We did not find any strong effects in experiment C, when analysing the impact on agent 
loyalty, although a small impact on preserving diversity was established. The main 
obstacle in this case seems to be that α' is applied as a factor only in a very limited 
number of occasions, as it heavily depends on the initial institutional influence, i.e. the 
institution has to allow a trait change in the first place before an agent gets to decide 
whether they will switch to another institution (see Rule 3.1 and Rule 3.2 in Table 2), thus 
reducing the probability of institutional change. We found that the model in which we 
used the lowest alpha (100x100/0.75/0.5 in experiment C) showed the strongest effect of 
agent loyalty, which provides some empirical support for this post-hoc hypothesis. The 
alternative hypothesis, i.e. that the size of the population is the explanatory factor, is not 




in any of the simulations. However, experiments that specifically address this hypothesis 
will be necessary to expand on our findings. 
We found that, in our models, the normalized number of cultural regions was proportional 
to the population (when α/α' is held constant) which suggests that our results are scalable, 
i.e. the results hold regardless the population size. Consequently, there is a linear trend for 
the absolute number of cultural regions , where the bigger the population, the more 
cultures emerge. This implies that the size of the cultural regions (i.e. number of agents 
per cultural region on average) is similar across populations, but changes for each model 
through the given α and α' values. Thus, an alternative interpretation of our results is that 
the addition of strong institutions to the simulation impacted the size, not the number, of 
the cultural regions that emerged in the system. Our model here replicates the reversal 
behaviour of Axelrod's previous finding (that number of cultures decreases with 
increasing population size (p219, Axelrod, 1997), which had previously also been 
addressed and discussed by Flache et al (p9842011). 
Lastly, our results in Table 4 show that, generally speaking, more cultures than 
institutions emerged in our models. This means that even under the influence of one 
institution, multiple agents can all belong to different cultures and those cultures can 
survive. In other words, an institution can allow the simultaneous existence of several 
cultures. This result is consistent with Shibanai et al (Shibanai et al., 2001), in which 
mass media, as a globally acting entity, was also found to promote the emergence of 
cultural diversity. 
So far, our models support the idea that institutional influence can be used to control 
cultural diversity. In the following experiments D to F, we will now extend our study of 
institutions to include two mechanisms of influence used by and on institutions: 
democracy and propaganda.  
2.3.2 Section 2: Experiments D to F 
In this second set of experiments, we show how two directions of institutional influence 
affect the system: bottom-up (democracy) and top-down (propaganda). We explore how 
they impact cultural regions and institution numbers when we apply the influence-loyalty 





2.3.2.1 Experiment D: Rare and frequent democratic processes 
In our democratic model, we manipulated the frequency at which democratic processes 
(referenda) occur in a system. We defined a unit of time as equivalent to the number of 
iterations necessary to have one iteration on average per agent, i.e. a unit of time is 
equivalent to 100 iterations in 10x10; 1024 in 32x32; and 10000 in 100x100. Then, a 
period is the duration of time between events. For example, a period of 10, i.e. a 
frequency of 1/10, means that the referenda occur after an average of 10 iterations per 
agent. We have set the frequency in exponential decrements of 1/10 (high democracy), 
1/100 (moderate democracy)  and 1/1000 (low democracy), in order to study a broad 
spectrum of possible values.  
As can be seen in Figure 6, in a model where democratic processes are allowed, cultural 
diversity was sustained, but it was strongly reduced compared to the previous baseline of 
diversity that we achieved in experiment A. This was the case at all three frequencies of 
democracy and all population sizes. Additionally, for the 10x10 population, the lower the 
democracy, the higher the diversity, when noise <= 0.01, with F(2, 735) = 48.806, p < 
0.0001. For populations >= 32x32 this effect was non-monotonous. The lowest amount of 
diversity was reached by allowing moderate democracy (1/100). The difference was 
significant when compared to low democracy (1/1000) when noise <= 0.01, with F(1, 
980) = 259.595, p < 0.0001, as well as compared to high democracy (1/10), with F(1,980) 
= 181.324, p < 0.0001 when noise <= 0.01. We present the results with noise <= 0.01 to 
avoid the extreme effect with noise = 0.1 observed in the figure, although that effect is 
consistent with our results. For further details on the performed ANOVA calculations, 





Figure 6. Cultural diversity for different frequencies of democracy. X-axis displays levels of 
noise; Y-axis displays normalized cultural diversity. Each colored line symbol denotes one 
frequency of democracy, from low (light blue) to high (dark blue). 95% confidence intervals are 
displayed only when exceeding the size of the line symbol. Data points are averages of 50 
repetitions per territory with 100,000 iterations per agent. 
With regards to robustness, the system with added democracy turned somewhat unstable 
from a noise level of 0.01 onwards; at noise equals to 0.1, a state of anomie was reached 
for low democracy in 100x100, for medium democracy in 32x32 and 100x100, and for 
high democracy in all population sizes. Thus, an exploration of even more frequent 
democratic processes was deemed unnecessary; the results indicated that higher levels of 
democracy would only further destabilize our model against noise. 
2.3.2.2 Experiment E: Rare and frequent propaganda processes 
Just as with democracy in experiment D, in our model with propaganda, we manipulated 
the frequency at which propaganda processes occur in a system. When one looks at the 
occurrence of these two political tools, one finds that referenda are, in reality, rare 
(Serdült & Welp, 2012, p.76), whereas instances of propaganda are quite common and 
frequently encountered (The Propaganda Society, 2011), so this time, we used higher 
frequencies of 1/1, 1/3 and 1/5. When we attempted rarer frequencies of propaganda in an 
earlier exploratory analysis, aligned with our predictions, once propaganda becomes too 
rare, effects become indiscernible. 
As can be seen in Figure 7, our model with propaganda generated many co-existing 
cultural regions, i.e. in general, more propaganda led to more diversity. The only 




noise, it was the rarer level of propaganda (1/5) which yielded more diversity than the 
moderate level (1/3). 
 
Figure 7. Cultural diversity for different frequencies of propaganda. X-axis displays levels of 
noise; Y-axis displays normalized cultural diversity. Each line symbol denotes one frequency of 
propaganda, from low (light red) to high (dark red). 95% confidence intervals are displayed only 
when exceeding the size of the line symbol. Data points are averages of 50 repetitions per 
territory with 100,000 iterations per agent. 
In terms of resilience against noise, propaganda was able to stabilize the system even at 
the highest levels of noise (0.1). However, we found noticeable variations of diversity for 
the chosen frequencies of propaganda under higher levels of noise. For example, there 
was a tendency to monoculture, i.e. diversity was reduced significantly at noise levels = 
0.01 and 0.1 and when propaganda was rare to medium frequent.  This is a clear departure 
from the behavior of our previous models, where we so far tended to observe a 
convergence to anomie, which is better substantiated theoretically (as the highest possible 
noise value (1.0) can be equated with anomie). 
2.3.2.3 Experiment F: Referendum + Propaganda 
Our final experiment explored what effects the combination of the two studied process in 
experiments D and E, democracy and propaganda, would have on the diversity in our 
system. We combined the two processes, generating a feedback loop of information that 
flows from individual to institutions (democracy) and vice versa (propaganda), so that 
institutional influence could run in both directions. This idea has been implicitly proposed 
in previous institutional research [35]. We manipulated the frequency at which both these 
processes occur in a system with the same values as we explored before, so for 




democracy, we chose to apply it at frequency levels of 1/10, 1/100 and 1/1000; in the 
following graph (Figure 8), we omitted medium democracy (1/100) for brevity and 
readability, as it did not add additional information, i.e. it followed the prevailing trend 
described below. For the graph including medium democracy, please refer to Appendix 8.  
 
Figure 8. Cultural diversity for combinations of democracy and propaganda frequencies. X-
axis displays levels of noise; Y-axis displays normalized cultural diversity. Each line symbol 
denotes one combination of democracy and propaganda. 95% confidence intervals are displayed 
only when exceeding the size of the line symbol. Data points are averages of 50 repetitions per 
territory with 100,000 iterations per agent. 
In our feedback loop of institutional influence, the main effects of propaganda and 
democracy were partly confirmed from previous experiments: high levels of democracy 
still produced less diversity than baseline values that we obtained in experiment C (black 
lines in Figure 8), and also significantly less than low democracy, similar to experiment 
D. Furthermore, when we analyzed effects of propaganda interacting only with low 
democracy, propaganda held a positive relationship with diversity, i.e. the more 
propaganda, the more cultural regions, just as was the case in experiment E. 
 The effects are more difficult to discern for common democratic processes (1/10). For 
noise levels <= 0.001, differences in diversity are small, and for noise levels >= 0.01, the 
model turns very sensitive to propaganda. The interaction of democracy and propaganda 
for noise levels <= 0.00001, however, significantly impacts diversity. In this situation, the 
way propaganda impacts diversity was reversed, i.e. a system with high propaganda and 
high democracy produced less diversity, while less propaganda in a state of high 
democracy produced more cultural regions. This effect is only marginally visible in 




with F(2, 588) = 142.552, p < 0.0001. Further details regarding our calculations can be 
found under Appendix 4. 
Finally, we would also like to present some data with regards to the numbers of 
institutions for this last experiment. Data and figures illustrating institutional numbers 
from experiments A, C, D and E can be found under Appendix 7. 
We previously indicated in Table 4 that the number of institutions is generally smaller 
than the number of cultures across all our models. As illustrated in Figure 9, in this 
combined model, both democracy and propaganda increased the number of institutions 
when compared to the baseline. Democracy had the stronger effect. These effects were 
qualitatively similar for a separate analysis of democracy (Figure C in Appendix 7), and 
propaganda (Figure D in Appendix 7), but somewhat less extreme in their individual 
applications, i.e. numbers of institutions tended to be smaller than shown here. In 
particular for high levels of democracy, the number of institutions increased such, that it 
was higher than the resulting number of cultural regions, i.e. one cultural region could be 
governed by multiple different institutions. 
 
Figure 9. Number of institutions for combinations of democracy and propaganda 
frequencies. X-axis displays levels of noise; Y-axis displays normalized numbers of institutions. 
Each line symbol denotes one combination of democracy and propaganda. 95% confidence 
intervals are displayed only when exceeding the size of the line symbol. Data points are averages 
of 50 repetitions per territory with 100,000 iterations per agent. 
2.3.2.4 Discussion: Experiments D to F 
Although the goal of democracy and propaganda is the same; i.e. to increase similarity 




impact of the two processes on cultural diversity was found to be opposite. Generally 
speaking, frequent democratic processes led to fewer, larger cultural regions (as shown in 
experiment D), while frequent propaganda led to more, smaller cultural regions (as shown 
in experiment E). Our results also reflect intuitive assumptions about these processes: 
propaganda needs to be common to succeed, so rarer frequencies did not produce any 
relevant results; referenda are rarer, and we found that the system destabilized more 
quickly when they were permitted too frequently.  
When both institutional influence processes are combined, we found that the results 
observed in experiments D and E were reinforced, except in a state of high democracy, 
where higher frequencies of propaganda induced a more homogenous state in the 
population.  
With regards to institutional numbers, we found that that they increased in the presence of 
democracy and propaganda. One possible explanation for this increase is that the 
feedback loop of institutional influence that exists in our model allows for a more 
consistent exchange of information between agents and institutions, so that the numbers 
of cultures and institutions converge more. Additionally, we found that frequent 
democratic processes increased the number of institutions even more; in fact, for models 
with high democracy we found that there were more institutions than cultures. This is the 
case when one culture is split into regions that each have its own institution, but are 
culturally identical. In this situation, a number of agents who belong to the same culture 
each subscribe to a different institution.  
It is important to highlight that by using different combinations of propaganda and 
democracy, we are able to control most of the cultural diversity spectrum. Several 
combinations prove very successful at preserving diversity without destabilizing the 
system (i.e. not resulting in extremes such as anomie or global convergence), even when 
the noise is set at its highest level. 
2.4 General Discussion 
Over the course of six experiments, we explored the effects of institutions on cultural 
diversity. We found that our model of institutional influence and agent loyalty compare 
well against previous models proposed by Axelrod (Axelrod, 1997) and Flache et al 
(Flache & Macy, 2011): high levels of institutional influence successfully promoted 




helped preserve this diversity, though it did not further increase or impact it in any 
significant way. 
The promotion of diversity can be understood if we look at the mechanism of institutional 
influence. The more an institution affects individuals' lives, the more it controls 
interactions between people, their traits and values, and how they socially influence each 
other. Strong institutions can keep people of one cultural belief system from associating 
with people from other cultures, which leads to isolation and reduces assimilation. This 
becomes particularly evident when we consider societies in which familial units play a 
very strong influencing institutional role: in cases where this is true, people are much less 
likely to interact about cultural beliefs with other "rival" families, or take on the cultural 
beliefs of strangers; instead, distrust towards the general public, political and social 
isolation and selfishness towards outgroups are found to be predominant (A. Alesina & 
Giuliano, 2013; Ermisch & Gambetta, 2010).  
Aside from simple institutional influence, the second goal of our research was to 
investigate how individuals' power to change their institutions affects the world in which 
they live, and what happens when institutions attempt to directly convince their members 
to re-adopt more traditional traits, even when those members might have been tempted 
away towards new beliefs. To study this, we implemented bottom-up and top-down 
institutional influence processes. Here, we found that democracy (bottom-up influence) 
promoted global convergence, whereas propaganda (top-down influence) by itself 
boosted diversity.  
A possible explanation for this divergent result can be found in the source of institutional 
traits. In both cases, agents are the initiators of institutions. However, in the propaganda 
model, institutions are created, and then they preserve their configuration, they are fixed. 
"Old" traits are kept in the system, even when agents change towards more popular 
cultural opinion (due to interactions with neighbors). The traits that are stored in the 
institutions can be reused to influence agents once again through propaganda. This way, 
many small pockets of cultural regions can emerge and re-emerge.  
Institutions' traits in the democracy model do not stay fixed. They are modified when 
agents are influenced by interactions with their neighbors, i.e. institutions are updated 
with the more recent, popular traits as old traits are abandoned by their agents. These new 




A bottom-up process generates the possibility that these new traits permeate the 
institutions as well, and institutions in turn can help to preserve these traits in the future. 
This way, less diverse, larger cultural regions emerge.  
In our final model, in which we integrated both bottom-up and top-down influence in a 
feedback loop of information, we replicated the main effect of democracy, and the main 
effect of propaganda under low democracy. Additionally, we found an interaction in 
which the inclusion of high levels of democracy led to a reversal of propaganda effects: 
now, lower levels of propaganda increased diversity, while higher levels of propaganda 
reduced the amount of diversity in the system. Considering the previous explanations of 
the origins of institutional traits, we found a similar logic operating behind this 
interaction: if institutions can be modified towards the traits that are popularized across 
cultures (which then tend to convergence), the institutions' propaganda then does not 
reverse agents' traits back to 'older' values; they instead now help spread the new ideas 
that are growing popular in the population through propaganda, and if these propaganda 
processes are very frequent, they homogenize the population even more than before. 
Measuring amounts of cultural diversity and frequencies of the mentioned institutional 
processes (such as how much democratic power people exert and how much propaganda 
exists) is very difficult in real societies. One attempt to apply our ideas can be to look at 
how cultural diversity is commonly perceived across the world. For example, we find a 
highly fragmented landscape with many small, diverse cultural pockets across the African 
continent (i.e. Chad alone holds around 100 distinct ethnic groups), which tends to also be 
low in democracy and high in propaganda, compared to for example a Western European 
political landscape which is more democratic, and arguably less diverse - i.e. we 
commonly use the term "Western culture" to describe many features that are identical 
across it (A. F. Alesina, Easterly, Devleeschauwer, Kurlat, & Wacziarg, 2002; Gören, 
2013). 
One concrete "trait" that can be mentioned, which is spreading across already fairly 
similar cultural regions through democracy and propaganda, and which is turning those 
regions more similar, is marriage equality; the idea of tolerance towards sexual 
orientations has been expanding across the Western world in recent years, with multiple 
referenda being held on the (Jacobs, 2012; Sio1Net, 2015; The Irish Times, 2015). This 
movement, in turn, has been taken up by the media, is popularized further through 




successfully led to new, more inclusive laws in some countries. This stands in stark 
contrast to many smaller, autocratically governed areas across the world where 
homosexuality is treated very differently, ranging from ostracism over criminalization to 
punishment by death penalty (Rupar, 2014). This finding is reminiscent of Flache's 
hypothesis that maybe, ironically, conformist cultures are able to sustain more diversity 
than individualistic ones (Flache & Macy, 2011, p.990), and that not all cases of 
persistent diversity are necessarily positive, as sometimes they can be a disguise for 
xenophobic and ostracizing, discriminative tendencies (Fisher, 2013a, 2013b).  
2.4.1 Limitations and further research 
We have substantially extended the current line of research on cultural diversity on a 
theoretical level by incorporating central authorities, i.e. institutions, for the first time, 
and by providing a system which, for future research, will facilitate controlling the full 
spectrum of possible diversity levels. However, three of our findings in particular will 
need to be clarified by further research.  
Firstly, we only found a small effect of agent loyalty; it was able to preserve diversity but 
not increase it. We assume the main reason for the small size of the effect is that an 
agent's change of institutions is dependent on the probability of it changing its trait first. 
We added this assumption to the model because we perceived that realistically, it is 
unlikely that a person will change their institutional affiliation to that of their neighbor if 
the neighbor did not convince them of their cultural trait in the first place. Further 
research into the agent loyalty parameter when it is conceptualized as independent of 
institutional influence should clarify if it will indeed stay a small effect or have a bigger 
impact in its own right. 
Secondly, we did not find a clear relationship between the number of institutions and the 
number of cultural regions (Experiment F, Figure 9); in some cases they were more 
cultural regions than institutions, but in other cases, the reverse was true. In real life 
settings, both options are possible: one cultural region can be governed by multiple 
institutions, and one institution govern multiple cultures; however, we cannot be sure how 
this impacts diversity. From our results, we hypothesize that artificially manipulating the 
number of institutions would not consistently change the resulting diversity (in either 




Thirdly, the question remains how cultural diversity can be sustained even when 
institutions are permeated by novel ideas that are gaining approval in the population (i.e. 
under democracy). We hypothesize that democratic institutions still exert enough 
influence to slow down cultural drift patterns that would otherwise lead to complete 
monoculture. Possibly, allowing influences from other cultural regions to permeate 
institutions is what promotes the here established levels of cultural diversity. Further 
research should consider not only investigating the amount of cultural diversity that exists 
in a system, but also use a measure of frequency at which cultural change has occurred 
inside those cultural regions. 
We also consider important the integration of multilateral social influence into our model 
of institutions, which has been used previously to induce and maintain cultural diversity 
(Flache & Macy, 2011; Parisi et al., 2003). In this sense, further research can also 
consider the inclusion of new parameters that expands the conditions in which the 
interactions occur, for example the distinction between normative and informational 
social influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), agents' differing personalities - openness, 
desire for control (Brandstätter & Farthofer, 1997; Caldwell & Burger, 1997); situational 
factors - such as cultural resilience in the presence of peace and war, wealth and poverty 
(Manzo & Baldassarri, 2015; Montiel, 1997); or the possibility of agent mobility within 
the system (Schelling, 1969, 1971).  
Finally, we found that little research has investigated the patterns presented here in real 
life settings as of yet. Field studies and experimental research on the impacts of 
institutions on diversity need to be carried out in order to test the practical and empirical 
relevance of our model's predictions. 
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Chapter 3  
3 CulSim: A simulator of emergence and resilience of 
cultural diversity 
CulSim is an agent-based computer simulation software that allows further exploration of 
influential and recent models of emergence of cultural groups grounded in sociological 
theories. CulSim provides a collection of tools to analyze resilience of cultural diversity 
when events affect agents, institutions or global parameters of the simulations; upon 
combination, events can be used to approximate historical circumstances. The software 
provides a graphical and text-based user interface, and so makes this agent-based 
modelling methodology accessible to a variety of users from different research fields. 
3.1 Motivation and Significance 
The existence of diverse cultural groups is considered paradoxical given that we live in an 
interconnected world where individuals constantly share information with each other. 
Moreover, this diversity persists, despite confrontations with drastic changes over the 
course of population lifetimes. As an example, the Maya have often been recognized for 
their cultural diversity, although they have been victims of catastrophic events: pre-
Hispanic collapses around 800 AD (Diamond, 2011); Spanish invasion after 1521 
(Means, 1917); and genocide, 1981-1983 (1999).  
CulSim, the computer simulation software presented here, is a tool to explore proposed 
models of the emergence of cultural groups (Axelrod, 1997; Flache & Macy, 2011; Ulloa, 
Kacperski, & Sancho, 2016). It introduces events that, upon combination, can simulate 
catastrophic situations such as wars, pests, invasions, or natural disasters. The results 
allow researchers to study the resilience of cultural diversity in the provided models. 
CulSim includes my own recently proposed model, which introduced institutions to 
explore their effects on cultural diversity (Ulloa et al., 2016). Here, it offers the possibility 
to analyze events on an institutional level (e.g. institutional collapses). Although the 
institutional model shows some methodological similarities with other studies focused on 
mass media (Gonzalez-Avella, Cosenza, Klemm, Eguiluz, & Maxi, 2007; Quattrociocchi, 
Caldarelli, & Scala, 2014; Shibanai, Yasuno, & Ishiguro, 2001), it distinguishes itself for 
letting the agents build their institutions and for dividing the feedback loop of information 




The ubiquity of different human groups raises questions regarding the emergence and 
resilience of cultural diversity. Researchers have proposed models to study the emergence 
of cultural diversity under social influence (Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950).  Formal 
models demonstrated that everyone should, in the long term, converge to the same 
opinion when all individuals are connected to the same social network (Harary, 1959; J. 
R. French, 1956; Robert P. Abelson, 1964). More recently, agent-based models have 
facilitated the study of multiple factors that have been shown to affect the emergence and 
preservation of cultural diversity. Initially, Schelling (Schelling, 1969, 1971) used the 
idea that a small “dislike” for a dissimilar neighbor could lead to complete segregation 
between multiple groups. Conversely, Axelrod (Axelrod, 1997) proposed a model that 
successfully allows the emergence of cultural diversity by using categorical opinions (as 
opposed to continuous (Harary, 1959; J. R. French, 1956; Robert P. Abelson, 1964) and 
homophily, i.e. the principle of "like attracts like"  (Byrne, 1969; Lazarsfeld & Merton, 
1954; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001a), to regulate social influence. In this 
model, initial parameters heavily impacted the emergence (or non-emergence) of cultural 
diversity. For example, a smaller population size was conducive to diversity (Axelrod, 
1997), while an increase in neighborhood size increased cultural homogeneity (Greig, 
2002). 
Later on, Axelrod's model was found to be sensitive to perturbations, noise that was 
introduced in two forms: mutations  (Klemm, Eguíluz, Toral, & Miguel, 2003; Klemm, 
Eguíluz, Toral, & San Miguel, 2003), i.e., random changes in a feature of an agent's 
cultural vector, and selection error (Flache & Macy, 2011), i.e., occasional perception 
mistakes of a neighbor’s similarity (error estimating homophily). Klemm et al. (Klemm, 
Eguíluz, Toral, & Miguel, 2003; Klemm, Eguíluz, Toral, & San Miguel, 2003) found that 
even tiny mutation rates produced a convergence towards a monoculture without any 
diversity, while large rates produced anomie, a term introduced by Durkheim (Durkheim, 
1951, 1982) to describe a state in which each individual is culturally different from its 
neighbors. Since then, several researchers have addressed the robustness of the 
emergence of cultural diversity against perturbation, for example by proposing a dynamic 
social network (Centola, González-Avella, Eguíluz, & Miguel, 2007);  by using 
frequency bias (Parisi, Cecconi, & Natale, 2003), where social influence is multilateral, 
meaning one is influenced by several individuals at once, instead of dyadic, where 
influence occurs between just two individuals - based on Boyd and Richerson (1985); by 




introducing institutions (Ulloa et al., 2016), following up on Durkheim’s idea that 
institutions play a large role in group formation (Durkheim, 1951, 1982).  
To my knowledge, no research has investigated how events that can affect many 
individuals at the same time might impact cultural diversity in these kind of models. 
CulSim includes four models, all based on Axelrod’s. The main social mechanisms that 
distinguish the models are indicated in Table 5. The description of the algorithms of 
models M1-M3 can be found in Flache and Macy (Flache & Macy, 2011, p. 975); the 
algorithm of model M4 can be found in Ulloa, Kacperski and Sancho (Ulloa et al., 2016).  
Table 5. Social mechanisms used by the models. The first column provides the identifier used 
in CulSim. The other columns indicate main social mechanisms that distinguish the models. 
Identifier Homophily Frequency bias Institutions 
M1 Yes No No 
M2 No Yes No 
M3 Yes Yes No 
M4 Yes No Yes 
CulSim supports eleven parameters. Seven (rows, columns, radius, features, traits, 
mutation, and selection error) can be applied to all models, and four (institutional 
influence, agent’s loyalty, democracy and propaganda) are exclusive to the institutional 
model (M4). The Initial Parameters section of CulSim’s user manual describes the 
parameters in depth, and summarizes some known effects according to previous studies. 
The user manual also presents a table with recommended values to start explorations 
(Ulloa, 2016). Finally, the user manual describes in detail the ten configurable types of 
combinable events of CulSim (including population-related events, institutional-related 
events and parameter change events). The software provides a graphical user interface to 
visually explore singular scenarios or multiple repetitions, and a command-line interface 
to configure comprehensive experimental designs in computer servers. A video that gives 
a brief overview over the functionality of CulSim is available in the supplementary 
material. 
3.2 Software Description 
CulSim allows users to test different hypotheses about cultural diversity, in particular 
which conditions can sustain it, or which factors promote globalization instead. It is based 
on previous research on agent-based models (Axelrod, 1997; Centola et al., 2007; Flache 




Miguel, 2003; Parisi et al., 2003; Ulloa et al., 2016). In this line of research of agent-
based models, also known as artificial societies (Epstein & Axtell, 1996), a world is 
represented by a number of agents interacting with each other on a grid layout (a NxM 
matrix).  In CulSim, each cell of the grid represents an agent (which can be imagined to 
represent an individual). This agent has a list of F cultural features. Each feature can 
contain one of T cultural traits, for example a music feature could contain rock, salsa, or 
jazz (T=3). Two agents are said to belong to the same cultural group if the agent's cells 
are adjacent to each other, and if they share the same trait for each of the possible 
features. An interaction occurs when an agent accepts (copies) another agent's trait (or 
group of agents’ trait - when influence is multilateral) which could occur depending on 
the conditions imposed by the model, e.g. the homophily between the agents. The two 
agents that participate in an interaction have to be in a “Von Neumann” neighborhood of 
radius r; e.g. agent b is in the Von Neumann neighborhood (r = 2) of agent a in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10. Von Neumann neighborhood of radius 2.  In the grid, white cells represent the “Von 
Neumann” neighborhood of agent a. All agents (e.g. agent b) in this neighborhood can potentially 
influence agent a, or vice versa.  
When the institutional model (M4) is used (Ulloa et al., 2016), an agent can belong to an 
institution that also contains a list of F cultural features. Institutions do not occupy any 
position on the grid. Figure 11 represents all elements within an institutional model. It 
illustrates a situation in which the institution's cultural vector (termed I) shares the first 
two features (out of three) with the blue cultural group (vector A) - both cultural vectors 
carry traits 3 and 4 in the first two positions). Vector I also shares two features (the first 
and the third one) with the pink cultural group (vector B) – both cultural vectors carry 3 
and 2 in the same positions. This similarity can explain why one of the agents (located 
between agent a and agent b), who is part of the pink group, belongs to institution i. At 
some point, this agent can change its institution to j, or it can become part of the blue 





Figure 11. Overview over a world state in CulSim using the institutional model.  The grid 
shows 6 cultural groups (yellow, orange, blue, pink, green and red) in a world of size 6x6. Since 
all agents (cells) of each cultural group carry exactly the same cultural traits, vector A is 
representative of each agent of the blue cultural group, and vector B representative of each agent 
of the pink group; in reality, each agent has its own cultural vector. Each cultural vector in this 
case contains 3 features (F=3), and each feature could contain 1 of 4 possible traits (T=4). The 
houses i and j on top of the grid represent two institutions. Grey lines connect institutions to the 
agents that belong to them. The vector I represents the cultural vector of the institution i (purple), 
and J represents the cultural vector of institution j (pink).  
In the example, an interaction of agent a with agent b (in which one of vector B's traits 
would be copied to a's cultural vector) depends on the similarity of vectors A and B - this 
similarity requisite is called homophily (Centola et al., 2007; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & 
Cook, 2001b) - and also the similarity with its institution j. The institutional influence, 
denoted by α, controls the importance that the agent-institution similarity has over the 
agent-agent homophily, and the agent loyalty controls the likelihood of agent a changing 
its institution towards b’s - depending on the similarity between a and j, and a and i - 
given that agent a accepted b’s trait. The institutions are also at the center of two social 
mechanisms regulated by their corresponding parameters. First, propaganda is a top-down 
process in which an institution sends a message to convince its subscriber agents of a 
particular trait, and second, democracy is a bottom-up process in which the agents vote 
for a particular trait to become part of the institution’s vector. For a full description of the 
institutional model and parameters, see Ulloa et al. (2016). 
In this context is where CulSim can be used to execute events in order to affect the 
current state of the simulation. The events were conceived by exhaustively considering 




target the cultural vectors of the institutions, or the agents. In terms of institutions, the 
cultural vector of one institutions could be targeted fully (i.e. remove all traits of the 
institution according to certain probability), or partially (i.e. for each trait, remove it 
according to certain probability). Also, the traits can be targeted by removing them 
(content removal) or by replacing them by foreign (external) ones (conversion), i.e. traits 
that does not exist in the simulation. In terms of individuals, it only makes sense to fully 
target the cultural vector to either simulate death (full traits removal, called decimation), 
or the arrival of a foreign agent1 (full traits conversion, called either settlement or 
immigration depending if the foreign agents are associated to in institution or not 
respectively). Second, it is possible to attack the connections between the institutions and 
the agents. On one hand, an institution could be destroyed and all the agents that belonged 
to it become stateless (institutional destruction); on the other hand, some agents can leave 
the institution (apostasy). CulSim allows for the configuration of the events according to 
different (probabilistic and non-probabilistic) distributions (e.g. uniform or normal 
distributions) across the grid, and there is the option of combining events to represent 
compounded social catastrophes (e.g. an invasion involves at least settlement and 
decimation). For full details on events, please refer to the Events section of the user 
manual. 
All of the above is accessible through the graphical user interface. Additionally, the 
interface includes a batch mode to run experimental designs in personal computers. For 
servers, a command-line interface is available with access to the same functionality. 
When multiple simulations are being run, CulSim takes advantage of all the cores 
available in the machine by running one simulation on each core. For the sake of 
efficiency, the implementation of the models was done using static data structures 
(instead of dynamic ones). 
3.3 Illustrative Example 
In the proposed example, I compare the effects of two events, decimation and settlement. 
Decimation is represented by removing all cultural traits from a group of agents leaving 
them empty (new-born). Settlement is represented by replacing all traits from a group of 
                                                 
1
 Partial conversion is possible through other agents or institutions inside the system, but not a collective 





agents with foreigner traits; i.e. the settlers take previously occupied positions. The group 
of agents are selected by configurable events distributions; in this example, both events 
are assigned to cells (agents) in the grid, using a normal probability distribution function 
(standard deviation = 0.2) with its maximum value (1.0) at the center of the grid. The 
scenario uses the institutional model (Ulloa et al., 2016) with the following fixed 
parameters: institutional influence of 0.65, grid size of 50x50, 6 cultural features, 14 
cultural traits, Von Neumann neighborhood of radius 3, mutation and selection error with 
probability 0.001, agent loyalty to 0.5, and no propaganda or democracy. Figure 12 
illustrates the cultural spaces at different times for the two events: (A) before the event, 
(B.1) just after decimation, (B.2) 100000 iterations after decimation, (C.1) just after 
settlement, (C.2) 100000 iterations after settlement. Each agent is colored according to its 
cultural traits. 
 
Figure 12. Cultural spaces before and after decimation and settlement.  Left column shows 
the cultural spaces just before the event. The middle and right columns show the state just after 
the event and 100000 iterations after; the top row correspond to decimation, and the bottom one to 
settlement. The black cells in (B.1) represent the dead agents, and the white cells (C.1) represent 
the settlers.  
High similarity exists between the states before and 100000 iterations after the events, 
although some changes are noticeable. For example, in B.2, the pink cultural group 




side has vanished completely; in C.2, the settlers (white cells) stabilized themselves in the 
center. 
CulSim also displays the progression of 20 different response variables as the simulation 
runs its course. For example, Figure 13 shows how to track the evolution of cultural 
similarity (i.e. a comparison of the cultural vectors of all the cells, agents, between two 
states) between the cultural space just before the events (decimation or settlement) and 50 
iterations after they occurred (green lines).  
 
Figure 13. Progression of cultural similarity and energy after decimation and settlement.  
Green lines show the similarity between the state just before the event (left, decimation, and right, 
settlement) and the state of the 50 consecutive iterations (x-axis) after it. The similarity is 
calculated by comparing the cultural vectors of each cell in two states of the simulation. The blue 
lines show the energy of each state of the iterations. 
In Figure 13, the similarities between the 50th iteration after decimation and settlement 
are .99 and .92 for decimation and settlement respectively. From this exploration, a 
hypothesis emerges: it is possible that cultural groups are resilient against decimation as 
they can recover successfully after the event, but might not be able to recover as well 
when settlers arrive, bringing their own culture.  
As with all stochastic processes (such as the simulation example I present here), a single 
iteration that is obtained by tracking the simulation via main interface cannot be taken as 
representative of a general trend and needs to be repeated for reliability and validity 
purposes. Using the batch mode dialog of CulSim, we can run many repetitions in order 
to statistically test whether the observed effects reflect replicable trends. In our example, 
the experiment was repeated 10 times, and based on the analysis of the generated data 
files, Figure 14 exhibits the average similarities found between the state of the simulation 




applied. We can confirm the observation to establish that the chosen scenario is resilient 
against decimation, but unable to recover the area taken by settlers.   
 
Figure 14 Similarity after applying the events.  The graphs show the average similarities (over 
10 repetitions) between the state of the simulation just before the events occurred, and the state 
reached after 50 iterations. The y-axis shows the cultural similarity, and the x-axis the type of 
event applied. On top of each bar we see the confidence intervals at 99%. 
3.4 Impact 
CulSim extends the use of computer simulations to the emerging area of digital 
humanities, in particular to cultural studies, by providing a tool that addresses a non-
technical audience. The software has a default configuration that allows its immediate use 
to quickly grasp the concepts behind this type of research, and it allows storage of 
interesting configurations, events and simulation states that can be shared among users. In 
this sense, CulSim makes available a methodology that has proven fruitful in other fields 
of study such as physics, biology, and sociology. Within the proposed methodology, 
complexity of culture is taken literally, i.e. it is understood as a complex system (Miller & 
Page, 2007) in which macro behaviors can be explained from micro behaviors, as is the 
case with the models implemented in the project: agent-based simulations that model 
essential mechanisms and concepts that have been described in theoretical works.  
In the field of social sciences, CulSim can expand our understanding of how cultural 
diversity persists throughout catastrophic events that target human populations, and is, to 




models based on Axelrod’s (Axelrod, 1997), focusing on the effects on cultural diversity. 
CulSim enables the study of combinations of various events, approximating scenarios that 
have occurred to societies in the past, as is the case of for example the Maya peoples, 
whose cultural diversity has persisted despite the historical events that have befallen their 
population. For example, to simulate the Spanish invasion into Mexico and Guatemala 
that devastated the Maya, historians can review the available documentation and find 
appropriate values and distributions to configure events such as decimation, institutional 
conversion (to Spanish beliefs) and destruction, on top of the introduction of (Spanish) 
settlers into the population. 
CulSim also becomes relevant in the context of contemporary controversial discussions 
about globalization. It has been claimed that a global (mono-)culture is necessary in order 
to promote world peace (Vadlamannati, 2008), while at the same time, we celebrate the 
importance of cultural diversity as a source for ideas to overcome a variety of problems 
facing our world today (Ashraf & Galor, 2011). In particular, the inclusion of an 
institutional model (Ulloa et al., 2016) gives opportunity to explore the role of these two 
concurrent discourses, which can provide insights into how to shape institutions that favor 
a peaceful global community while at the same time promoting cultural diversity. 
3.5 Conclusions 
CulSim will help researchers answer novel questions related to the emergence of cultural 
diversity based on existent models from the sociological literature. It allows the 
exploration of ranges of parameters and interactions that have not been yet studied in the 
literature. CulSim makes agent-based models accessible to researchers of different fields, 
and brings new questions related to resilience of cultural diversity, by introducing 
different types of events that target populations, institutions and global parameters. The 
possibility of combining events offers the opportunity to approximate circumstances of 
historical scenarios within the simulation.  
3.6 Code and software metadata 
Table 6 and Table 7 present metadata associated with the code and the software of 
CulSim 
Table 6. Code Metadata.  
Code metadata description  Please fill in this column  




Permanent link to code/repository used 
of this code version 
https://github.com/robertour/CulSim/archive/2.2.zip 
 
Legal Code License GNU General Public License (GPL) Version 3 
Code versioning system used Git 
Software code languages, tools, and 
services used 
Java  
Compilation requirements, operating 
environments & dependencies 
 JDK 1.7 (or 1.8) 




Support email for questions roberto.ur@protonmail.com 
Table 7. Software Metadata.  
(Executable) software metadata 
description   
Please fill in this column  
Current software version 2.2 




Legal Software License GNU General Public License (GPL) Version 3 
Computing platforms/Operating Systems Linux, OS X, Microsoft Windows, Unix-like  
Installation requirements & dependencies Java 7 (or 8) 
If available, link to user manual - if 
formally published include a reference to 
the publication in the reference list 
https://github.com/robertour/CulSim/wiki 
Support email for questions roberto.ur@protonmail.com 
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Chapter 4  
4 Case Studies based on the Maya peoples 
The third chapter presents three studies borrowed from the Maya history that serve to 
exemplify the usefulness of cultural diversity simulations in real world applications and 
historical contexts. In particular, the focus will lie on the institutional model of diversity 
first introduced in Ulloa, Kacperski, & Sancho (2016). Furthermore, a prominent aim of 
the following chapter will be to give an in-depth illustration of the utility of the CulSim 
tool presented in Ulloa (2016), and this will be the first instance in which the events will 
be methodologically explored in order to study their impact in the stability and diversity 
of different scenarios.  
The history of the Maya peoples will be introduced to serve as the backdrop against 
which the research will be presented. The Maya peoples’ history is a good choice for 
multiple reasons. First, they are an exemplary case of how diversity can be resilient 
against a multitude of events (decimation, apostasy, settlement, institutional damages and 
institutional conversion). Second, the three selected events illustrate different cases that 
demonstrate the flexibility of the simulation tool. Third, because the existing data, coming 
from archaeological studies, qualitative and quantitative historical studies, and dating 
from different ages and different historical settings, can be used to choose parameters for 
the simulation in different and multidisciplinary ways. Therefore, this chapter shows the 
great potential as a research tool of the proposed simulator CulSim. 
4.1 A brief introduction to Maya history 
Even though the term “Maya” in today’s popular understanding is often used to refer to 
the Mesoamerican civilization that, before the European invasion, lived in what is now 
Mexico and Central America, it also denotes an estimated seven million individuals who 
live in this area today, and belong to a number of indigenous communities that share 
some cultural and linguistic heritage, and are considered descendants of ancient Maya 
civilizations (Nations, 2010). There are many distinct Maya groups, which have their own 
traditions, cultures, historical identities, and even 30 unique languages, which can be 
clustered into 5-6 major language groups and which are spoken in different regions of 





Figure 15. A map showing the present-day locations of the different linguistic groups in 
Guatemala. Source: (Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano, 2005, p. 65). Licence: Creative 
Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO licenseThe Maya region is an excellent example of an 
ecosphere with a population that, while sharing certain traits, has remained diverse over a 
large period of time, as, despite what is often believed, the composition of the Maya 
system today is, in terms of diversity, not so different from that of the Maya civilization 
prior to the 15th century, or of the 9th century (Sharer & Traxler, 2006, pp. 6, 9–11; 
Suárez, 1983; Thompson, 1932, 1970; Zorich, 2012).   
The earliest Maya villages are thought to have been build prior to 2000 BC (the Archaic 
Period; Estrada Belli, 2011; Sharer & Traxler, 2006), while the Pre-classic and Classic 
Periods were defined by a development of complex societal structures, cities and the 
establishment of writing and trade systems (Estrada Belli, 2011). A large number of city 
states existed during this time period, ruled by dynastic political systems and in a state of 
constant warfare with each other (Demarest, 2004; Sharer & Traxler, 2006). The Maya 




between city states and alliances, whose areas were very culturally diverse, with 
distinctive regional architectural styles (Foster, 2005), over 30 languages (Sharer & 
Traxler, 2006), a variety of deities (Demarest, 2004) and unique regional art styles 
(Miller, 1999).  
This diversity has remained resilient into modern times even though the Maya ecosphere 
had been greatly impacted by several major devastating events that occurred within a 
period of over a thousand years. In terms of language, "linguistic contacts were primarily 
among the upper classes and ... their potential effects reached lower groups only 
sparingly" (Suárez, 1983, p. 92), and while cultural intrusions by the Toltec or Spanish 
colonizers did affect urban populations, in particular the ceremonial aspects of Maya 
culture,  the rural peasantry was not affected significantly (Lutz, 1976, p. 50, 1997).  
In modern times, the true Maya culture and identity is said to consist of features surviving 
from the pre-European contact period. Identification with dress and language, which are 
markers of authentic and  intact cultural identity, is key (Fischer & Brown, 1997). In 
particular, “for the modern Maya, the most conspicuous link to that past that is 
indisputably non-Spanish is found in Maya language” (Fischer & Brown, 1997, p. 14). 
Government forces of the extreme right and political organization from the extreme left 
promoted goals of assimilation and ideological indoctrination with attacks on Maya 
culture and language, but this goal was not achieved (Fischer, 1996). “Today, Maya 
identity and culture remain strong… But we cannot ignore the enormous weight of five 
centuries of continuous assimilationist and integrationist policies that we have suffered” 
(Raxche’, 1996). 
The following three catastrophic events that impacted the Maya will be the major focus of 
this chapter: the so-called Classic Maya collapse (D. Webster, 2002), the Spanish 
Invasion (Lovell, 2005; Restall & Asselbergs, 2008) and the Guatemalan Civil 
War/Genocide (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, 1999b) . Only a brief 
introduction into the events will be given, but references will be provided for readers 
interested in a more complete historical knowledge. The three events will be analyzed 




4.2 Brief summary and relevant aspects of the model 
The base model used in this chapter is described in Ulloa et al. (2016), and the modelling 
of the events used is described in Ulloa (2016a). In this section, the simulation of this 
chapter is briefly summarized, highlighting only those elements that are relevant. 
In the simulation, each individual is placed in a cell of a grid which contains a trait (e.g. 
Spanish, Jazz) for a list of cultural features (e.g. language, music). A cultural group is 
defined as individuals that are adjacent to each other and that also have the same cultural 
traits on each of the possible cultural features. The two images of Figure 16 contain 25 
individuals (in a 5x5 grid) and 4 cultures represented by different colors. The color 
depends on the cultural traits that each individual has. For example, the two green agents 
(cells with arrows pointing out their cultural vectors) belong to the same culture (green), 
because their features music and sport both hold the same trait each, jazz and tennis.  
 
Figure 16. Hypothetical example of two cultural spaces of states of a simulation at different 
times. Each of the 25 cells (5x5 grid) represent an individual. The colors of each cell are based on 
the cultural traits that the individual contains. The arrows point to two cultural vectors of the two 
individuals with identical traits, therefore they belong to the same institutions (green). The left 
image (A) presents the state of the simulation at time t, and the right image at time t + 100. 
The cultural groups in Figure 16 can be characterized by three criteria: the number of 
individuals that belong to it (size), the place they occupy on the grid (position), and the 
cultural traits that they contain (content). These criteria are used to calculate the similarity 
between two states of the simulation. A state of the simulation is a snapshot of the 
cultural composition at any given time.  
For example, the left side image (A) of Figure 16 represents the cultural composition of 
the simulation at time t, whereas the right side image (B) represents the state at time 
t+100. In the simulation, time is controlled via iterations; in each iteration, agents have 
the opportunity to interact with each other and share traits, depending on several 
conditions explained in Ulloa et al (2016) . Therefore, it is possible to compare the 




Given two states, A and B of Figure 16, each cultural group in A can be compared to the 
most similar one in B in terms of the three criteria (size, position and content), and at the 
same time, these criteria are used to find the most similar cultural group. The similarity 
between two groups a and b, which belong to two different states, A and B respectively, 
is calculated as follows for each individual criteria: 
 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑎, 𝑏) = 1 −  |𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 − 𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒|, where 𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 is the size of group g 










, where 𝑔𝑥 and 𝑔𝑦 represents the 
coordinate x and y of group g, and N the totals of columns (or rows) of the grid. 
 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑎, 𝑏) =
1
𝐹
∑ 𝛿𝐹𝑓=1 (𝑎𝑓 , 𝑏𝑓), where 𝛿(𝑖, 𝑗) = {
1,   𝑖 = 𝑗
0,   𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
, 𝑔𝑓 represent the 
trait for the cultural fth feature of cultural group g, and F represent the total 
number of features  
Then, the similarity between groups a and b is calculated by multiplying the three 
previous similarities: 
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝(𝑎, 𝑏) =  𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑎, 𝑏) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑎, 𝑏) ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑎, 𝑏)  
Now it is possible to calculate the similarity between the two states, A and B: 
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑡(𝐴, 𝐵) =
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑛({𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝(𝑎,𝑏)∶𝑏 𝑖𝑛 𝐵})
𝐴
𝑎 ∈𝐴 +∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑛({𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝(𝑏,𝑎)∶𝑎 𝑖𝑛 𝐴})
𝐵
𝑏 ∈𝐵  
‖𝐴‖+ ‖𝐵‖
  
Notice that in the numerator of the formula, the comparison is done from A to B and from 
B to A. This is necessary because it is common to have an unmatched number of cultural 
groups from one state to another (i.e. one state has more or less cultural groups than 
another, which could happen when, for example, one of the states of Figure 16 
disappeared in a future iteration, or conversely a new state emerged). By considering a 
comparison in both directions, all cultural groups get an opportunity to compare 
themselves to one another. 
The model used in this chapter also includes institutions. The institutions have an impact 
on cultural traits that an individual may adopt when an interaction between agents occurs. 
Basically, each individual can belong to an institution, and an institution is generally 
associated with several individuals. The influence that the institutions exert over their 
associates is controlled by a parameter that is called institutional influence (see Ulloa et 
al., 2016 for details). There are also two processes associated with two institutions, a 




like to be represented in the institution, and a top-down process, called propaganda, in 
which the institution promotes an unpopular trait among its associates. 
The underlying idea of institutions is to provide a repository, in the way of a secondary 
form of cultural traits (Suarez & Sancho, 2010). The interpretations can be manifold. The 
concept can represent many real-life institutions, from libraries to governments. 
Therefore, it is necessary to clarify its use across the Maya case studies. Generally 
speaking, institutions refer, in an abstract form, to a political and cultural center. These 
could be cities or influential individuals (kings, local leaders). In Study 3 institutions are 
explicitly stated to refer to sacred places which were destroyed, and to economical centers 
such as cooperatives, which were commonplace in the 80s in Guatemala. It is possible, in 
Study 3, to name institutions directly, because the available sources contain many details 
on how these constructs worked. It can be assumed that Maya cities in the past contained 
many sacred places and local leaders as well, but sources rarely offer exact details. 
One final detail that needs mentioning is that a cultural group qualifies as such only if it 
contains a minimum of three members, as suggested by Flache & Macy (2011), and based 
on the idea that triad social interactions are fundamental for social consensus (Simmel, 
1950). This is relevant because inside the simulation, purely on a computational level, 
cultural groups that have less than 3 members are not uncommon mainly due to mutation 
rates (i.e. random changes in the agent’s traits). Such changes generally do not persist 
over time. It is reasonable to take them out of the 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑠𝑡(𝐴, 𝐵) formula because they 
could, just by chance, be over-represented if included. 
4.3 Study 1: Classic Maya Collapse 
4.3.1 Literature Review 
Between the 8th and the 9th century, archeological records, such as decrease of monument 
construction and recorded lists of reigning royalty in the southern Maya lowlands of 
Mesoamerica, for example Palenque, Copán and Tikal (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2013; D. 
L. Webster, Freter, & Gonlin, 2000) point to a drop in the Maya population, which 
coincided with a mass abandonment of Maya cities and a decline of the Maya civilization 
in general (D. Webster, 2002). This historical development has been termed a “collapse” 
in anthropological research literature, even though the term might wrongly suggest that 
the Maya civilization vanished completely, which is, as evidenced by the existing Maya 




discussed mystery in Mesoamerican history, as no definite cause or even explanation has 
proven true so far. While over 80 different theories have been proposed, none are 
universally accepted (Gill, 2000).  
Foreign invasion, revolution, economic and trade route collapse, mega-droughts and 
diseases have all been suggested as major driving forces of the collapse, though these 
theories are, up to a certain degree, still speculative. Only recently, evidence in support of 
some of these theories has emerged from interdisciplinary research. For example, the 
decipherment of Maya glyphs now allows for a better understanding of the warfare and 
political instabilities of the period, although Ulloa & Froese (2016) argue that warfare 
might not by itself explain a collapse unless documents are found that prove that warfare 
increased to very high levels in some particular instances. Archeological evidence 
supports an explosion of warfare so far only for the Petexbatún area (D. Webster, 2000).  
Evidence for a competing hypothesis, the drought hypothesis, has been found in the 
Yucatán Peninsula: periods of drought have been ascertained here (Curtis, Hodell, & 
Brenner, 1996), and one of the most extreme spikes of drought recorded coincides with 
the Maya collapse (Hodell, Brenner, Curtis, & Guilderson, 2001; Hodell, Curtis, & 
Brenner, 1995; Medina-Elizalde et al., 2010). 
As is often the case with historical events, it is more likely that there is no single cause of 
the collapse, but that a combination or sequence of factors provides a more satisfactory 
explanation. Webster (2002) illustrates one possibility for a combination of factors and 
theories in his framework, summarizing many of the more popular theories (pp. 327–
329). He proposes that the collapse originated from environmental caused by population 
growth, rulers’ over-ambitious decision-making, and agricultural choices. Environmental 
degradation then triggered increased vulnerability to natural disasters (storms, droughts, 
diseases), abusive economic practices, famine due to extreme soil exhaustion, external 
warfare, and internal problems (ideological rebellions, intercity competition, ineffective 
ritual regulation). Finally, Webster hypothesizes that any of these events would result in a 
political decline that might then lead to the abandonment of political centers and regions.  
Webster’s framework (2002, pp. 327-329) can be adapted to emphasize specific theories. 
For example, Webster uses the framework to argue how soil exhaustion could  increase 
internal competition, lead to warfare, and then ultimately to the failure of the political 





The purpose of this study is to showcase the usefulness of CulSim by applying its 
simulated events to segments of Webster’s framework; therefore, demonstrating that 
CulSim can be configured to approximately represent popular theories of the collapse. 
Since this is the first time CulSim is being applied in a study of a real life case, the events 
will be studied separately. This is a good starting point to provide a panoramic overview 
of the effects of each possible event provided by the simulator. Therefore, the 
combination of events to represent an specific historical situation will be illustrated in the 
following studies. 
Table 8 summarizes the nine events that will be analyzed in this study. A full description 
of each of these events can be found in the user manual of CulSim (Ulloa, 2016b). 
Table 8. Events of CulSim. The first Column describes the name of the event. The Second 
column presents the type of event depending on the way it targets the information in the 
simulation. The third column describes the effects of the event in the simulation. 
Event Type Description 
Decimation Decimation A percentage of the population is killed. Dead 
individuals are represented as agents with empty traits.  
Settlement Foreigners A percentage of existing individuals are replaced by 
settlers. Settlers are represented as agents with foreign 
traits, and are associated to a foreign institution, an 
institution with foreign traits. 
Immigration Foreigners A percentage of existing individuals are replaced by 
immigrants. Immigrants are represented as agents with 
foreign traits; they are not associated to any institution. 
Apostasy Structural 
damage 
A percentage of the population become apostates. 






A percentage of the institutions are destroyed. 
Destroyed institutions are removed from the system, 
and all agents formerly attached to them become 






A percentage of institutional traits are removed from 











A percentage of institutional traits are converted to 
foreign traits. 
Full conversion Institutional 
conversion 
All institutional traits from a percentage of institutions 
are converted to foreign traits. 
All the events in Table 8 can be configured by assigning a certain size to the event; this is 




(event targets). This percentage is expected (i.e. not exact all the time). The reason is that 
probabilities are associated to targets according to certain probabilistic distributions. For 
example, if the percentage of a uniformly distributed decimation is 20%, each agent has a 
0.2 probability of being removed; therefore, it is expected that 20% of the agents will be 
removed. The same logic is applied for normally distributed decimations; however, in this 
case, probabilities are distributed to agents based on their proximity to the center of the 
event. For both types of distributions, thus, an expected percentage is the parameter. This 
expected percentage will, from now on, be referred to as the size of the event. Also, for 
normally distributed probabilities, two other parameters are relevant: the center of the 
event, i.e. a cell of the grid that will receive the highest probability of the normal 
distribution (and the further a cell is from the center, the less probability it will receive), 
and the ceiling of the distribution, i.e. the value of the highest probability assigned to the 
cell in the center of event. 
As discussed previously, the events that were presented in Table 8 can be associated to 
prominent theories about the Maya collapse. Table 9 gives an overview over possible 
associations of CulSim events with a small selection of common theories explaining the 
Maya collapse. The terminology used in the first column of Table 2 is taken from 
Webster’s framework (Webster, 2002). It is important to note that in Webster’s 
framework, the consequence of all collapse theories is the abandonment of cities. This 
abandonment of the cities is interpreted as a complete institutional destruction (5th event 
in Table 8); I argue that practically all the links between individuals and their instutions 
(cities) were lost as a consequence of this abandonment.  
The content of Table 9 is not exhaustive; however, it should suffice in order to illustrate 
how popular theories (which we provide along with the literature where they are 
discussed most prominently) can be represented by different events in CulSim.  
Table 9.  Relations between Webster’s framework, Classic Maya collapse theories and 
CulSim events. This table illustrates how CulSim can be used to establish parallels between the 
theories and the simulation events. The first column shows, in terms of Webster’s framework, the 
terminology to generally describe the theory. The second column presents common Maya 
collapse theories with some references that describes or criticizes them. The last column relates 
these theories to possible events that can be used to simulate them. 
Terminology Theory (References) Related Events 
Increased 
vulnerability 
Disease (Anderson & May, 1982; Dunn, 
1968; Santley, Killion, & Lycett, 1986; 
Shimkin, 1973) 
 
Decimation: representative of 
victims of disease or starvation 
 
Apostasy: representative of 




 Droughts  (Gill, 2000, p. 311; McKillop, 
2006; Medina-Elizalde & Rohling, 2012; D. 
Webster, 2002, p. 239; Weiss, 1997, 2001) 
credibility (e.g. individuals 





Soil Exhaustion (Cook, 1919; Culbert, 1977; 
Demarest, 2004) 
Decimation: representative of 
starvation 
Apostasy: representative of 
loss of an institution’s 
credibility (e.g. individuals 
might consider it unable to 





Institutional collapse due to increasing 
socioeconomical complexity (Tainter, 
2011)  
Institutional destruction: 
representative of an internal 
collapse of inflexible 
institutions (e.g. institutions 
that were unable to adapt) 
Apostasy: representative of 
loss of an institution’s 
credibility (e.g. individuals 




Collapse of Teotihuacan’s trade partner (D. 
Webster, 2002) 
Immigration: representative of 
immigrants of the collapsed 
state 
Apostasy: representative of 
loss of an institution’s 
credibility (e.g. individuals 




Revolution (Thompson, 1954) Apostasy: representative of 
rebels 
Decimation: representative of 
casualties of a possible civil 
war  
Institutional content 
destruction: representative of 




Foreign invasion (Chase, 1983; Sabloff & 
Willey, 1967) 
Settlement: representative of 
hostile invaders 
Decimation: representative of 
war casualties  
Institutional content 
destruction: representative of 
damages caused by invaders 
Institutional conversion: 
representative of a take-over 
of institutions by rebels 
While CulSim provides multiple response variables that can be used to analyze the effects 
of events, the response variable used in the present study is the similarity between the 
state before the event (s_bef), and the state 100000 iterations after the event (s_aft), i.e. 




used indirectly to test the feasibility of events listed Table 8 as realistic candidates for the 
Maya collapse.  
Given that the Maya peoples’ cultural diversity persisted even after the so-called Maya 
collapse (i.e., there are high levels of similarities between the diversity of the population 
of the classic Maya and the Maya today, with the main marker being the preservation of 
languages, (Raxche’ (Demetrio Rodríguez Guaján), 1996; Sharer & Traxler, 2006; 
Suárez, 1983; Thompson, 1932), whatever happened during this period and caused the 
collapse did not result in complete cultural disintegration. In this first case study, this 
argument will be applied as a criterion to discard events, i.e., based on the axiom that this 
simulation in some way represents real events, its results will indicate that all those 
events, that in the simulation result in major cultural disintegration, are unlikely to have 
occurred, or, if they did, they should be assumed to have occurred at a very low order of 
magnitude.  
As the focus of the following experiments will be to separately analyze the events of 
Table 8, the next important decision is to choose sizes for the events representing the 
theories proposed. However, literature on the Classic Maya collapse rarely offers concrete 
values that can be used to approximate or estimate the size of the events. Therefore, the 
strategy for this case study will be to explore events of all sizes, i.e. ranges of values from 
0% to 100%, with increasing steps of 20% each. This will enable a panoramic exploration 
of the behavior of each event. Additionally, to compare for competing possible 
distributions, each event will be applied once with a uniform distribution, in which the 
probability of the event is equal across the grid, and once with a normal distribution, in 
which the probability is distributed with the ceiling (set as 0.95) at the center of the grid, 
and decreases with distance from the center. 
Events will be tested on two versions of the scenarios shown in Table 10. In the first 
version (which will be called the red version, and is colored red in figures), individuals 
are initialized with random traits and, over time, many cultural groups emerge together, 
along with the corresponding institutions. Because here, agents are initialized with 
random cultural traits, after many iterations, a variety of cultural groups will exist, all 
with different institutional arrangements (Ulloa et al., 2016). For example, one red 
scenario can stabilize with a number of 5 cultural groups, while another stabilizes at 55 
groups. This depends not only on parameters but also on the initial traits. In the second 




same institution. This is done, so that even after many iterations only one cultural group 
exists, thus representing the monoculture (which will be called the blue version, and 
colored blue in figures). The red and the blue versions are in a state of equilibrium, i.e. 
they remain constant over 1000000 iterations of the simulation before the event is 
applied. The idea is to compare effects of events on societies that are comprised of 
cultural diversity (many cultures) against effects that these events would have on a 
monoculture (a completely homogenous society). 
Table 10. Scenarios for Study 1. This table present the factors and values for the scenarios of 
Study 1. The first column, show the identifier of the scenario. The second column, the population 
size expressed in number of rows and columns. The third column, the radius that define the size 
of the interacting neighborhood, e.g. an agent can have up to 84 neighbors with radius 6, and 24 
with radius 3 (it could be less if the individual is in the borders). The last column indicates how 
much the institutions influence the individual, e.g. preventing trait changes to happen. The top 
row shows in parenthesis the notation used to describe each parameter. 
Scenario (S) Population (NXN) Radius (R) Institutional influence (I) 
A 32x32 6 0.85 
B 32x32 3 0.85 
C 100x100 6 0.80 
D 100x100 6 0.85 
Both the diverse and the monoculture version use the same four scenarios, presented in 
Table 10 with their associated parameters. In terms of notation, the scenarios of Table 10 
are going to be identified by the following pattern: S(G): NxN/R/I. The meaning of 
initials S, N, I and R, are given in parentheses in the header column of the table. The letter 
G represents the average of cultural groups generated by the scenario. 
Values of the parameters listed in Table 10 were chosen based on prior literature. 
Scenarios A and C were previously explored in Ulloa et al. (2016). B and D are variants 
of A and C respectively, and were chosen to study possible interactions, and to enable 
generalizations from the obtained results of scenarios A and C. For example, according to 
results from the previous literature, larger neighborhood interactions decrease cultural 
diversity in simple versions of the here presented model (Greig, 2002), and smaller 
institutional influence decreases the number of diverse cultures (Ulloa et al., 2016). For 
the methodology, thus, the hypothesis is that scenario B will produce more diversity than 
its corresponding scenario A, and scenario D will produce less diversity; this, in turn, will 
ease the interpretation of the results after events are introduced into the simulation.  
All other parameters that are used in the current simulation are held constant, i.e. they are 




(T); both noise sources, mutation and selection error, are set at 0.001; the number of 
iterations before the event are set at 1000000, the event always occurs at iteration 
1000000, and the similarity is calculated at 100000 iterations after the event. Finally, 
since each simulation is non-deterministic, 24 repetitions with each scenario are run. Each 
repetition involves 1100000 iterations. In order to avoid variance disturbances due to 
different initial conditions, the 4 scenarios (without events) and 24 repetitions are run 
until 1000000 iterations are reached (i.e. before the event). At this point, the states of the 
96 repetitions are stored and loaded to execute each of the events. Therefore, all events 
will be executed in exactly the same 24 conditions per scenario. 
4.3.3 Results 
All results sections below will be accompanied by images, which will serve as the main 
source of information to the reader. Images will be described first in abstract terms, with 
only the most important features of the results pointed out, on the basis of the simulation 
only. Following this, the results delivered by the images will then be discussed in the 
context of theories that have attempted to explain the Maya collapse.  
The images will contain two graphs in two columns, the left graphs present a uniformly 
distributed event and the right graph a normally distributed event. Both graphs display, as 
explained in the Methodology section, two version of the scenarios (colored red and blue) 
in which the Red scenarios start with a population in which individuals are initialized 
with random traits and where many cultures emerge over time (1000000 iterations), and 
the Blue scenarios start out with a population that is homogenous, i.e. comprise only one 
culture. The dependent variable is always the similarity of the resulting state 100000 
iterations after the event occurred and the state just before the event, e.g. when the 
similarity is 1.0, the states are identical, whereas if the similarity is 0.2, the simulation 
state has changed almost entirely. 
4.3.3.1 Decimation 
Figure 17 presents the effects of uniform and normally distributed decimation on the two 
version of the scenarios (Red, many cultures, and Blue, one culture). Following the x axis 
with increasing event size, we can observe that the similarity stays high for both versions 




In general, the graph indicates that cultures, whether diverse or homogenous, are 
generally highly resilient to decimation. There is a difference for Blue versus Red, such 
that monoculture scenarios show higher resilience against decimation, however, diversity 
also displays a very good resilience, especially for scenarios with bigger populations 
(100x100). Finally, the number of cultures in Red can be used to see a more differentiated 
picture (in the legend, the scenarios are sorted by number of cultures and distinguished by 
different symbols). Once it is assumed that at least a few different cultures existed a 
priori, the simulation shows a trend where the more cultures exist, the more resilient they 
prove against decimation. 
 
Figure 17. Effects of decimation on diverse and monoculture scenarios with either uniform 
or normal distribution. The Blue lines represent the monoculture version of four scenarios, and 
the Red lines the diverse version of four scenarios. The left graph shows the results for an 
uniformly distributed event, and the right graph results for a normally distributed event. The 
symbols in the legend denote parameters that characterize scenarios in the format S(G): NxN/R/I 
where S is the identifier; G is the average number of cultural groups; NxN is the number of rows 
and column; R is the distance for neighborhood interaction; I is the level of institutional influence. 
The Y-axis holds the dependent variable, in this case the similarity between the state just before 
the event (1000000th iteration), and 100000 iterations after the event. The X-axis shows the size of 
the event as a percentage of the affected agents.  
In terms of the Maya case study, the simulation suggests that those hypotheses which 
postulate that the Maya collapse occurred due to high levels of decimation are plausible. 
Even in scenarios where we assume that 80% of the population died, we see that diversity 
is preserved. To reiterate the criterion, this is what we expect considering the real life 





Figure 18 presents the introduction of uniform and normally distributed foreigners to the 
two versions of four scenarios: Red lines again represent scenarios with many cultures, 
and Blue lines scenarios with one culture. In this graph, we distinguish between two 
different types of foreigner events: settlement (top row) and immigration (bottom row). 
We can see that both have a higher impact on the cultural similarity than decimation did: 
the introduction of a settlement of even a small size decreases the similarity, for both Red 
and Blue versions.  
 
Figure 18. Effects of immigration and settlement on diverse and monoculture scenarios with 
either uniform or normal distribution. The Blue lines represent the monoculture version of four 
scenarios, and the Red lines the diverse version of four scenarios. The left graphs show the results 
for an uniformly distributed event, and the right graphs results for a normally distributed event. 
The top graphs present the settlement event, and the bottom graphs the immigration event. The 
symbols in the legend denote parameters that characterize scenarios in the format S(G): NxN/R/I 
where S is the identifier; G is the average number of cultural groups; NxN is the number of rows 
and column; R is the distance for neighborhood interaction; I is the level of institutional influence. 
The Y-axis holds the dependent variable, in this case the similarity between the state just before 
the event (1000000th iteration), and 100000 iterations after the event. The X-axis shows the size of 




Settlement has a stronger impact than immigration (the downward gradient is higher), 
which is an expected result: settlers bring along their institutional allegiance, which 
affects the native population much more strongly. Immigrants come without institutions 
and thus, when their numbers are low, adopt existing institutions. This differentiation 
disappears when the event size increases, probably because high numbers of immigrants 
create their own institutions (i.e. they end up acting in a similar fashion as in the 
settlement scenario). 
A diverse cultural world (Red) is significantly more resilient to foreigner introduction 
overall than a monoculture (Blue): the gradient of the descent is generally slower and 
starts at a larger event size. No clear relation was found between the number of cultures 
(in the cases of Red scenarios) and the resilience. 
In regards to the Maya case, there is some evidence that minor migratory movements 
might have occurred during the time of the Classic Maya. According to the simulation, 
however, any larger number of foreigners would have severely destabilized the Maya 
cultural make-up. We can conclude that, for example, a small number of Teotihuacan 
immigrants could have been easily tolerated and they might have assimilated well, 
especially if they distributed fairly uniformly across Maya territory. However, a strong 
invasion, such as the one suggested for Seibal (Chase, 1983; Sabloff & Willey, 1967), 
would have left a very noticeable fingerprint on the cultural composition of the Maya, so 
it is less likely that the hypothesis of Maya collapse due to foreigner introduction holds 
true. Webster (2002) agrees with this, pointing out that foreign representation, for 
example in the form of an attack, would have had far-reaching consequences. Instead, the 
foreign influences first detected in Seibal’s iconography are now considered less exotic 
due to the accumulation of recent research and excavations (D. L. Webster, 2002).  
4.3.3.3 Institutional structural damage 
Figure 19 shows how uniform and normally distributed institutional structural damage 
could have affected scenarios Red and Blue. Two different types of structural damage, 
apostasy (top row; abandonment of institutions by agents through for example a revolt) 
and institutional destruction (bottom row; destruction of institutions in terms of political 
decline or collapse) are presented. Both have a higher impact on the cultural similarity 





The introduction of institutional damage even of a small size significantly decreases the 
similarity of the starting scenarios. Overall, institutional destruction tends to affect the 
composition of the simulation at a faster rate than apostasy. For example, for a 40% event 
size, the similarity when destruction is applied has already been reduced to 80%, whereas 
for apostasy, the similarity is still near 100%, as good as when no event is applied (0%), 
i.e. the only changes are a product of cultural drift. 
The diverse scenarios (Red) prove to be somewhat more resilient to complete (100%) 
institutional destruction, regardless of the type of destruction (apostasy or institutional 
destruction); all of them are above at least 50%, and the scenarios with bigger populations 
(100x100) are above 75%. Moreover, at the 100% rate, the number of cultures (for Red 
scenarios) is positively correlated with similarity, i.e. the more cultures, the higher the 
similarity. The simulation reflects the ability of a diverse culture (as compared to a 
homogenous one) to preserve individual group cultures and, presumably, to rebuild 
institutions.  
Homogenous cultures tolerate high rates of apostasy as well, but they then collapse; 
particularly against institutional destruction, they perform badly. For the normal 
distribution, at event sizes of 20%, the similarity for Blue drops to around 15%. This 
could be considered unbalanced, as the Blue scenarios’ institution is centrally attacked, 
and receives the highest probability of the distribution (0.95). But a pre-post similarity of 
15% is still much lower than the 50% similarity that is held by the Red scenarios even at 





Figure 19. Effects of apostasy and institutional destruction on diverse and monoculture 
scenarios with either uniform or normal distribution. The Blue lines represent the 
monoculture version of four scenarios, and the Red lines the diverse version of four scenarios. 
The left graphs show the results for an uniformly distributed event, and the right graphs results for 
a normally distributed event. The top graphs present the apostasy event, and the bottom graphs 
the institutional destruction event. The symbols in the legend denote parameters that characterize 
scenarios in the format S(G): NxN/R/I where S is the identifier; G is the average number of 
cultural groups; NxN is the number of rows and columns; R is the distance for neighborhood 
interaction; I is the level of institutional influence. The Y-axis holds the dependent variable, in 
this case the similarity between the state just before the event (1000000th iteration), and 100000 
iterations after the event. The X-axis shows the size of the event as a percentage of the affected 
agents. 
In general, the results obtained for institutional structural destruction are very important 
because, according to Webster’s framework, any theory cannot simply ignore that sooner 
or later the events caused an institutional collapse, so that cities and regions were 
abandoned. Moreover, the results also suggest the ability of individuals to rebuild their 
institutions in spite of complete destruction.  
Finally, the resilience shown in the Red version of the scenarios illustrates the validity of 
the simulation process in general; a different result, such as a total cultural disintegration 




explain considering the survival of diverse Maya cultural groups after the Classic Maya 
institutional collapse. 
4.3.3.4 Institutional content removal 
Figure 20 shows how uniform and normally distributed institutional content removal 
could have affected Scenarios Red and Blue. Partial removal (top row) and full content 
removal (bottom row) will be explored. Results for partial and full content removal are 
comparable to those we obtained for structural destruction in Figure 19.  
Noting the gradient of the lines, partial content removal seems to have had a larger 
impact than full content removal. This estimate is based on the shape of the curve; the line 
following partial removal descends sooner (i.e. at smaller value size) than full 
institutional content removal. One possible explanation is that partially removing content 
is more likely to affect institutions of adjacent cultural groups, degrading the cultural 
border akin to a two-way street. Conversely, full content removal enables individuals to 
consistently rebuild their institutions from within a homogeneous population, and maybe 
even improve the way institutions were created at the beginning (from random assigned 
traits to individuals). The improved resilience of the simulation against full content 
removal illustrates the capacity of the individuals to reconstruct their institution’s content 
even when they had completely lost all traits. 
Once again, diverse scenarios (Red) proved to be more resilient to the proposed events. 
The statement holds true even when the number of cultures of Red scenarios is taken into 
account, i.e. the more cultures the Red scenarios has, the more similarity they are able to 
hold. As with institutional destruction, the degradation in the Blue scenarios is due to 
monocultures starting out with one institution, which then receives full impact and 
splinters into multiple different institutions, that do not manage to recover to the original 
state. It is noteworthy that the only scenario that shows an (inversely) proportional 
decrement is a full content removal with a uniform distribution (in the Blue scenarios). 
This is expected as the destruction of the only existent institution depends on its 
associated event probability; this probability is equal to the event size and therefore the 





Figure 20. Effects of partial and full institutional content removal on diverse and 
monoculture scenarios with either uniform or normal distribution. The Blue lines represent 
the monoculture version of four scenarios, and the Red lines the diverse version of four scenarios. 
The left graphs show the results for an uniformly distributed event, and the right graphs results for 
a normally distributed event. The top graphs present the partial content removal event, and the 
bottom graphs the full content removal event. The symbols in the legend denote parameters that 
characterize scenarios in the format S(G): NxN/R/I where S is the identifier; G is the average 
number of cultural groups; NxN is the number of rows and columns; R is the distance for 
neighborhood interaction; I is the level of institutional influence. The Y-axis holds the dependent 
variable, in this case the similarity between the state just before the event (1000000th iteration), 
and 100000 iterations after the event. The X-axis shows the size of the event as a percentage of 
the affected agents. 
In terms of the Maya case study, the simulation gives some support for hypotheses, such 
as the proposition of revolutions, which suggests destruction of content (or structure) as a 
cause of the Maya collapse. It is plausible that the Maya cultural diversity would have 
persisted after even large events of this type, especially since the values for institutional 
destruction were accepted. It is important that the removal of content, as a separated event 
from destruction, does not cause more damage than institutional destruction, i.e. 




to say, keeping the institutional structure but losing all the content does not affect the 
cultural composition more than losing the structure and the content. 
4.3.3.5 Institutional conversion 
Figure 21 shows how uniform and normally distributed institutional conversion could 
have affected Red and Blue scenarios. Partial conversion (top row) and full content 
conversion (bottom row) will be explored. Both have a high impact on cultural similarity. 
Compared to all the previous events, the conversion is the one that presents the highest 
impact: changing content in institutions even just at 20% in the partial conversion event 
leads to big changes in the cultural make-up of all scenarios. Although, with the full 
conversion event the results similarity holds slightly higher, the deterioration slope is still 
pronounced.  
The Red (diverse) scenarios are still more resilient to institutional content conversation 
than homogenous populations (Blue). The positive correlation of number of cultures (of 
Red scenarios) and similarity holds up. Similar to institutional content removal, for 






Figure 21. Effects of partial and full conversion on diverse and monoculture scenarios with 
either uniform or normal distribution. The Blue lines represent the monoculture version of four 
scenarios, and the Red lines the diverse version of four scenarios. The left graphs show the results 
for an uniformly distributed event, and the right graphs results for a normally distributed event. 
The top graphs present the partial conversion event, and the bottom graphs the full conversion 
event. The symbols in the legend denote parameters that characterize scenarios in the format 
S(G): NxN/R/I where S is the identifier; G is the average number of cultural groups; NxN is the 
number of rows and column; R is the distance for neighborhood interaction; I is the level of 
institutional influence. The Y-axis holds the dependent variable, in this case the similarity 
between the state just before the event (1000000th iteration), and 100000 iterations after the event. 
The X-axis shows the size of the event as a percentage of the affected agents. 
In terms of the Maya case study, according to the result of this simulation, theories that 
directly or indirectly suggest a conversion, in the sense of for example an institutional 
shift of values, are unlikely to have occurred without leaving a major impact on the 
cultural composition of the Maya people. This is consistent with the results obtained by 
settlement and immigration. In general, it seems that the introduction of foreign traits 





The proposed events can be clustered into three groups, according to the impact they have 
on the cultural composition of a stable state (such as the one reached after 1000000 
iterations).  
The first group consists of events called decimation and apostasy. These events had the 
least impact on the cultural composition. The second group consists of the events called 
institutional destruction and (full or partial) content removal. These events had a 
moderate impact. Incidentally, these two groups can also be distinguished by the target of 
their attack: events of the first group attack agents, whereas events of the second group 
attack institutions. Thus, we can conclude that events that attack institutions have a bigger 
impact on the simulation state than those that just attack agents. 
Settlement, immigration, and conversion belong to the third group, events with the highest 
impact. The events of the third group also share a special characteristic: they are all 
events that introduce foreign traits into the simulation. Settlement and immigration do this 
by introducing foreigner individuals, and conversion does by changing specific traits of 
the simulation itself.  
In terms of the Maya collapse, the results of the simulation mainly challenge those 
theories that base the cause of the Maya collapse on foreign invasions and use attacks or 
immigration events as justifications for the institutional decline or abandonment of the 
cities. In order to be considered valid after the results of the simulation presented here, 
these theories would need to find solid evidence that a drastic cultural shift occurred in 
the Maya populations after the collapse, or propose how a small impact of foreign 
invasions could be possible.  
Theories that propose decimation events (such as drought, diseases or natural disasters) or 
apostasy (revolts) as causes for the Maya collapse are well-supported by the simulation. 
Similarly, theories based on attacks to the institutional content, such as internal warfare 
(battles between cities) or revolutions, are plausible. In general, the present simulation 
shows that none of these events by themselves would affect the cultural composition 
more than institutional structural destruction would. This is important because, according 
to Webster’s framework (2002), theories that attempt to explain the Maya collapse should 
at some point explain the institutional collapse (abandonment of the cities), which for the 




individuals and the institutions. Results of this simulation support the idea that 
populations are able to rebuild their institutions even after such a rupture occurs, 
sometimes in a very similar fashion to the intuitions they had before the collapse. 
Although the simulation does not model the geographical motion of individuals, there are 
no restrictions to the idea that new institutions might emerge, for example in different 
geographical locations. 
On a more general note, the results indicate that cultural diversity is more resilient to 
events than cultural uniformity (monoculture). Although monoculture scenarios were 
more resilient than diverse ones in the particular cases of decimation and apostasy, they 
performed much worse across all other events, in particular those in which institutions 
were involved. This holds true even (especially) when event sizes of 100% were used. In 
those cases, cultural diversity scenarios are capable of sustaining their cultural 
composition, whereas monocultures completely disintegrate. And, importantly, even 
though cultural diversity allows for the existence of multiple institutions, these 
institutions do not seem to be the main factor behind the resilience, as it is for 
monoculture cases.  
Finally, in most cases, there was a positive correlation between the number of cultures of 
the starting scenario (only applicable in the Red version) and the resilience of this 
scenario, i.e. the more diverse scenarios were largely more resilient than the less diverse 
(with some exceptions). It is possible that an optimal degree of diversity exists, depending 
on the circumstances, and while formulating an in-depth hypothesis about this would go 
beyond the scope of the present chapter, it is possible to conclude that monoculture 
scenarios are not the optimal ones for the majority of cases.  
Methodologically speaking, the presented experimental design was not meant to provide 
an exhaustive analysis of any particular theory, but to offer a panoramic view of the 
effects of multiple events and the whole spectrum of their event sizes. This panoramic 
view was essential to showcase the possibilities and uses of CulSim in a first applied 
study for the simulator, and also managed to help advance modelling of the Maya 
collapse by adapting and testing components of an existing framework (Webster, 2002).  
An exhaustive combination of events (at the proposed levels) is theoretically possible. 
However, it is computationally prohibitive, as there are over 10x106 combinations only 




sense, it was also a more appropriate use of CulSim to focus on each particular theory of 
the collapse individually. In the case that testing of event combinations is desired for a 
smaller number of chosen combined scenarios, several events and their respective sizes 
can be combined in order to represent more complicated frameworks. This is especially 
interesting if there is more information about the values of events regarding their sizes. 
The presented theories here do not often provide any data to support specific sizes, but 
other historical events certainly do. Two of these will be the focus of the next two studies. 
Importantly for this study, by matching simulated events to a framework, CulSim tool 
was shown adaptive, and flexible enough to be useful in a wide variety of theories. 
4.4 Study 2: Spanish Invasion of the Guatemalan Highlands 
4.4.1 Literature Review 
The common assumption of the Maya as a homogenous group stems from colonial 
assumptions of Native peoples as one unified “Other” to be pitted against the European 
invader. As previously noted, in reality, Maya people form distinct, diverse communities. 
Up until the Spanish conquest in the early 15th century, termed the post-class period, 
diverse Maya city states were locked in a constant struggle of cooperation and war 
(Lovell, 2005). Figure 22 illustrates the expansion of the two main states, Quiché and 





Figure 22. Political centers of the regions at Spanish arrival. Sources: (Informe Nacional de 
Desarrollo Humano, 2005, p. 28). Licence: Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 IGO license 
The Spanish made use of these pre-existing tensions by setting up rivals against each 
other. For example, they made alliances both with the Mexica, who had previously fought 
over territories with Maya groups, but also with Maya city states who had struggled 
against or been subject to another Maya group. As such, the Spanish conquest was not a 
clear-cut fight between Spanish invaders and a homogenous Maya people, but instead a 
complex network of cooperation and betrayal between multiple fronts that each had their 
own individual ulterior motives. The Spanish colonizers could not have taken over most 
of Mesoamerica without the assistance of the Mexican and Maya warriors (Sharer & 
Traxler, 2006, p. 762). 
Lovell (2005) writes that following the first confrontation between a Spanish expedition 
force led by Pedro de Alvarado and representatives of the Quiché nation, “the Quiché … 
tried to force an alliance with the Cakchiquel and the Tzutuhil peoples” (2005, p. 59). 




Instead, in an example of the prior described political machinations, Caqchikel peoples 
and the Spanish collaborated to subjugate the people of Quiché (Restall & Asselbergs, 
2007). Caqchikel people, after this, were taken by the Spanish as vassals, and, treated 
poorly, incited a rebellion, which led to their own subjugation (Restall & Asselbergs, 
2007). Still, while on one hand, the diversity of the Maya peoples (and the wars for 
control accompanying it) made them more susceptible to politically instigated defeat, 
according to Lovell, “Spanish subjugation of the Guatemalan highlands was made an 
arduous, protracted affair by the political fragmentation of the region [...] [as there was] 
no single, dominant native group to be overcome” (2005, pp. 59–60).  
Thus, the Spanish employed a set of various strategies such as burning of high ranking 
Maya officials (Recinos, Adrián, 1952; Sharer & Traxler, 2006), burning of entire Maya 
cities and their artefacts such as their art and literature (Jones, 2000; Lehmann, 1968; 
Recinos, Adrián, 1952; Sharer & Traxler, 2006) as well as the forceful relocation of Maya 
populations into colonial towns (reducciones, congregaciones) (Sharer & Traxler, 2006), 
which made them responsible for the mass destruction of Maya institutions. Some Maya 
populations chose to retreat into inaccessible regions (mountains and forest areas), 
abandoning their institutions and restructuring their organization (Pugh, 2009, p. 191; 
Schele & Mathews, 1999; von Houwald, 1984, p. 256). 
Finally, Spanish colonists could also not have taken over Central America without the 
help of “Old World diseases” (Jones, 2000), in particular smallpox, measles and 
influenza, malaria, parasites and tuberculosis, as the native indigenous population had no 
resistance to these diseases and many communities were strongly devastated (between 33-
90% of various populations in Yucatán, Petén Itzá, Belize, Nojpetén) especially within 
the first century after the Spanish arrived (Coe, 1999; Lovell, 2005; Thompson, 1954). 
4.4.2 Methodology 
From the historical overview of events, it is clear that the Spanish invasion involved 
multiple types of aggressions against the Maya population. In this study, data and textual 
descriptions of the events related to the Spanish conquest were compiled, analyzed and 
associated to different events of the simulation. This work is presented in the Appendix 
12. Based on the literature, appropriate distributions and values for occurring event sizes 
were selected. Table 11 presents the results of this selection, and for each selection, I 




Table 11. Distributions and values for Invasion. The table presents the selected events, 
distribution and values for the events in the simulation. The first column presents the name of 
each event. The second column the distribution and selected values together with a short 
explanation of what they represent. The third column present a reference that illustrates the 
presence of the event. 
Event Distribution Reference Example 
Decimation Uniform (50%): 
represents the 
casualties of plagues 
brought by the Spanish 
“… one-third to one-half of the Indian population of 
highland Guatemala must have perished as a 
consequence of this pestilence” (Lovell, 2005, p. 71) 
Apostasy Uniform (50%): 
represents survivors 
that escaped and 
found refuge in the 
mountains, leaving 
behind institutions 
A Kaqchikel priest foretold that the Kaqchikel gods 
would destroy the Spanish and the Kaqchikel people 
abandoned their city and fled to the forests and hills 
on 28 August 1524 (7 Ahmak in the Kaqchikel 
calendar). Ten days later the Spanish declared war 







destruction) to the 
communities 
Pedro de Alvarado “… advanced killing, ravaging, 
burning, robbing, and destroying all the country 




5 x Centralized (10%): 
represents destructive 
events to various cities 
across the country, one 
in the center and one 
in each corner 
Alvarado decided to have the captured K'iche' lords 
burnt to death, and then proceeded to burn the 
entire city (Recinos, 1950; Recinos, Adrián, 1952, 
pp. 74–75; Sharer & Traxler, 2006, pp. 764–765). 
Similar destructions occurred in Kacqchikel, Utatlán, 
Mazatenango, Nebaj (Lovell, 2005, pp. 59–65; 
Recinos, Adrián, 1952, p. 19; Schele & Mathews, 
1999, p. 298, 310, 386n19). 
Settlement 
(invaders) 
Centralized (2.5%) and 
Uniform (2.5%): 
represents one event 
(of size 5%) divided in 
two; one, the 
colonizers settling in 
the center, and two, 
the foreigners 
controlling territories 
Cortés dispatched Pedro de Alvarado with 120 
cavalry (with 50 spare horses), 300 infantry, 
crossbows, musketeers, 4 field pieces (cannons), 
large amounts of ammunition and gunpowder, and 
an unspecified (hundreds or thousands) number of 
allied Mexican warriors from Tlaxcala, Cholula and 
other cities in central Mexico (Lovell, 2005, p. 58; 




Centralized (10%) and 
Uniform (10%): 
represents one event 
(of size 20%) divided in 
two; one, conversion of 
institution near the 
Spanish base, and two, 
the colonization of 
other cities 
 
“Se impuso un nuevo tipo de asentamiento 
territorial, cuya base la constituyó el sistema de 
“pueblos de indios” establecido hacia mediados del 
siglo XVI; formados muchas veces con indígenas 
pertenecientes a distintas etnias. Así se rompería el 
sentido de la antigua pertenencia étnica y 
territorial. Los nuevos referentes del poder y la 
identidad serían la Corona de Castilla, Santiago de 
los Caballeros, España, la ciudad de Guatemala, las 
parroquias y gobernaciones, con sus distintas 
instituciones y funcionarios, y la Iglesia.” (Informe 




The selection of values for the following analyses is not trivial, and worthy of 
examination. In terms of decimation, Coe provides some figures as high as 90% of the 
population (Coe, 1999, p. 297); however, this number estimates decimation over the 
entire first century. A 50% decimation is an estimate made considering the sizes of the 
Maya group armies, and taking into account the size of the area; it seems more 
appropriated for the first decade. Regarding apostasy, the value of 50% was chosen to 
represent how indigenous people were relocated onto reducciones, or those that, after the 
destruction of main cities, abandoned the remaining cities in order to look for protection 
in the mountain areas (Schele & Mathews, 1999). 
The content removal of 10% represents only the scattered damage caused by the Spanish 
armies while transiting the lands, i.e. the destruction of small communities; this is why 
the value is kept low. The destruction of important Maya centers is represented by the 
institutional structure damage event. The literature points to several big battles in which 
cities were completely devastated: these major destructions are represented by 5 
centralized events with different centers in a five-face dice configuration (one in the 
middle and 4 in the corners). In total, this represents a destruction of ~50% of the existent 
institutions. These institutions completely lost their content (adding to the institutional 
content event), and in the simulation, all the agents that belong to them become stateless 
(adding to the apostasy event). 
The 5% figure for settlement is inflated, as sources indicate that no more than 10000 
invaders including native warriors (Sharer and Traxler 2006; Lovell 2005; Matthew 2012) 
participated in the conquest; assuming more than one million habitants - just the Quiche 
was controlling around a million (Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano, 2005), 10000 
invaders would be equivalent to less than 1% of the population. The figure is inflated to 
5% as these estimates refer to the population before the Spanish arrival, and a higher 
percentage should be assumed as the population did not recover to comparable values 
until modern days (Veblen, 1977). This 5% is split into two distributions in the simulation 
in order to reflect a pattern of conquest: although many Spanish people remained 
clustered in the center, as the conquest advanced some of them were sent on conversion 
missions and stayed in different communities. This principle was also applied when 
executing the institutional conversion event, which was split across two distributions of 
10%, one centralized and another uniformly distributed over the territory. Here, the figure 




was chosen to reflect the main conversion agenda of the Spanish conquest: religion and 
language.  
Based on results from Study 1, we can infer that conversion and settlement (colonization) 
are the two most damaging events. Incidentally, for the case study of the Spanish invasion 
into Maya territory, they are the events that are the most interesting to study in terms of 
their effect on Maya civilization.  For this reason, in this study, we will study how the 
events related to Colonization (i.e. insertion of foreign traits: settlement and conversion) 
affected the Maya population in comparison with the other events, i.e. the four events that 
are not related to the insertion of foreign traits (decimation, apostasy, institutional content 
removal and institutional damage). The first group of events (termed event-set) will from 
here on forward be called Colonization, while the second event-set will be called 
Damages.  
We will mainly discuss how the presence or absence of damages during colonization 
affected the make-up of the Maya cultural composition. However, for the sake of 
completeness, a full 2x2 experimental design was run, with the two factors Colonization 
and Damages set as either absent or present. To exemplify, Damages without 
Colonization would be equivalent to a scenario where destruction is caused by external 
forces but foreigners never settle in the local territory or convert institutions. Conversely, 
Colonization without Damages, presents the case of a colonization that did not involve 
violence.  
For our first experiment in this study, we applied two parameter settings from Study 1 
across the two previously presented two different population sizes (32x32 and 100x100), 
as this allowed the results between the two studies to be compared. However, due to 
length considerations and because larger populations are generally more representative of 
real life scenarios, just population sizes of 100x100 will be presented in the results 
section. The results for population size 32x32 can be found in the Appendix 11. The 
presented scenarios correspond to scenarios C and D of Table 10. 
For our second experiment in this study, we will introduce four new scenarios in order to 
test the generalizability of the results obtained in experiment 1. Table 12 presents these 
four new scenarios as variations of Scenario C of Table 10, created by changing one 
factor at a time (cells that are changed are highlighted in the table). Factors that are not 




been extended to the following patter S(G): NxN/R/I/F/T. The meaning of initials S, N, I, 
R, F and T, are given in the parenthesis in the header of the table. The letter G represents 
the average of cultural groups generated by the scenario. 
Table 12. Variations of scenario D. This table present the factors and values for the variations of 
scenario D for the second experiment.. The first column, show the identifier of the scenario. The 
second column, the population size expresed in number of rows and columns. The third column, 
the radius that define the size of the interacting neighborhood, e.g. an agent can have up to 84 
neighbors with radius 6, and 24 with radius 3 (it could be less if the individual is in the borders). 
The fourth column indicates how much the institutions influence the individual, e.g. preventing 
trait changes to happen. The fifth column, the number of cultural feature that each individual has. 
The sixth column, possible cultural traits that each feature could have. The top row shows in 
parenthesis the notation used to describe each paramenter. The second row presents the original 










C 100x100 6 0.80  5 15 
C1 100x100 4 0.80 5 15 
C2 100x100 6 0.70 5 15 
C3 100x100 6 0.80 10 15 
C4 100x100 6 0.80 5 30 
In the third experiment, first, Colonization events are split into two by separating uniform 
and normal distributions to study the effects of different distributions (See Table 8). 
Second, settlement and conversion events also split up to study the effects of the two 
different event types that comprise the event-set. Additionally, for this analysis, the size 
of the settlement event is increased to 20% in order to make it comparable with the 
conversion event, because the underlying goal of this experiment is to explore which of 
these two events and which of these two distributions is driving the main effects found in 
experiment 2. 
Experiment 4 explores how two institutional mechanisms (democracy and propaganda), 
which were first proposed in Ulloa, Kacperski, & Sancho (2016), affect the simulation. It 
is important to remember that although the concepts of democracy and propaganda could 
be considered modern or even associated to Western culture, both terms are used to 
describe two abstract mechanisms that reflect the direction in which information flows 
between the institutions and the population, bottom-up and top-down. Thus, there is no 
anachronism in using these concept, as this flow can be argued to happen as part of the 
institutional role in societies. 
To reiterate the two parameters, democracy is a bottom-up process that allows those 




then written into their institution. Propaganda is a top-down process that allows an 
institution to propagate a trait that exists in the institutional vector, but is the least popular 
trait in the population that belongs to this institution, which can be accepted or rejected by 
affected agents based on their affinity to their institution. Four combinations of 
propaganda and democracy are explored as extensions of scenarios C and D. The Table 
13 presents the combinations. The values are presented as fractions in the form 1/X, 
meaning that a democratic or propaganda process occurred each X iterations. 
Table 13. Extension of scenario C and D with institutional mechanisms. The table present 
extensions of scenarios C and D that include two institutional mechanisms: democracy and 
propaganda. The first column shows the value of democracy for each scenario and the second 
column the value of propaganda. The notation 1/X represents a frequency that reads 1 occurrence 







Simulations are run in the same fashion as the diverse version of Study 1: (a) agents are 
assigned random traits at the beginning of the simulation (iteration 0), (b) the simulation 
runs for 1000000 iterations to reach an equilibrium, (c) the events are executed and (d) 
another 100000 iterations pass before results are collected (i.e. similarity is assessed); for 
all cases, 24 repetitions are performed of each configuration. 
4.4.3 Results 
For the sake of clarity, the results presented here are limited to scenarios of 100x100. The 
Appendix 11 holds full results, including the ones for population sizes of 32x32, and 
complete graphs with complementary results visualizations. In general, the results with 
populations of 32x32 were more difficult to interpret as the events had more drastic 
effects the cultural compositions. Further analyses are necessary to explore the reasons of 
such differences. 
For experiment 1, we will contrast two event sets: Colonization and Damages. To 
reiterate, the first event set, Colonization, contains events that introduce foreign traits into 
the system (i.e. settlement and institutional conversion); the second event set, Damages, 
contains events that are related to the consequences of an invasion (i.e. decimation, 
apostasy, institutional destruction and institutional content removal). Figure 23 shows the 





Figure 23. Effects of Damages and Colonization on the similarity of diverse scenarios. The 
purple bars present the results for cases in which the event set contained the Damages event, 
whereas the green, the results for cases that did not. The left graph presents the results with 
Colonization event-set, whereas the right graph the ones without Colonization. The Y-axis shows 
the similarity between the state just before the event (1000000th iteration), and 100000 iterations 
after the event. The X-axis shows the results for two scenarios in the format S(G): NxN/R/I: S is 
the identifier; G, average number of cultural groups; NxN, number of rows and column; R, 
distance of neighborhood interaction; I, institutional influence. 
We can see from Figure 23  that for all the instances where at least one event-set is 
introduced (six in total), the similarity between pre-event and post-event states remains 
above 70%. As expected, this is lower than the baseline similarity (scenarios called No 
events in Figure 23), which are above 95%. For the scenarios Colonization and Damages, 
i.e. scenarios where all events are integrated, similarity is at about 75%. In general, 
similarity across all scenarios is acceptably high to represent the resilience of diversity 
among the Maya population. We can also observe that in instances where a culture 
experiences Just Damages (without foreigner traits introduction), similarity is higher; this 
is in line with findings from the previous study, which showed that any introduction of 
foreigners into the simulation impacts the state of the simulation more strongly. It is 
interesting that, on average, the combination of Colonization and Damages resulted in 
slightly higher similarity than when Just Colonization was introduced; although the 
difference only qualifies as a trend, with an ANOVA F = 3.356, n = 94, p = 0.07, it is 
important to underline that the expected result would have been in an opposite direction 
of the trend. 
Figure 24 presents some further scenarios to corroborate the reliability of the findings 
from Figure 23 (i.e. the scenarios uphold similarity around 75% when the Colonization 




similarity between the scenarios C1 to C4, these differences cannot be associated with the 
diversity (i.e. number of cultures) because this diversity is confounded with the 
simulation parameters, which in turn lead to the diversity. Nonetheless, given the lack of 
a clear relation between diversity and similarity, it is most likely that the different 
parameters of the scenarios are the ones driving the main resilient effect that explains the 
difference among scenarios.   
 
Figure 24. Effects of Damages with Colonization on the similarity of variations of scenario D. 
The purple bars present the results for cases in which the event set contained the Damages event-
set, whereas the green the results for cases that did not. All cases contain the Colonization event-
set. The Y-axis indicates the similarity between the state just before the event (1000000th 
iteration), and 100000 iterations after the event. The X-axis indicates the results for four 
extensions of scenario D format S(G): NxN/R/I/F/T, where S is the identifier; G, average number 
of cultural groups; NxN, number of rows and column; R, distance of neighborhood interaction; I, 
institutional influence; F, number of cultural features fo each agent; T, number of posible cultural 
traits for each feature. 
Figure 24 confirms that previously noted non-significant trend that Just Colonization (i.e. 
scenarios with colonization but without damages) on average affected the composition of 
the cultural state more strongly than the scenario where both events sets were included 
(i.e. Colonization with Damages scenarios). This time, the observation proved to be 
significant with an ANOVA, F = 17.17, n = 188, p < 0.001. As Colonization is in itself a 
compound event, i.e. it involves two types of distributions (uniform or centralized) and 
two types of event (settlement or conversion), it is possible that this effect might be an 
interaction between those individual two events and their distributions. In order to clarify 




Figure 25 confirms that institutional conversion is the main driving force for the 
significant difference found in the previous scenarios. Institutional conversion events 
seem to be more destructive when no damages are inflicted, or, conversely, conversion 
events are less destructive when damages occur. We can note the opposite pattern for the 
settlement events, where damages increase the effects on the cultural composition.  
 
Figure 25. Effects of Damages with Conversion, Settlement, Centralized and Uniform 
Colonization on the similarity of variations of scenario D. The purple bars present the results 
for cases in which the event set contained the Damages event-set, whereas the green the results 
for cases that did not. All cases contain a version of the Colonization event-set: the top-left graph, 
Conversion Colonization; the top-right, Settlement Colonization; the bottom-left, Centralized 
Colonization, and the bottom-right, Uniform Colonization. The Y-axis indicates the similarity 
between the state just before the event (1000000th iteration), and 100000 iterations after the event. 
The X-axis presents the results for four extensions of scenario D in the format S(G): NxN/R, 
where S is the identifier; G, average number of cultural groups; NxN, number of rows and 
column; R, distance of neighborhood interaction; I, institutional influence. 
From the presented simulation experiments, it was not possible to ascertain how Damages 
are preventing institutional conversion events from affecting the similarity pre- versus 
post-event, however, there is a strong likelihood that institutional destruction could be the 




that can be converted. Future experiments could attempt to provide support for this 
hypothesis. 
Finally, for the last experiment, the role of democracy and propaganda processes was 
explored. Figure 26 illustrates how these processes affect cultural composition and 
resilience. Results are similar for scenarios C and D, and will thus be discussed together. 
 
Figure 26 Effects of invasion (Damages and Colonization) in scenarios with Democracy 
and/or Propaganda. The yellow and blue bars present results for the scenarios C and D with the 
extensions presented in the X-axis. Each extension is a combination of Democracy and 
Propaganda showed in the parenthesis of X-axis labels. The Y-axis indicates the similarity 
between the state just before the event (1000000th iteration), and 100000 iterations after the event. 
Firstly, Figure 26 demonstrates that democracy by itself increases cultural resilience, 
whereas propaganda on its own has the opposed effect. The make-up of the world is 
affected fairly strongly, with similarity only slightly over 60%. This result can be 
explained due to the fact that democracy processes in the simulation provide a mechanism 
for agents to reconstruct their institutions according to traits they themselves possess. 
Therefore, effects of events that target institutions are less severe and their long-term 
effects on the composition of the simulation state are diminished. Conversely, propaganda 
as an institutional mechanism increases promotion of foreign traits among the population; 
this ultimately affects similarity strongly. 
Scenarios that combine democracy and propaganda perform better at protecting the 
diversity of the simulation state than the baseline scenarios with only propaganda. And 




better than the scenario without any institutional mechanism; though the effect is very 
small, the difference is significant (ANOVA, F=6.934, df=93, p=0.01).  
4.4.4 Discussion 
In this study, the concept of an invasion was introduced in the form of two event-sets, 
which were divided to distinguish the effects of Damages caused by invaders 
(decimation, apostasy, institutional destruction and institutional content removal) from 
the effect of the Colonization of invaders in the form of foreign traits (settlement and 
institutional conversion). This decision was undertaken based on previous results from 
Study 1, where a strong effect was found for Colonization-type events.  
One of the most intriguing findings from the results section of this case study shows that 
scenarios that included Just Colonization were affected in terms of the similarity of pre 
and post-event states more than scenarios that included both Damages and Colonization. 
Intuitively, expectations might be that the combination of all events would be more 
disruptive than just a subset of them. However, it can be theorized that institutional 
destruction and apostasy are responsible for this unexpected result. It is possible for 
example that institutional conversion becomes less effective when institutions have been 
destroyed, or when agents have stopped identifying with their institutions (apostasy).  
The findings of this study are highly applicable to the Mesoamerican case study proposed 
here. Given the Maya diversity and lack of centralized control, there was no clear 
institutional target in the Maya area. Instead, the conquerors had to attack a wide range of 
centers of control, spreading damages and destructions across the region without being 
able to take over any existent structural organization (such as was possible in two other 
conquests in America). When the Spanish invaded and colonized regions in which the 
Mexica and the Inca lived, in both cases, a centralized empire existed at the Spanish 
arrival, and this mega-structure was overtaken with the replacement of the figure head of 
the empire by someone who claimed to be representative of the Spanish crown (Cortés & 
Pagden, 1986; Prescott, 1843). Contrarily, after Pedro de Alvarado killed the Quiche 
lords, the Spanish conquerors still had to defeat all the other city states’ rulers, one by 
one. As the Spanish mostly achieved this by completely obliterating cities and their 
associated institutions, conversion attempts made in the region where the Maya lived 




An important component that is not featured in the presented simulation is the costs 
associated with a uniform conversion, as opposed to a centralized one (which has been 
demonstrated to be the least effective conversion strategy against diversity). Uniform 
deployment of military (that pursues the goal to cover a big territory) is self-evidently 
more expensive to upkeep due to the necessary infrastructure and transport of goods and 
services for the troops; keeping a centralized force concentrated on a smaller, singular 
territory is in turn cheaper and more practical in terms of infrastructure. This logic can be 
followed across all events that include any form of damages. It follows that the successful 
invasion of a culturally diverse territory costs more or will necessary be less efficient, or, 
if a compromise is taken, both. In part, this kind of military decision-making in the face 
of Maya diversity could be responsible for the fact that Maya cultural groups have 
survived the Spanish conquest. 
Finally, it is important also to highlight that institutional mechanisms within the 
simulation play a significant role in the resilience of cultural diversity. In particular, 
democratic institutions have been shown in the simulation to promote resilience, whereas 
propaganda has been shown to decrease it. Future analyses of the types of institutions that 
were used by the Mayas should be considered following these primary exploratory 
experiments. For now, in this study, the general ranges were deemed satisfactory to argue 
intrinsic resilience of cultural diversity and apply the case study as presented here.  
4.5 Study 3: Guatemalan Civil War 
4.5.1 Literature Review 
From 1960 until 1996, a civil war between government and leftist rebel groups (who were 
demanding social reforms and improved conditions because of high levels of inequality 
and poverty among the Maya peoples. According to McClintock (1985), the war between 
the government forces and the leftist rebel groups is considered a small fragment of the 
violence that took place in Guatemala during this period. In reality, the war was fought 
between the Guatemalan government and the ethnic Maya indigenous populations from 
the rural areas of Guatemala. The much larger occurrence of violence was one-sided, 
perpetrated by the government forces against the Maya population, and is considered a 
large-scale violation of human rights (Amnesty International, 1976) and a genocide 
(Amnesty International & International Secretariat, 1982; Ball, Kobrak, & Spirer, 1999; 




Guatemalan government of that time is considered to have been a military fascist 
dictatorship, with different military factions assuming control across the described 36-
year time span (Ball, Spirer, Spirer, & American Association for the Advancement of 
Science, 2000; Schirmer, 1999).  
Multiple military organizations have been called responsible for the killings, 
disappearances and destruction of rebel alliances, including massacres of villages and 
executions of those individuals suspected of collaborating with the Maya indigenous 
people, such as Ladino peasants, leftist academics and politicians, trade unionists and 
journalists (Ball et al., 1999; Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, 1999b). 
Disappearances have been estimated at around 40,000 individuals during the entire war, 
while more than 160,000 killings are considered, most of them indigenous people 
(Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 73 Vol I). The findings of an 
investigation into the war crimes have been recorded in the “Memoria del Silencio", a UN 
report - written by the Commission for Historical Clarification (Historical Clarification 
Commission (CEH), 1999a, 1999b), which includes detailed accounts of the events 
occurring during this time period, and geographical and economic data to support claims 
of violence and genocide against the Maya population. An overview over all sources used 
in the following analyses is given in Appendix 13, with the “Memoria del Silencio” as the 
main literary source for figures and parameter sizes chosen for this study. 
4.5.2 Methodology 
Similar to the Spanish invasion of Study 2, the civil war involved multiple types of events 
at different degrees of magnitude. However, while there is not much surviving reliable 
evidence about the events and in particular numbers regarding the Spanish invasion, the 
level of documentation, information about specific cases, there is a great amount of 
evidence regarding the Guatemalan civil war. As mentioned, Appendix 13 holds much of 
this information, presented in the form of tables. Each table holds supporting figures for 
each event in one simulation, highlighting important accounts on the civil war, and 
according to them, events sizes have been selected for this study’s simulations. A detailed 
justification for individual values is provided. The tables also refer to complete sections 
of the Memoria del Silencio United Nations report for sections which can be directly 
related to the simulations events. Finally, a collection of important figures from the 
Memoria del Silencio are provided along with the figures to illustrate important data. 




selected to be included in the simulation, along with one illustrative reference to support 
the selection of the value. 
Table 14. Distributions and values for Invasion. The table presents the selected events, 
distribution and values for the events in the simulation. The first column presents the name of 
each event. The second column the distribution and selected values together with a short 
explanation of what they represent. The third column present a reference that illustrates the 
presence of the event. 
Event Distribution Illustrative references 







according to the 
1981 census 
(2.500.000) 
“… la CEH estima que en términos muy aproximados 
tuvieron lugar más de 160,000 ejecuciones y 40,000 
desapariciones.” (Historical Clarification Commission 
(CEH), 1999a, p. 73 Vol I)  
 
“In El Quiché, 344 massacres took place, representing 
more than half of the total deaths and over 45 percent 
of the human rights violations in the country.” (Manz, 
2002, p. 294) See Figure 2. of Appendix 13. 
Apostasy Uniform (50%): 
representative of 





institutions out of 
fear 
“Mayans were obliged to conceal their ethnic identity, 
manifested externally in their language and dress.” 
(Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999b, pp. 
29–30) 
 
“Por lo tanto, aparte de la eliminación física de gran 
cantidad de sus miembros, también se vulneró en la 
población la confianza hacia las organizaciones sociales 
y sus miembros.” (Historical Clarification Commission 





the size of the army 
divided by the 
population 
according to the 
1981 census 
(2.500.000) 
“Guatemala’s military almost doubled in just one year, 
from 1983-84 (21,560) to 1984-85 (40,000)” (Coerver 
& Hall, 1999, p. 155) 
 
“… el Ejército alcanzó el objetivo estratégico territorial 
a través de la creación de nuevas zonas y bases 
militares. Esta organización territorial en el interior del 
país se realizó desplegando una o más unidades 
militares por departamento, que coincidieron con los 
límites políticos administrativos.” (Historical 
Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 47 Vol II) See 











unions) in the 
central region 
“… a government agency created with US funds, 
declared 250 cooperatives illegal because of their 
supposed ‘Marxist inspiration’” (Davis, 1992, p. 22) 
 
“… after the 1976 earthquake (…) Guatemala boasted 
510 cooperatives, 57% of them in the Highlands with 
more than 132,000 members (Brockett, 1998, p. 112)” 

























the general damage 
across all territories 
The following sections of the United Nations Report 
broadly illustrate this type of losses (Historical 
Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 172–189 
Vol IV) :  
- Persecución y muerte de autoridades indígenas 
- Pérdida de valores, normas, costumbres  
- La identidad maya y expresiones religiosas  
- Ocupación y destrucción de lugares sagrados 
- Uso de los idiomas y trajes mayas 
 
“En Quiché el Ejército realizó acciones represivas, 
asesinando a 68 líderes de cooperativas en Ixcán, 40 en 
Chajul, 28 en Cotzal y 32 en Nebaj entre febrero de 
1976 y noviembre de 1977, según el IGE.” (Historical 















introduced to Maya 
institutions 
“Beginning in 1982, traditional Maya authorities were 
generally substituted by delegates from the armed 
forces, such as military commissioners and PAC 
commanders. In other cases, the Army tried to control, 
co-opt and infiltrate the traditional Maya authority 
structures” (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 
1999a, pp. 118–119 Vol IV) 
 
 A copious amount of information is available describing the circumstances of the 
civil war, thus the selection of the values is not a trivial process. Values for events such as 
decimation, settlement and institutional destruction were highly evident from the sources 
and are highly reliable in approximating the events. Others, like apostasy, institutional 
content removal, and institutional conversion, require some justification. The apostasy 
size of 50% for example are representative of one out of two individuals who decided to 
give up their Maya heritage in some way. This is an estimate, and the resulting figure is 
bigger when the number of individuals that completely lost their institutions because of 
institutional destruction events are taken into consideration. In the case of the destruction 
event, the numbers we have on how many cooperatives were destroyed serves as the main 
point of reference to estimate the event size (Lyon, 2007; Manz, 2002). As cooperatives 




might have been lower in actuality, and 25% might be a high figure even for the 
accumulated destruction. 
The quantification of institutional conversions and content removals is somewhat 
subjective. It seems to make sense, as a point of reference, to assume that these events 
were similar or equivalent in magnitude to those of institutional destruction. Therefore, 
centralized distributions for conversion and content removal are introduced at the same 
size as institutional destruction, i.e. at 25%. Additionally, this distribution is used twice; 
once for partial events (partial conversion or removal of traits) and once for full events 
(complete conversion or removal of traits). There is after all evidence that some content 
was damaged all across the Guatemalan territory (Historical Clarification Commission 
(CEH), 1999a). Thus, a uniform 20% content removal event has been added to the 
previous two in order to affect the whole space. 
In studies 1 and 2, a ceiling (i.e. probability of the event occurring in the center of a 
centralized distribution) of 0.95 was used for all centralized events. In the present study, 
this value was reduced to 0.75. The reason for this change is that we have information 
about how the military was distributed across the Guatemalan territory, i.e. we know that 
it was spread more evenly and wider, and that there were different troops, different 
military zones and multiple attacks across the territory (Ball et al., 1999; Davis, 1992; 
Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, 1999b; Schirmer, 1999). Thus, the 
damaged caused by attacks was also more evenly spread (as compared, for example, to 
what we know about the Spanish invasion, where attacks were executed in a very concise 
manner, and with clear objectives). Military attacks in Guatemala were directed at 
multiple targets simultaneously. 
The current approach and configuration settings were used not only to adequately 
simulate the scenario in question, but also in order to further illustrate capabilities of 
CulSim, and to gain insights into the internal happenings while the simulation runs. Thus, 
the experiment uses four scenarios, which were chosen based on a different criterion than 
the scenarios in the previous two studies: Maya cultural groups were selected as the 
criterion for this study. Figure 15 showed a map of the various linguistic groups of 
Guatemala, and will serve as one possible way of organizing the Maya cultural 
composition, i.e. for the following simulation, the existing number of linguistic groups 
(more than 20) are used as a point of reference to search for appropriate scenarios that 




contain subgroups, and some of groups might be separated by other barriers than the 
language that they share; however, language presents a strong cultural barrier between the 
groups and, therefore, a good criterion for the selection of the scenarios. 
Results gained from studies 1 and 2 were used, as well as some initial exploration using 
CulSim, to find 4 scenarios (shown in Table 15) that would provide the best starting 
points to generate worlds with between 20 and 30 separate cultural groups. On these four 
scenarios, the above selected events were applied, in the order apostasy, institutional 
destruction, content removal, decimation, invasion and conversion.  
 Instead of 5 features and 15 traits, as was the case for previous studies, the presented 
scenarios will all employ agents and institutions carrying 6 features, with 14 traits on each 
feature. This configuration was chosen because it makes use of the maximum range of 
colors available on computer screens, and enables the clearest visualizations of results. 
Number of iterations and number of repetitions before and after the event are constant 
across all three studies. We did not introduce democracy or propaganda into these 
scenarios as we did in Study 2 to simplify presentation of the results and to focus on main 
findings. 
Table 15. Scenarios for Study 3. The scenarios presented in this table present the factors and 
values used for Study 3 that, upon previous exploration, were found to produce between 20 and 
30 cultural groups. The first column shows the identifier of the scenario. The second column, the 
population size expresed in number of rows and columns. The third column, the radius that define 
the size of the interacting neighborhood, e.g. an agent can have up to 84 neighbors with radius 6, 
and 24 with radius 3 (it could be less if the individual is in the borders). The last column indicates 
how much the institutions influence the individual, e.g. preventing trait changes to happen. The 
top row shows in parenthesis the notation used to describe each paramenter. 
Scenario (S) Population (NXN) Radius (R) Institutional influence 
(I) 
E 32x32 3 0.80 
F 32x32 6 0.80 
G 100x100 3 0.35 
H 100x100 6 0.55 
Three analyses were performed on the selected scenarios. Firstly, similarity was used, in 
the previous two studies, to explore the effect of events in the similarity. Secondly, the 
number of cultures existing before and after the events were analyzed in order to explore 
how the diversity of the population was affected further. Thirdly, an image of the 
repetition of each scenario with the lowest and highest similarity will be supplied. This 




Finally, correlations were employed to test significances and strengths of important 
observation made through visualization to have statistical support for conclusions. 
4.5.3 Results and Discussion 
The first image, Figure 27 provides an overview over similarity of pre and post events 
states across the four scenarios described in Table 15. In all chosen scenarios, the post-
events state stabilizes near 70%. This suggests that, despite the existence of major 
destructive forces, cultural diversity has retained major similarities to the composition 
before the destruction, while carrying some unavoidable changes. This result is highly 
promising regarding the validity of the simulation, as it reflects historical events well; the 
Maya population suffered major destructions, but was able to sustain a large part of its 
cultural heritage while some changes were undeniable, e.g. the appropriation of violence 
from the youth that make it impossible for them to reintegrate themselves with the 
community (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, Vol IV p. 196). 
 
Figure 27. Effects of the civil war on different scenarios. The Y-axis expresses the similarity 
between the state just before the event (1000000th iteration), and 100000 iterations after the event. 
The X-axis present the results for four scenarios in the format S(C): NxN/R/I: S is the identifier; 
C, average number of cultures; NxN, number of rows and column; R, distance of neighborhood 
interaction; I, institutional influence. 
The previous two studies were heavily focused on interpreting results in terms of the 




variables to showcase CulSim’s further capabilities, another response variable will be 
presented, the effect of the events being applied on the number of cultures existing before 
and after the event. Figure 28 illustrates the change that has occurred. 
 
Figure 28.  Effects of the civil war on cultural diversity. The Y-axis indicates the number of 
cultural groups before the events (yellow, 1000000th iteration) and 100000 iterations after the 
event (green). The X-axis indicates the results for four scenarios in the format S(C): NxN/R/I: S is 
the identifier; C, average number of cultures; NxN, number of rows and column; R, distance of 
neighborhood interaction; I, institutional influence. 
We can observe that in all cases there is an increase in the number of cultures for the post-
event state as compared to the pre-event state. Scenarios that started with more agents 
(i.e. 100x100 scenarios, see Table 15) ended up splitting into far more cultures. There are 
two main hypotheses to explain this explosion of diversity: (a) institutional damage 
events (both in terms of content and structure) decreased how much control institutions 
had over the population, causing instabilities which were then exploited by random 
mutations occurring in the system (random changes in the population traits); (b) foreign 
traits (also introduced as an event) permeated the population, allowing emergence of 
hybrid cultures.  
In order to illustrate better which of the scenarios more likely occurred, Figure 29 
presents images for each scenario. Each pair of horizontal images represents 2 repetitions 




and the other is the repetition that showed the most similarity. The figure shows, in each 
pair of images the state right before the event occurred (1000000th), and the state 100000 
iterations after the event. 
 
Figure 29. Repetition with the lowest and highest similarity per scenario. Each row in the 
figure presents a pair of images per repetition of one scenario. In each pair, the left image 
represents the state before the event (1000000th iteration) and the right image the state 100000 
iterations after the event. For each scenario: the first repetition, corresponding to the first pair of 
images on the left, is the one with the least similarity for each scenario (out of 24 repetitions); the 
second repetition, corresponding to the last pair of images on the right, is the one with the most 
similarity for each scenario (out of 24 repetition). Each image presents the number of cultural 
group in the bottom-left corner. The bottom-right corner of the second and fourth columns (the 




Within the simulation, an entirely foreign culture (i.e. a culture of agents that were 
introduced from outside and share no traits with the native agents) would be represented 
as white (some agents of white color prevail in the after-event images above). A hybrid 
agent of a foreigner and a native agent in the simulation is represented with a color of a 
light shade. For all the scenarios in Figure 29, we can observe that scattered cultural 
groups have emerged after the event. Most of these scattered groups are colored in lighter 
shades. The foreigner hybrid hypothesis (hypothesis b) is therefore the more likely 
hypothesis responsible for the increase in cultural groups variations. 
The hybrid cultures, as mentioned, appear scattered across the grid, i.e. they do not have 
clearly defined borders. This is the explanation for why we perceive that there is an 
explosion of cultures when analyzing Figure 2. As separate cultures are counted only 
when they have at least 3 agents of the same culture adjacent to themselves, the scattered 
agents are counted as single cultures despite that fact that one could argue that they 
possess the same roots. Therefore, the Figure 2 over-represents the diversity of cultures 
actually in existence.  
Secondly, all these new scattered smaller cultural groups have a strong effect on the 
similarity response variables. This illustrates that sometimes, the similarity variable might 
not be the optimal choice to represent changes between the before and after scenarios, 
although generally speaking they provide a general perspective of what is happening. 
Graphs such as the ones in Figure 3 should be used to help analyze similarity across 
different time spans in a more detailed view of the simulation. 
Notoriously, in 3 out of the 4 scenarios (F, G, H), the repetitions that were affected the 
most by the event (i.e. the one least similar after it) were the ones with the least number of 
cultural groups.  Correlations between number of cultures and the similarity were 
computed for the 4 scenarios. A significant positive correlation was found for the 
100x100 scenarios (C and D): for 100x100/.35/3, r = 0.618, n = 24, p = 0.001; and for 
100x100/.55/6, r = 0.637, n = 24, p < 0.001. In the 32x32 scenarios, number of cultures 
and similarity were not significantly correlated: for 32x32/.8/3, r = -0.078, n = 24, p = 
0.716, and for 32x32/.8/6, r = 0.23, n = 24, p = 0.27. 
4.5.4 Discussion 
Study 3 presents the results of experiments that attempt to simulate events of a recent 




cultural diversity. This study differs from the other two mainly because of the voluminous 
amount of information available about it. A considerable effort and part of the 
methodological challenge of this experiment was the condensation of this information 
into parameters and values. The goal was to present a depiction of the violent conflict of 
the civil war that would be as accurate as possible and to transform this information into 
the scope allowed by a simulation.  
Based in the results, the civil war had a considerable impact on the cultural composition 
of the Maya communities, yet despite this, it is evident that the cultural groups manage to 
thrive. What can be considered the more worrisome outcome of the simulation is the 
endurance of foreign traits in the population. Inside the simulation, these foreign traits 
were introduced to represent marks that the military left on the country. The presence of 
these traits in the population even long after the event is evident in Figure 29, in particular 
also the mingling of the traits within the communities. This outcome is paralleled in 
Guatemalan modern reality. In one prominent instance, the existence and power position 
of current Guatemalan gangs has been ascribed to be a consequence of the civil war, in 
particular of the participation of civilians in the confrontations, for example in the form of 
civil patrols (PACs) or military commissioners (Historical Clarification Commission 
(CEH), 1999a, pp. 258–301. Vol 2.).  
The introduction of military traits was used to explain the explosion of diversity evident 
in the simulation results. Although it seems that the number of cultures is magnified by 
the way cultures are counted in the simulation, when we look in-depth at the state of the 
simulation after the events by using visualizations, we can observe that a large number of 
novel and hybrid cultures indeed emerged as a consequence of the events introduced to 
represent the Guatemalan war. This should be seen not only as representative of violent 
groups but Guatemala has also had a large increase in the number of NGOs that were 
founded as by-product of governmental distrust with the goal to have positive impact on 
the community (Rohloff, Díaz, & Dasgupta, 2011). Additionally, the formation of NGOs 
(which are often supported by international funds) can be taken to represent the formation 
of new institutions as well as the presence and propagation of institutional traits that are 
reflective of indigenous groups, forming hybrid institutions of old and new. In other 
words, it is possible that the post-war international presence has found the space to 




Methodologically speaking, Study 3 expands on the ways in which analyses have so far 
been proposed in CulSim. This exploration exemplifies how the simulator can be used to 
find patterns in the data, and more importantly, how to interpret them. At the same time, 
this study also presents different ways in which data can be explored and hints at a few 
more avenues which can be explored with CulSim which are not presented here. As one 
example, institutional analyses can be performed. These would occur in a similar fashion 
to the analyses done with the number of cultural groups and the accompanying 
visualizations that are proposed in this chapter, but instead of looking at the group 
cultural level, these analyses would help understand patters of institutional re-emergence. 
They would allow an investigation of the number of institutions, of the similarity of pre 
and post-event institutions, and of the visualizations of individuals’ allegiances to 
institutions.  
Furthermore, one possible future study could investigate the individual components of the 
simulation result variable; currently, the response variable termed similarity joins three 
criteria (size, position and content) into one. It would be interesting to study these 
response variables separately, as each of them could offer information about the internal 
changes at different stages of the simulation. In particular, the combination of position 
and size (regardless of the content) would make it possible to study the patterns of 
displacement of information. In terms of visualizations, such as those in Figure 29, the 
question for example could be whether there are parameters that help assimilation of 
foreign traits and promotion of local uniformity. Adding or manipulating institutional 
parameters, i.e. democracy or propaganda, before and after the events could increase the 
probability that less disintegrated cultural groups could rebuild. An exploration of such 
mechanisms is important, as the current simulation results suggest that a solution of the 
violence problem is unlikely to occur without intervention, as violence traits have created 
stable cultural groups that can survived over long periods of time. 
Finally, although extensive work was done to realistically simulate the events of the 
Guatemalan civil war with the values provided by sources such as the UN report and 
literature that exists about the occurrences of this time, some values that were chosen, 
such as apostasy, were not as well-supported as others, for which exact figures were 
available. Additionally, sources of data on events such as the civil war should always be 
evaluated critically. Thus, conclusions drawn from studies such as this one should be 




further evidence and available documentation should be taken into account to justify and 
validate the presented results. 
4.6 Summary and General Discussion 
In this chapter, results from three studies were presented. Study 1 was a simulation study 
based on the case of the historical event of the Maya collapse and used popular theories 
presented in Webster’s framework of the Maya collapse to demonstrate a possible way to 
adapt a simulation to integrate a variety of theories and explore their implication on 
cultural diversity. Several ranges of values were explored for events that were found to be 
representative of the theories discussed. Results indicated that events that introduced 
foreign traits (i.e. settlement, immigrants and institutional conversion) affected cultural 
composition of an environment most strongly, followed by events that targeted 
institutions (institutional conversion and institutional content removal), which affected 
the composition moderately. Finally, events that targeted the population had minor effects 
on cultural composition. Monoculture scenarios were found to be more sensitive to 
institutional and foreign traits introduction, while they were found to be quite robust 
against population attacks, differences as compared to diverse scenarios were small. On 
multiple occasions, scenarios that displayed a higher starting diversity acted in a more 
resilient fashion, whereas the reverse was rare. 
Study 2 demonstrated that the cultural diversity of the Maya contributed to their cultural 
survival after Spanish invaders attacked their territories. For one, the complete 
annihilation of the Maya peoples or conversion of their institutions was impossible as 
there was no centralized target to defeat. Furthermore, in order to achieve such a 
conquest, the Spanish invaders would have had to spread their forces uniformly across the 
entire Maya territory, this was expensive, inefficient and probably impossible to 
successfully execute due to lack of infrastructure. Results of the simulation indicate that 
the colonization process can be much less effective when it is accompanied by high levels 
of damages. Attempts at institutional conversions are unsuccessful when associations 
between existing institutions and the population are destroyed by institutional destruction 
or apostasy, and thus, fast and complete conversion is made impossible.  
Finally, exploratory simulations of Study 2 showcased the important role of institutional 
processes such as democracy and propaganda. Democracy was shown to increase cultural 




bottom-up process (democracy) can help in the reconstruction of institutional entities, 
whereas a top-down process (propaganda) disseminates foreign traits across the 
population.  
Results from Study 3 illustrate that the introduction of foreign traits was the main cause 
responsible for cultural changes suffered by the Maya populations after the Guatemalan 
civil war. Results from the previous studies support findings that even the extreme 
violence and population decimation of this war would not have affected the cultural 
composition of the Maya communities too strongly; however, in this case, the foreign 
traits led to a large increase in cultural diversity. The real life equivalent of foreign traits 
represented in the simulation were military factions. As within the simulation, certain 
cultural groups were partially disintegrated, as was done in real life to obtain higher 
conformity, newly formed groups partially adopted violent traits, forming hybrid cultures. 
This is discussed in the context of modern Guatemalan state forms and politics. 
As part of the third study, ideas regarding the reintegration of cultural groups in the 
simulation through institutional mechanisms and simulation parameters were proposed. 
Future experiments in this direction are important as they can provide first ideas as to of 
how to help with the regeneration of cultural diversity in Guatemala.  
Aside from an application of the results to the Maya case, an aspect of the simulation 
worth mentioning is the frequent positive correlation between diversity and resilience that 
was found across the three studies. This adds to the evidence of the benefits of diversity 
that are discussed throughout the chapter. To analyze the results in more detail, Studies 1 
and 3 offer this evidence suggesting that resilience increases together with diversity, 
while Study 2 presents evidence in both directions, i.e. in some cases resilience increases 
with diversity and in others it seems to decrease. However, in Study 2, it is important to 
note that in most presented scenarios, the diversity depended on initial parameters fed into 
the simulation. For example, the higher the institutional influence, the more diversity is 
generated. In this sense, the relation between diversity and resilience is confounded, as it 
is not possible to discern which percentages of the effect stem from initial parameter 
settings, and which actually occur due to the existing internal diversity. Study 1 and Study 
3 partially resolve the issue with different strategies. Study 1 introduces pre-set scenarios 
(i.e. artificially introduced and not organically generated within the simulation) that assigs 
all agents the same cultural group and institution, therefore eluding the problem of 




diversity. Conversely, Study 3 tackle the problem by providing correlations between the 
initial number of cultural groups and the similarity (pre and post-event) within the 
repetitions of the same scenario types. This strategy allows to keep all parameters even. 
However, some control over the resulting diversity in each repetition is lost.  
An extended analysis is necessary to verify all of the conclusions drawn in these three 
studies about the relationship between resilience of cultural diversity with increasing 
starting diversity. However, it is possible to conclude that there exist scenarios in which 
diversity does increase resilience. It might not be possible to generalize this to all 
scenarios; and most likely there is a non-linear relation where an optimal degree of 
diversity exists is the better alternative hypothesis. 
Although cultural diversity is proposed as a mechanism of resilience, it is certainly not 
the only possible mechanism, and other factors can be hypothesized to contribute to 
resilience. Geographical accessibility has previously been shown to serve as a cultural 
barrier (Parisi, Cecconi, & Natale, 2003) and it can be applied to Maya communities in 
for example the Cuchumatanes highlands (Lovell, 2005). Related to this, the distance 
between the group centers (e.g. cities or tribes) could serve to increase resilience, as 
would be the case for the Tarahumaras (Sheridan & Naylor, 1979), who have proven 
resilient and been able to sustain their culture despite their homogenous culture. Another 
factor that needs to be studied in depth is how the number of institutions affects cultural 
resilience. The possibility that there is a connection between institutions and resilience is 
supported from a combination of results, from Chapter 4, Study 2 and from other studies, 
especially from Ulloa et al. (2016). The results from Study 2 showed that democracy 
increased cultural resilience, whereas Ulloa et al. (2016) had shown that democracy also 
increased the number of institutions in the system. It is from this study possible to 
hypothesize that the presence of replicated information across institutions might help a 
culture to stay resilient against events. One final possibility is that the content of some 
cultural traits might affect the receptiveness of an individual to new traits, or the degree of 
institutional influence and loyalty. 
Methodologically speaking, the three studies presented in this chapter cover a wide 
spectrum of experimental analysis that can be done with CulSim. Study 1 adapted a 
theoretical framework of the Maya collapse to the events provided in the simulator; it 
offered a comprehensive exploration of individual events that can be used to model future 




Spanish invasion of the Maya highlands. Using previous results of Study 1, the 
experimental design explored the interaction between events related to foreign 
intervention and the damages caused by it. Study 3 used quantitative data collected by 
international organizations, and interpreted it in terms of the simulation in order to 
approximate the Guatemalan civil war. It analysis the results in-depth using different 
response variables and visualizations to compare the simulation with a real-life event. 
In summary, simulations were successfully applied to historical events in the form of case 
studies related to the Maya peoples; many similarities were found between the cases and 
the simulations. The demonstrated applications of the model are also manifold. CulSim 
can help archeologist find plausible ranges of values to describe at what size events might 
have occurred historically, when they do not have access to conclusive information or 
quantitative data. A second application is the possibility to provide explanations and 
possible causes for different outcomes of comparable historical events, as for the case of 
Spanish conquest in different territories of America. Finally, it is possible for researchers 
to make use of large amounts of detailed information collected about certain events, in 
order to replicate them in a controlled environment, where it is possible (a) to explore the 
complex interactions among the components, (b) to compare different outcomes if 
circumstances would have been different and (c) to analyze parameter changes that could 
help to reverse or improve after-effects of the events. 
On a theoretical level, CulSim can be used to explore scenarios with the goal to analyze 
effects of events on cultural diversity and interactions of various simulation parameters. 
Cultural similarity and resilience as well as institutional variables can be studied in-depth, 
and it is possible to determine how changes in parameters, regardless of existence of 
events, can affect cultural compositions across simulations.  
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Chapter 5  
5 Summary and Discussion 
5.1 Summary 
The main purpose of this thesis was to model cultural diversity in a computer simulation 
and explore factors that could affect the stability and resilience of cultural diversity, such 
as institutions, democracy and propaganda, and drastic events.  A second major purpose 
was to show the applicability of the simulation on a study case of the Maya peoples. For 
this purpose, multiple experiments were conducted, and a cultural simulator (CulSim) 
was created based on previous models suggested by Axelrod (1997) and, more recently, 
Flache and Macy (2011). Results from conducted experiments were presented across two 
major experimental manuscripts (Chapters 2 and 4), with one further manuscript serving 
to introduce CulSim, a simulator of cultural diversity, addressed to a broader, non-
technical audience of researchers (Chapter 3). Contributions were made to the field of 
agent-based models, in particular artificial societies, by extending mechanisms to the 
study of cultural diversity, and to the field of digital humanities and cultural studies, as a 
particular focus of this thesis was on applying results to historical scenarios about the 
diversity of Maya culture. 
Chapter 2, titled “Institutions and Cultural Diversity: Effects of Democratic and 
Propaganda Processes on Local Convergence and Global Diversity”, introduced an 
approach to analyze emergence of cultural diversity across several computational models. 
One purpose of this chapter was to review sociological ideas of group formation across 
the scientific literature dedicated to artificial societies (e.g. Axelrod, 1997; Flache & 
Macy, 2011); the primary goal of Chapter 2 was to test whether the introduction of 
institutions could stabilize group formation in the face of different types of perturbations 
(such as cultural drift and selection error). Perturbations have across the literature posed a 
problem difficult to overcome when simulating cultural diversity (Flache & Macy, 2011; 
Klemm, Eguíluz, Toral, & Miguel, 2003; Klemm, Eguı́luz, Toral, & Miguel, 2005; Parisi, 
Cecconi, & Natale, 2003).  
Chapter 2 was successful in its goal to illustrate the important role that institutions play in 
regulating, stabilizing and directing cultural diversity. It was shown for example that 




importantly, we could show that institutions lowered the sensitivity of the simulation to 
both types of perturbations, making it more stable.  
As a second major contribution, Chapter 2 contrasts the role of two important 
mechanisms of information flow, which were termed democracy and propaganda. While 
both democracy and propaganda are programmed in such a way that their main impact 
inside the simulation is the increase of similarity between agents and institutions (in order 
for each to exert more influence on the other), we found that the end result was opposed 
for the two processes: propaganda was shown to increase cultural diversity, while 
democracy was shown to decrease it. Also, democracy increased the number of 
institutions much more than propaganda did.  
These findings are then applied to general political scenarios. Following the discourse on 
the situation of Maya communities in Guatemala from Chapter 4, Chapter 2 provides 
insights as to how it might be possible to intervene in Guatemala to improve the situation. 
Our simulation suggests that the attempts to homogenize and integrate the Maya 
population through top-down processes to address issues of governability of the country 
are doomed to only further splinter and divide the country into smaller subgroups that are 
completely separate and are unwilling to communicate (Fischer, 1996; Morgan Jesse, 
2005). Based on the results of Chapter 2, a more efficient approach to achieve dialogue 
would be an increased democratization of institutions, for example by giving individuals 
across Maya communities more input into all aspects of society and ensuring their voices 
are heard in all matters of decision-making (through for example referenda and voting). 
However, this can also only be done while taking into account a wide variety of trust 
issues and loss of institutional connections stemming from the Guatemalan civil war, and 
as a byproduct of current corruption in Guatemalan institutions, as well as the cultural 
tensions still existing across the different populations living in Guatemala. 
Chapter 3 presents a software platform, the cultural simulator CulSim, which serves to 
bring together decades of research in cultural diversity (such as Axelrod, 1997; Flache & 
Macy, 2011; Klemm et al., 2003; Ulloa, Kacperski, & Sancho, 2016), with the purpose of 
making simulation research of cultural diversity accessible to a broad academic audience. 





Through CulSim, researchers can extend previous work that has employed agent-based 
simulations by exploring a wide range of parameters, which are introduced in Chapter 3 
and the user manual provided in the Appendix 9. CulSim also includes the institutional 
model presented in Chapter 2, enabling researchers to explore further interactions 
between individuals, their cultures, and their institutions. Future research with this models 
might provide us with answers to questions on how to shape institutions that favor a 
global community while at the same time promoting cultural diversity, a discussion that 
has received much attention in the recent decades of globalization, cultural minorities, 
and immigration (Ashraf & Galor, 2011; Azarya, 2004; Daes, 2004; Dunklin, 2005; 
Rothkopf, 1997; Smith & Ward, 2000; Vadlamannati, 2008). 
CulSim also introduces a set of tools to simulate drastic events that have struck societies 
in the past in order to explore their effects on cultural diversity. This set of tools has been 
inspired by the history of the Maya peoples, but it can be applied on this concrete level to 
explore other case studies across most other cultures in the same manner as is proposed in 
Chapter 4. Additionally, it can also be applied on an abstract level without relating it 
specifically to any particular culture.  In that case, it can help testing or generating 
hypotheses of the resilience or resistance of cultural diversity under particular parameter 
configurations.  
In Chapter 4, three historical scenarios are simulated, all of which concern the diversity of 
the Maya peoples’ community: The Classic Maya collapse (Webster, 2002), the Spanish 
invasion of the Guatemalan Highlands (Restall & Asselbergs, 2008) and the Guatemalan 
civil war (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999). On one hand, an overview 
over historical, literary and archeological records is provided to give readers an adequate 
understanding of the historical events that unfolded in Central America over the time span 
of the chosen 1500 years. This overview is provided to illustrate that simulations such as 
the one proposed in this thesis can be usefully applied to a wide variety of cases and, in 
particular, to showcase that a wide variety of literary sources, be they speculative 
(theories on the Maya collapse), qualitative (literary records of Spanish invaders such as 
letters), or quantitative (such as numerical data collected in the Memoria de Silencio) can 
be adopted and translated into useful study designs or parameter/factor levels. 
On the other hand, CulSim is used to simulate these three historical study cases in order 
to illustrate its capability and applicability. It is shown that CulSim is can be used to 




such as immigrants or settlers; it is also shown that CulSim can be used to analyze 
institutional theories, which focus on events such as apostasy or institutional structural 
destructions. 
In general, the major contribution of Chapter 4 is the introduction of reproducible 
methodological approaches which enable researchers to simulate the above mentioned 
types of events with the goal to support or undermine versions of theories proposed by 
preceding literature, in accordance with obtained results.  
Many results from the simulations presented in Chapter 4 support the idea that cultural 
diversity proves resilient against many of the events that the Maya community has 
suffered. This means that Maya cultural diversity persisted in a state similar to the way it 
was 1500 years ago. Results also support the idea that diverse cultures are resistant in 
general to a majority of threats, when we are referring to the preservation of the same or 
very similar cultural traits across centuries. This is particularly evident for cultures that 
start out as diverse from our results, whereas globalized monocultures do not show the 
same level of resilience and resistance, in particular towards those events which target the 
culture’s institution.  
5.2 Discussion 
The following general discussion will focus on three major topics of the presented thesis: 
(a) the role of institutions in the emergence of cultural diversity, (b) the resilience of 
cultural diversity against drastic events, and (c) the applicability of the simulations to real 
life scenarios. The discussion on each of this topics will include contributions, limitations 
and future directions. 
5.2.1 Role of Institutions 
The general contribution of the presented thesis is the introduction of a new 
computational model of emergence of cultural diversity. The model is based on Axelrod’s 
ideas of homophily and categorical cultural traits (1997), and introduces institutions to the 
system. The institutions regulate the interaction between agents, and help stabilizing 
diversity in the presence of perturbations. Similar to Flache & Macy’s model (Flache, 
2011), the institutional model is able to extend the configurations in which cultural 
diversity emerges. Improving on Flache’s model, global parameters, associated with the 




diversity. Thus, they can serve to explain the emergence of different degrees of diversity 
where other parameters fail to give a plausible explanation. In a previous model, an 
increase in neighborhood size was interpreted as the expansion of telecommunications, 
which in turn was shown to reduce cultural diversity (Greig, 2002). And yet, in the real 
world, cultural diversity does exist even in highly interconnected places. Institutional 
parameters can, for such cases, be useful as a possible explanation which keeps cultural 
boundaries intact.  
At the same time, institutions do differ in the amount of institutional influence that they 
exert. To name just one example, ideologies (religion) exert a different level of influence 
over their followers, as opposed to libraries do over visitors. Parameters that control the 
democracy and propaganda inside the simulation also extend possibilities provided by 
institutional influence. 
The results of Chapter 2 indicate that societies where institutions strongly influence their 
member individuals are more likely to produce a wider variety of cultural groups. 
Conversely, individuals that are not strongly connected or do not strongly identify with 
their institutions might end up belonging to more homogeneous societies where values 
and ideologies have mingled. In terms of real life scenarios, this might represent the 
effects of institutions like religions, which tend to demand high levels of identification 
from their members, and which, each by way of excluding individuals who follow other 
religions, form a culturally diverse social landscape. This would be opposed to 
institutions like libraries, who exist in the lives of individuals as areas of providing a wide 
variety of knowledge and meeting spaces, but do not take any approaches to influence 
their members and do not require strong identification but which, just by default of 
existence, homogenize their members by providing for example a certain level of 
education to everyone equally. While those two are examples of institutions that differ 
extremely, the model can also be used to compare differences between similar types of 
institutions such as provinces in Canada as opposed to states in the US. 
While institutions are necessary for cultural groups to emerge, they are not indispensable 
for them to persist over time. The simulation shows that after institutional damages or 
even complete institutional destruction, cultural groups preserve enough distributed 
information to thrive until institutional reconstruction can occur. This is a hopeful 
outlook, especially in view of many disasters that we observe continuously in our modern 




Indonesian tsunamis, which are always devastating for the affected diverse communities. 
It is an interesting point to make when addressing difficulties in planning for disaster 
recovery. During devastating events like those mentioned, it might be more important to 
work with local populations and use the option of helping to rebuild previously existent 
institutions (with improvements that all parties agree on) instead of attempts of 
completely replacing local institutions with ones that come from countries that provide 
disaster relief, sometimes with the “conscious exercise of power in pursuit of gain or 
advantage by the politically strong” (Duffield, 1993, p. 1) 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Although the introduction of institutions to Axelrod’s model is a contribution, it has the 
limitation of lacking enough institutional granularity to describe different levels of 
institutions. In other words, parameters are not intrinsic to cultural groups (or 
institutions), and they do not adjust over time. And although CulSim comes with an event 
which enables a change of institutional parameters at any point of time during the run of 
the simulation, for some scenarios, it would be preferable for parameters to emerge from 
the population. One possible way to approach this feature would be to make the 
institutional parameter dependent on the cultural traits. So far, they affect the behavior of 
agents, but this effect has not gone beyond a simple decision whether they will accept or 
reject a trait. In a way, this proposal would imply that cultural features have an 
institutional association (for example, political or civic engagement). For example, certain 
traits could guide how much institutional influence an institution can exert over each 
agent, or change the institution to act in a more or less democratic manner. 
In the presented simulations, institutions were conceived to act independently from each 
other, only interacting indirectly by way of negotiations among agents. On one hand, the 
assumption that institutions are not autonomous entities is reasonable, as people need to 
take actions for them to exist. On the other hand, it is clear that institutional associations 
do exist (for example, the tax exempt status of churches in many countries combines a 
governmental and religious agreement that comes from different institution). As an 
extension of the present model, institutional hierarchies could be artificially introduced by 
allowing the formation of direct connections between institutions. However, a better 
approach would be to allow individuals to subscribe to multiple institutions, and then it 
would be possible to reconstruct the institutional associations organically, by using the 




agents only being associated to just one institution at a time and also suggest the 
possibility to describe different types of institutions (e.g. by restricting the features they 
could store).  
It is also important to consider the mechanisms of emergence of new institutions. At the 
current state of the simulation, the model only allows new institutions to be formed at the 
beginning of the simulation, or after an institutional destruction event. It would be 
beneficial for future models to implement the possibility of institutional formation at all 
times whenever the population demands. 
All these different and exciting directions of research show the future potential of the 
presented novel institutional model. As with most simulation models, this one is a 
simplification and does not and cannot represent reality with all its complexity and 
factors. Thus, all conclusions made in this thesis should be judged by the restrictions that 
simplifications produce. At the same time, the reduction of complexity is what allows the 
generation of more objective results. In this sense, it is very encouraging that, in spite of 
all the simplifications, the model has been able to provide interesting data on the role that 
institutions play in the formation of cultural groups.  
5.2.2 Resilience of Cultural Diversity 
The formalization of a measurement for resilience in a simulation environment is an 
important contribution of the present thesis. Methodologically speaking, resilience is 
calculated by measuring the state of the simulation at two given times and comparing the 
two states in terms of their similarity with each other. A number of events can be 
introduced between the two states, and the change afterwards will reflect the loss of 
similarity, so resilience is therefore the counterpart, i.e. the extent of similarity between 
the two states.  
Events in CulSim were conceptualized in Chapter 3 using an exhaustive approach in 
terms of the possible ways information in the system can be targeted. This was done with 
regards to both population and institutions, and the structures that connect them. By 
definition, thus, two forms of classification were introduced, (a) the type of information: 
the content and the structure, and (b) the type of target: the population and the 
institutions. This classification proved to be useful to understand the results obtained in 
terms of cultural resilience. One particular finding that was obtained suggested that events 




than events targeting the population. However, results also suggested that another form of 
classification was possible: events that introduced foreign traits or institutions were found 
to be the most detrimental to similarity, regardless whether these traits were introduced at 
the level of institutions or the population. 
Regarding cultural diversity specifically, it was shown that it (in particular as compared to 
monoculture) was very resilient against all implemented events. In Chapter 4, the first 
case study, in which levels of event sizes were explored across all events, indicated a 
strong vulnerability of monocultures to certain events, especially those which targeted 
institutions in a centralized fashion. This result finds support in biological systems: it has 
been suggested that biodiversity increases the resilience in ecosystems on the whole 
(Elmqvist et al., 2003; Peterson, Allen, & Holling, 1998). At the same time, diversity in a 
species’ genetic pool is praised as an advantage to the species overall (Frankham, 2005). 
The resilience of cultural diversity in the presented experiments could also be partially 
attributed to the presence of multiple institutions when there are more cultural groups. 
This hypothesis is supported by the fact that institutional attacks were overall more 
damaging to the cultural composition. This argument has also been made previously: for 
example, the Internet was created as a distributed system of computers, to strengthen the 
system to random failures and avoid attacks to the central nodes (Cohen, Erez, ben-
Avraham, & Havlin, 2000).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
Further studies are required to establish a clearer connection between the amount of 
diversity and the resilience of a cultural system, as many other parameters of the 
simulation, which were not controlled, could be confounding the results. Nonetheless, the 
high values of similarity that were obtained in the three presented case studies serve as 
evidence in the proposed direction. Should it be true that the model resilience found is 
caused by other parameters in the system (e.g. institutional influence, interaction 
neighborhood), the results still show  that cultural diversity can emerge under those 
conditions imposed by the parameters. In this sense, it is important to remember that the 
amount of information also increases with diversity (e.g., more cultural traits are 
conserved, but also, more information is associated with the spatial distribution of the 
cultures); in other words, under exactly the same conditions a diverse system would 




While, as mentioned, the formalization of resilience adds to the literature, as it provides a 
measurable output variable for the study of cultural diversity and its stability over time, 
studying diversity in terms of resilience might be argued to be problematic: critics might 
say that it provides a very rigid measurement of a concept that in itself implies elasticity. 
In response, it is also true that the concept of resilience by definition implies a 
comparison over time. In order for a resilient system to be considered as such, it has to in 
some way return to its original form after an event, or more generally speaking, a 
perturbation – and this implies a comparison.  
In a simulation, the problem of comparing two states of the simulation is in some way 
equivalent to the comparison of two copies of the same picture. Judging the extent of their 
similarity is a non-trivial problem, in particular as subjectivity might be an issue (see 
Figure 29 in Chapter 4). In order to balance the subjectivity of the analysis and raised 
criticism of measurement rigidity at least partially, three criteria were used, aiming at 
several components of cultural composition: the size, position and content (traits) of each 
culture. Multiplication was used to combine these criteria (as opposed to, for example, an 
average) in order to provide a very conservative measure – a low value in any of the three 
criteria will result in a low similarity score for the entire comparison. 
Other measures of similarities should not be completely disregarded. For example, 
researchers might be interested in studying only individual criteria of the three used here, 
such as using cultural content as the sole criterion. This could be useful to improve our 
understanding of the internal dynamics of the model. 
5.2.3 Applicability of the institutional model and CulSim 
Axelrod’s model has inspired a large number of follow-up studies as well as many 
extensions that integrate novel and interesting ideas within the original simulation. The 
vast majority of research reports applicability on a very general level, not unusual within 
the simulation literature (Sokolowski & Banks, 2009), as the purpose of simulations is 
usually to show the key characteristics of a certain type of behavior or process. To my 
knowledge, Axelrod’s model has been applied only once to a real-life scenario by 
Bhavnani (2003) to describe civic traditions across Italy. While it also presents a model of 
institutions and historical events, its methodology, goals and interpretations are 
completely different from the here described simulation, and therefore, any possible 




differences in conceptualization. It is, however, important because it supports the idea 
that it is possible to broaden the scope of applicability of simulations, which has merit in 
itself.  
The present thesis provides another possibility with this objective. Three case studies 
inspired by Maya history are introduced, to show how CulSim can be used by researchers 
from cultural studies, and humanities in general, to explore possible historical scenarios in 
terms of their cultural diversity. In all three case studies, it was possible to draw 
similarities between the simulation and the real life scenarios, and to connect the results 
with implications of the related literature. Moreover, the chosen scenarios differed on 
multiple dimensions, extending the applicability further. They differed regarding (a) the 
area of application: archeology, history, and sociology; (b) the sources of information: 
theories, phenomenological sources, and human rights records; and (c) the methodology: 
exploration of event sizes, analysis for categorization of events, and an in-depth approach 
showcasing different possible dependent variables. 
Finally, with regards to applicability, it is important to point out, as has been mentioned 
by researchers before (Flache & Macy, 2011) that diversity and homogeneity are not 
meant to represent any value judgment in the current thesis. They are not, by value of 
their existence, good or bad. While our case studies in Chapter 4 argue that Maya 
diversity has been important for the preservation of Maya culture and that in this 
example, this is important and valuable, there are instances in which diversity brings with 
it a variety of issues, as can be exemplified by accounts of in-fighting and wars between 
the Maya communities and city states (Webster, 2000). Diverse populations tend to 
ostracism and xenophobia (Fisher, 2013a, 2013b; Flache & Macy, 2011). On the other 
hand, while globalization has been described as less resilient to institutional attacks, the 
benefits of improved communication can be mentioned as an advantage in terms of a 
discourse of integration that has to begin between the Maya communities and the rest of 
the Guatemalan population and the government, in order to improve the Maya peoples’ 
life quality and education.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
As mentioned before, in the context of institutions, any model is by definition a 
simplification of reality, and thus always subject to improvement. Here, I point to some 




First, an important event, displacement, was omitted from CulSim. It is well documented 
that one of the biggest consequences of the Guatemalan civil war was the internal and 
external displacement of its people (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999; 
Stepputat, 1999). External displacement could be approximated with the event of 
decimation, but simulating internal displacement is not possible in the current version of 
CulSim. One possible way to simulate this kind of event would be to relocate the agents 
in the grid by swapping agents’ coordinates. This would alter the internal cultural 
composition, and, based on the results obtained for foreign traits, it could have severe 
consequences for the number of cultural groups. Future researchers could attempt this 
proposal, or suggest better methods to attempt the simulation of this type of event. 
As a second flaw of the proposed model with particular regard to its applicability is the 
timing of the events. When combinations of events are executed in the simulation, they 
are usually executed in a specific order at the same time (iteration) within the simulation. 
A more realistic approach might be to distribute events through a period of time, timing 
them to be more historically accurate. This would be implemented in the simulation by 
introducing a way to schedule events after a certain number of iterations. In terms of 
consequence to the simulations, effects of simultaneous events are more drastic; it is very 
likely that effects of timed events would be lower than the current impact, as a spaced 
timing would allow the system to partially recover between events instead of forcing a 
recovery from one major synchronic combination of events. 
Finally, although the three case studies that were investigated were represented with 
values that were chosen to best approximate real life scenarios, the results presented 
cannot claim to be exhaustive. They were chosen and presented in a way that best 
showcases the possibilities and range of applicability of CulSim, including 
methodological considerations. A comprehensive research project on the Maya case 
studies should extend the scope of the performed literature review and more in-depth 
evaluate values in order to allow a more accurate exploration of different theories related 
with the topic. Many parallels were found between simulation results and real-life 
scenarios, but it is still important to point out that presented studies mainly illustrate the 
way the proposed models and the simulation can be used. Conclusions made from the 
results should be corroborated with further studies; this thesis provides the 





The presented thesis here contributes to the existent literature and research on cultural 
diversity in three important ways. It provides (1) a new model of emergence of cultural 
diversity, (2) a computational framework with the necessary tools to study catastrophic 
events that befall societies, and (3) a number of possible application cases that enable 
future researchers to use the provided tools to test further hypotheses related to cultural 
diversity. 
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Recently, I visited Guatemala again. I spent a few days in Nebaj, in the Ixil region, the 
community where, 10 years ago, I spent the most time working. Some things have for 
sure changed. The eyes of the observer, to start with, but objective things as well: Internet 
and cellphone coverage reaches everywhere, tourism has grown, and the connecting road 
is completely paved now. Other things seem to be frozen in time: the apprehensive gaze 
of inhabitants toward foreign tourists, the lack of visitors from the capital, the market, and 
the traditional clothing. The weakness of Guatemalan institutions is reflected in the 
unceasing violence, a byproduct of both, the armed conflict of the 80s, and the staggering 
corruption of the government. The last president is in jail, the previous one on trial for 
acts of genocide during the armed conflict. The current president ran his campaign with 
the slogan: "Neither corrupt, nor a thief". And while cultural diversity thrives in 
Guatemala, the lack of governmental, centralized leadership has obstructed the 
development of an otherwise resourceful country. At the same time, the inefficiencies of 
the government have allowed the reemergence of local institutions that, with the help of 








Appendix 1. Chapter 1. Diversity differences by populations. 
Legend: 
Yellow: reported values 
Green: main effects and interactions that corroborate reported results 
Blue: means and standard deviations that drive the significant differences 
Purple: alternate possible result that could have been reported 
Noise = level of mutation (ranges from 0.000001 to 0.1) 
Size = population sizes (10x10, 32x32, 100x100) 
Alpha = level of institutional influence (usually between 0.5 and 0.95) 
Alpha_prime = level of agent loyalty (values of 0.05, 0.5 or 0.95) 
 
Diversity differences by populations 
Although some differences are obvious in the Fig 3. of the main document, we found that 
the results seem fairly proportional, especially for the two biggest population (>=32x32) 
and higher alphas. Here is some of the evidence: 
1. We found no statistically difference for alpha 0.95 as it is shown in Test 1, in which 
case not even the interaction with noise was significant.   
2. For populations >= 32x32, if we just control for alpha >= 0.7, we find a significant 
difference for the population size with a considerable high F value in the main effect 
and interactions (see ANOVA 2 in Test 2). However, when we check the averages 
and standard deviations, it seems that two treatments are driving this main effect: 
32x32/0.7/0.5 vs 100x100/0.7/0.5 and 32x32/0.8/0.5, 100x100/0.8/0.5 both with noise 
of 0.1 (see the averages highlighted in cyan in the averages of the Test 2). In order to 
statistically corroborate this, we tested the following: 
2.1. For populations >= 32x32, when we control for alpha >= 0.7 and noise <= 0.01, 
we did not find any significant difference for the main effect of the population 
size (see ANOVA 2 in Test 2). The interactions did present a significant 
difference (highlighted green in ANOVA 2 in Test 2) although the low F values 
suggest a very small effect. 
2.2. For populations >= 32x32, when we control for alpha >= 0.9, we did not find any 
significant difference for the main effect of the population size (see ANOVA 3 in 
Test 2). The interactions did present a significant difference (highlighted green in 




For alpha = 0.95 
Test 1 – Two-way ANOVA comparing main effect of populations on cultural diversity 
for alpha = 0.95.  
Anova Table (Type I tests) 
Response variable: Cultural Diversity 
 
Factors: Noise*Size for alpha = 0.95 
             Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value              Pr(>F)     
Noise         5  8.930  1.7859 332.844 <0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size          2  0.002  0.0009   0.167               0.846     
Noise:Size   10  0.073  0.0073   1.358               0.195     
Residuals   882  4.732  0.0054                                 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
 
Averages of the compared groups 
     0.000001   0.00001    0.0001     0.001     0.01       0.1 
10  0.3482000 0.3786000 0.3502000 0.3368000 0.109400 0.1608000 
32  0.3586719 0.3646094 0.3567773 0.2993945 0.118125 0.1665625 
100 0.3647700 0.3610040 0.3567580 0.2985580 0.123676 0.1744460 
 
Standard deviations of the compared groups 
      0.000001    0.00001     0.0001      0.001        0.01         0.1 
10  0.12310092 0.14159456 0.15516272 0.14299194 0.085509517 0.041641816 
32  0.03890176 0.03069054 0.04192173 0.03812455 0.021656675 0.028318704 
100 0.01397752 0.01396468 0.01198097 0.01415235 0.007738047 0.008887763 
For alpha > 0.7 
Test 2 – Three-way ANOVA comparing main effect of populations on cultural diversity, 
ANOVA 1 including all noise and size models with alpha >= 0.7. ANOVA 2 subsets data 
by noise <= 0.01 for alpha >= 0.7, and ANOVA 3 displays results for all noises and sized, 
but for alpha >=0.9.  
Anova Table (Type I tests) 




Factors: Alpha(>=0.7)*Noise*Size  
                   Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value               Pr(>F)     
Alpha               3   7.35   2.451  622.40 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise               5  32.83   6.567 1667.44 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size                1   0.21   0.209   52.99    0.000000000000454 *** 
Alpha:Noise        15  58.87   3.925  996.57 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Alpha:Size          3   0.59   0.195   49.57 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise:Size          5   1.21   0.242   61.51 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Alpha:Noise:Size   15   3.20   0.213   54.20 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Residuals        2352   9.26   0.004                                  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
 
ANOVA 2 
Factors: Alpha(>=0.7)*Noise(<=0.01)*Size  
                   Df Sum Sq Mean Sq  F value               Pr(>F)     
Alpha               3 18.054   6.018 9207.907 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise               4  4.989   1.247 1908.434 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size                1  0.001   0.001    1.406               0.2359     
Alpha:Noise        12  2.016   0.168  257.089 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Alpha:Size          3  0.020   0.007   10.023           0.00000149 *** 
Noise:Size          4  0.011   0.003    4.036               0.0029 **  
Alpha:Noise:Size   12  0.011   0.001    1.350               0.1836     
Residuals        1960  1.281   0.001                                   
--- 







Factors: Alpha(>=0.9)*Noise*Size  
                   Df Sum Sq Mean Sq  F value               Pr(>F)     
Alpha               1  4.399   4.399 7735.524 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise               5  6.023   1.205 2118.309 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size                1  0.001   0.001    1.638              0.20085     
Alpha:Noise         5  1.243   0.249  437.001 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Alpha:Size          1  0.005   0.005    9.636              0.00195 **  
Noise:Size          5  0.018   0.004    6.256           0.00000975 *** 
Alpha:Noise:Size    5  0.006   0.001    2.236              0.04861 *   
Residuals        1176  0.669   0.001                                   
---s 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1)     
 
 
Averages of the compared groups 
32x32: 
 
      0.000001    0.00001     0.0001      0.001       0.01       0.1 
0.7  0.1036328 0.07275391 0.04289063 0.01794922 0.02898437 0.9999609 
0.8  0.1366016 0.11832031 0.08208984 0.03654297 0.03953125 0.1848047 
0.9  0.2079883 0.21148437 0.19265625 0.13765625 0.05285156 0.1605859 




     0.000001  0.00001   0.0001    0.001     0.01      0.1 
0.7  0.107312 0.079202 0.046138 0.024656 0.044248 0.999938 
0.8  0.121038 0.112404 0.078220 0.041880 0.038652 0.639134 
0.9  0.194498 0.194736 0.178012 0.124836 0.061804 0.173120 
0.95 0.364770 0.361004 0.356758 0.298558 0.123676 0.174446 
 
 
Standard deviations of the compared groups 
32x32: 
       0.000001    0.00001     0.0001      0.001       0.01          0.1 
0.7  0.05196727 0.05134128 0.04172406 0.01776962 0.02527264 0.0001933087 
0.8  0.03242833 0.03695716 0.03067827 0.01333619 0.01679011 0.0126984702 
0.9  0.03494106 0.03223964 0.04148088 0.03021904 0.01137599 0.0134539850 
0.95 0.03890176 0.03069054 0.04192173 0.03812455 0.02165668 0.0283187043 
 
100x100: 
       0.000001     0.00001      0.0001       0.001        0.01           0.1 
0.7  0.01858153 0.012621095 0.014854215 0.010980877 0.024396071 0.00006667007 
0.8  0.01066135 0.010140582 0.009223661 0.004281617 0.004210300 0.40198894726 
0.9  0.01389960 0.009546316 0.012931636 0.009466024 0.004440397 0.00853676324 






Appendix 2. Chapter 1. Diversity differences by agent loyalty. 
Legend: 
Yellow: reported values 
Green: main effects and interactions that corroborate reported results 
Blue: means and standard deviations that drive the significant differences 
Purple: alternate possible result that could have been reported 
Noise = level of mutation (ranges from 0.000001 to 0.1) 
Size = population sizes (10x10, 32x32, 100x100) 
Alpha = level of institutional influence (usually between 0.5 and 0.95) 
Alpha_prime = level of agent loyalty (values of 0.05, 0.5 or 0.95) 
 
Diversity differences by agent loyalty 
For alpha_prime = 0.05 vs 0.5 
We find a statistically difference for alpha_prime when we compare 0.05 vs 0.5 in the 
main effects and in the interactions. The low values of F suggest that the effects are small, 
which can be appreciated in Fig 5. 
Test 3 – Three-way ANOVA comparing main effect of alpha_prime on cultural diversity 
when alpha_prime 0.05 and 0.5. 
Anova Table (Type I tests) 
Response variable: Cultural Diversity 
 
Factors: Noise*Size*Alpha_Prime  
                   Df Sum Sq Mean Sq  F value               Pr(>F)     
Noise                     5  49.66   9.931 1318.90 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size                      2   2.69   1.347  178.92 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Alpha_Prime               1   0.25   0.245   32.57         0.0000000135 *** 
Noise:Size               10  37.94   3.794  503.89 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise:Alpha_Prime         5   1.03   0.207   27.47 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size:Alpha_Prime          2   0.19   0.095   12.65         0.0000034979 *** 
Noise:Size:Alpha_Prime   10   0.97   0.097   12.84 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Residuals              1764  13.28   0.008                                  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
 
 
Averages of the compared groups 
10x10: 
     0.000001 0.00001 0.0001  0.001   0.01    0.1 
0.05   0.2204  0.1966 0.0754 0.0112 0.0244 0.1824 
0.5    0.2416  0.2058 0.1558 0.0752 0.0582 0.1844 
 
32x32: 
       0.000001    0.00001     0.0001      0.001       0.01       0.1 
0.05 0.07212891 0.05546875 0.02761719 0.01611328 0.02095703 0.4638867 
0.5  0.12921875 0.11574219 0.07742187 0.04136719 0.03480469 0.2240820 
 
100x100: 
     0.000001  0.00001   0.0001    0.001     0.01      0.1 
0.05 0.015178 0.012350 0.009108 0.011186 0.026418 0.999938 
0.5  0.110166 0.090392 0.054666 0.027842 0.034284 0.999958 
 
 
Standard deviations of the compared groups 
10x10: 




0.05 0.09774937 0.08913668 0.0723994 0.003282607 0.01342553 0.04569464 
0.5  0.12253046 0.11770059 0.1249504 0.087975878 0.09272936 0.04248217 
 
32x32: 
       0.000001    0.00001     0.0001      0.001        0.01       0.1 
0.05 0.02715806 0.02796937 0.01348416 0.00752120 0.009566712 0.3889801 
0.5  0.03407586 0.03706017 0.02921841 0.01934477 0.012353845 0.1607923 
 
100x100: 
        0.000001     0.00001      0.0001       0.001        0.01           0.1 
0.05 0.007169587 0.004478714 0.002681824 0.004027407 0.003808567 0.00008302938 
0.5  0.010767517 0.012383314 0.008317589 0.005293126 0.006277636 0.00007024738 
For alpha_prime = 0.5 vs 0.95 
In the case of the comparison between alpha_prime of 0.05 and 0.5, the differences 
become even smaller.  
First, we found and almost not significant effect for alpha_prime in ANOVA 1 (Test 4). 
However, when we control by population size = 32x32 and noise <=0.01 (ANOVA 2 in 
Test 4), we find a significant difference. The low F value also suggest a very small effect. 
When we control by population size = 100x100 (ANOVA 2 inTest 4), we find a 
significant difference. In this case the F value is considerable, and the interaction with 
noise is also significant. 
We see a higher significant for higher population sizes. However, we are using different 
values of alpha for different population sizes: 0.85 for 10x10, 0.8 for 32x32 and 0.75 for 
100x100. It is more likely that the difference has to be attributed to the alpha values than 
the population size because: 
1. We show in Experiment A that the results were fairly proportional across populations. 
2. Alpha_prime is a dependant variable of alpha. We can appreciate this in Table 2 
(Chapter 1), Step 3. 
Test 4. Three-way ANOVA comparing main effect of alpha_prime on cultural diversity, 
with ANOVA 1 displaying results when alpha_prime 0.5 and 0.95. ANOVA 2 subsets 
data for noise levels <0.1 and population size 32x32 only. ANOVA 3 displays results for 
all noise levels and population size 100x100. 
Anova Table (Type I tests) 




Factors: Noise*Size*Alpha_Prime  
                         Df Sum Sq Mean Sq  F value              Pr(>F)     
Alpha_Prime               1   0.02   0.017    3.051              0.0809 .   
Noise                     5  37.52   7.504 1311.228 <0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size                      2   4.02   2.010  351.288 <0.0000000000000002 *** 
Alpha_Prime:Noise         5   0.05   0.010    1.743              0.1215     
Alpha_Prime:Size          2   0.01   0.006    0.981              0.3750     
Noise:Size               10  39.84   3.984  696.190 <0.0000000000000002 *** 
Alpha_Prime:Noise:Size   10   0.04   0.004    0.629              0.7901     
Residuals              1764  10.10   0.006                                  
--- 






Factors: Noise(<0.1)*Alpha_Prime for Size=32x32 
                   Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value               Pr(>F)     
Noise               4 0.6162 0.15405 157.902 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Alpha_Prime         1 0.0120 0.01201  12.307             0.000493 *** 
Noise:Alpha_Prime   4 0.0074 0.00186   1.908             0.107849     
Residuals         490 0.4781 0.00098                                  
--- 




Factors: Noise*Alpha_Prime for Size=100x100 
                   Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value               Pr(>F)     
Noise               5  72.63  14.527 141740.94 <0.0000000000000002 *** 
Alpha_Prime         1   0.01   0.011    109.87 <0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise:Alpha_Prime   5   0.02   0.003     31.84 <0.0000000000000002 *** 
Residuals         588   0.06   0.000                                   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
 
 
Averages of the compared groups 
10x10: 
     0.000001 0.00001 0.0001  0.001   0.01    0.1 
0.5    0.2416  0.2058 0.1558 0.0752 0.0582 0.1844 
0.95   0.2326  0.1832 0.1436 0.1154 0.0506 0.1912 
 
32x32: 
      0.000001   0.00001     0.0001      0.001       0.01       0.1 
0.5  0.1292188 0.1157422 0.07742187 0.04136719 0.03480469 0.2240820 
0.95 0.1250000 0.1233789 0.09439453 0.05718750 0.04759766 0.2396094 
 
100X100: 
     0.000001  0.00001   0.0001    0.001     0.01      0.1 
0.5  0.110166 0.090392 0.054666 0.027842 0.034284 0.999958 
0.95 0.103798 0.093024 0.070262 0.049850 0.052394 0.999966 
 
Standard deviations of the compared groups 
10x10: 
      0.000001   0.00001    0.0001      0.001       0.01        0.1 
0.5  0.1225305 0.1177006 0.1249504 0.08797588 0.09272936 0.04248217 
0.95 0.1312702 0.1166442 0.1340539 0.10725156 0.08092350 0.04288761 
 
32x32: 
       0.000001    0.00001     0.0001      0.001       0.01       0.1 
0.5  0.03407586 0.03706017 0.02921841 0.01934477 0.01235384 0.1607923 
0.95 0.04607260 0.03860573 0.03067649 0.03018372 0.01938804 0.1945799 
 
100X100: 
       0.000001    0.00001      0.0001       0.001        0.01           0.1 
0.5  0.01076752 0.01238331 0.008317589 0.005293126 0.006277636 0.00007024738 






Appendix 3. Chapter 1. Diversity differences by democracy. 
Legend: 
Yellow: reported values 
Green: main effects and interactions that corroborate reported results 
Blue: means and standard deviations that drive the significant differences 
Purple: alternate possible result that could have been reported 
Noise = level of mutation (ranges from 0.000001 to 0.1) 
Size = population sizes (10x10, 32x32, 100x100) 
Alpha = level of institutional influence (usually between 0.5 and 0.95) 
Alpha_prime = level of agent loyalty (values of 0.05, 0.5 or 0.95) 
 
Diversity differences by democracy 
For democracy = 1/10 vs 1/100 vs 1/1000, population 10x10 
For a population size of 10x10, we observe a monotonous result for democracy when 
noise <=0.01 in Figure 6 (chapter 1), i.e. the higher the democracy, the lower the 
diversity.  
1. The ANOVA 1 in Test 5 shows a significant effect for democracy, although observing 
the Fig 6. it is clear that the noise = 0.1 is driving a big portion of the effect,  
2. For noise < 0.1, ANOVA 2 in Test 5, democracy still shows a significant difference, 
and there is a significant effect for the interaction. 
Test 5 – Two-way ANOVA comparing main effect of democracy on cultural diversity. 
First reported ANOVA displays results for population 10x10 only. ANOVA 2 displays 
subset results for noise <= 0.01. 
Anova Tables (Type I tests) 
Response variable: Cultural Diversity 
 
ANOVA 1 
Factors: Noise*Democracy for population size of 10x10: 
                 Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value              Pr(>F)     
Noise             5 18.547   3.709  1189.5 <0.0000000000000002 *** 
Democracy         2  2.662   1.331   426.8 <0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise:Democracy  10 20.685   2.069   663.3 <0.0000000000000002 *** 
Residuals       882  2.751   0.003                                 
--- 




Factors: Noise(<=0.01)*Democracy for population size of 10x10: 
                 Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value               Pr(>F)     
Noise             4 1.7095  0.4274 122.464 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Democracy         2 0.3406  0.1703  48.806 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise:Democracy   8 0.1209  0.0151   4.331            0.0000407 *** 
Residuals       735 2.5649  0.0035                                  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
 
Averages of the compared groups 
       0.000001 0.00001 0.0001  0.001   0.01    0.1 
1/10     0.1094  0.1148 0.0302 0.0140 0.0306 1.0000 
1/100    0.1318  0.1142 0.0664 0.0246 0.0234 0.1716 





Standard deviations of the compared groups 
         0.000001    0.00001     0.0001      0.001       0.01        0.1 
1/10   0.05950167 0.05406874 0.03100296 0.01511858 0.01391079 0.00000000 
1/100  0.07678993 0.08119239 0.06598577 0.03796938 0.01334166 0.04210579 
1/1000 0.08845707 0.07568059 0.08813811 0.05041906 0.04661654 0.04488716 
For democracy = 1/10 vs 1/100 vs 1/1000, populations 32x32 and 
100x100  
For bigger populations sizes (or smaller alphas), the effect of democracy is non-
monotonous. We observe the lowest values of diversity with moderate democracy 
(1/100). To corroborate this observation we decided to test the two contrast, Low 
(1/1000) vs Moderate (1/100) and Moderate (1/100) vs High (1/10):  
1. For noises <= 0.01, the contrast 1/1000 vs 1/100 (ANOVA 3 in Test 5) shows a 
significant difference for democracy with a strong effect. The ANOVA 2 in Test 5 
removes the control for noise which in the Figure 6 (chapter 1) is evident that is 
driving a strong effect; the significance persist, but as expected the effect is moved to 
the interactions. 
2. For noises <= 0.01, the contrast 1/100 vs 1/10 (ANOVA 5 in Test 5) also shows a 
significant difference with a strong effect. The ANOVA 4 in Test 5 removes the 
control for noise which in the Figure 6 (chapter 1) is evident that is driving a strong 
effect; the significance persist, but as expected the effect is moved to the interactions. 
A complete ANOVA removing the controls for noise and democracy is also shown for 
reference (ANOVA 1 in Test 5) 
Test 6 – Three-way ANOVA comparing main effect of democracy on cultural diversity. 
ANOVA 1 displays results for population 32x32 and 100x100. ANOVAs 2 and 3 display 
subset results for democracy at 1/1000 and 1/100, and ANOVA 3 displays results for 
noise <= 0.01. ANOVAs 4 and 5 dusplay subset results for democracy at 1/10 and 1/100 
and ANOVA 5 displays results for noise <= 0.01. 
Anova Tables (Type I tests) 
Response variable: Cultural Diversity 
 
ANOVA 1 
Factors: Noise*Size(>=32x32)*Democracy (1/1000,1/100, 1/10): 
                       Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value               Pr(>F)     
Noise                   5 189.53   37.91 8675.34 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size                    1   0.17    0.17   38.17       0.000000000804 *** 
Democracy               2   0.56    0.28   64.11 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise:Size              5   2.32    0.46  106.01 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise:Democracy        10   4.33    0.43   99.00 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size:Democracy          2   0.66    0.33   75.92 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise:Size:Democracy   10   4.14    0.41   94.75 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Residuals            1764   7.71    0.00                                  
--- 




                       Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value               Pr(>F)     
Noise                   5 113.98  22.797 3513.33 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size                    1   0.30   0.304   46.84      0.0000000000123 *** 
Democracy               1   0.31   0.305   47.01      0.0000000000114 *** 
Noise:Size              5   3.38   0.676  104.11 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 




Size:Democracy          1   0.52   0.521   80.31 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise:Size:Democracy    5   3.08   0.615   94.79 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Residuals            1176   7.63   0.006                                  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
    
ANOVA 3                       
Factors: Noise(<=0.01)*Size(>=32x32)*Democracy(1/1000,1/100): 
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value               Pr(>F)     
Noise                  4 0.3808 0.09521 420.305 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size                   1 0.0594 0.05941 262.274 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Democracy              1 0.0588 0.05880 259.595 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise:Size             4 0.0292 0.00731  32.271 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise:Democracy        4 0.0188 0.00470  20.750 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size:Democracy         1 0.0032 0.00321  14.187             0.000175 *** 
Noise:Size:Democracy   4 0.0022 0.00056   2.452             0.044485 *   
Residuals            980 0.2220 0.00023                                  
--- 




                       Df Sum Sq Mean Sq    F value               Pr(>F)     
Noise                   5 154.57  30.915 215284.136 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size                    1   0.02   0.019    129.615 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Democracy               1   0.03   0.026    181.358 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise:Size              5   0.01   0.003     18.730 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise:Democracy         5   0.03   0.007     46.648 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size:Democracy          1   0.00   0.001      8.109              0.00448 **  
Noise:Size:Democracy    5   0.00   0.000      2.684              0.02024 *   
Residuals            1176   0.17   0.000                                     
--- 




                      Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value               Pr(>F)     
Noise                  4 0.4327 0.10816 627.728 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size                   1 0.0224 0.02237 129.824 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Democracy              1 0.0312 0.03124 181.324 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise:Size             4 0.0097 0.00242  14.059      0.0000000000369 *** 
Noise:Democracy        4 0.0283 0.00707  41.047 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size:Democracy         1 0.0014 0.00141   8.154              0.00439 **  
Noise:Size:Democracy   4 0.0017 0.00042   2.446              0.04491 *   
Residuals            980 0.1689 0.00017                                  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
 
 
Averages of the compared groups 
32x32: 
         0.000001    0.00001     0.0001      0.001       0.01       0.1 
1/10   0.08638672 0.07287109 0.03712891 0.01599609 0.02455078 0.9999414 
1/100  0.06660156 0.05585938 0.03074219 0.01355469 0.02613281 0.9999023 
1/1000 0.09386719 0.08761719 0.05460937 0.02238281 0.02902344 0.4639063 
 
100x100: 
       0.000001  0.00001   0.0001    0.001     0.01      0.1 
1/10   0.074994 0.063752 0.025664 0.013628 0.023452 0.999946 
1/100  0.046554 0.033660 0.018570 0.010562 0.024394 0.999972 
1/1000 0.062926 0.055344 0.029582 0.013508 0.031136 0.999958 
 
Standard deviations of the compared groups 
32x32:  
 
         0.000001    0.00001     0.0001       0.001        0.01          0.1 
1/10   0.02478725 0.01947626 0.01302671 0.007270249 0.008854169 0.0002342747 
1/100  0.01947936 0.02021195 0.01485654 0.012223785 0.017675908 0.0002959424 






         0.000001     0.00001      0.0001       0.001        0.01           
0.1 
1/10   0.00998407 0.010479294 0.005551163 0.004795620 0.003979039 
0.00008621284 
1/100  0.01294161 0.007113769 0.006142500 0.008590286 0.008499806 
0.00005360475 






Appendix 4. Chapter 1. Diversity differences by democracy / 
propaganda combined.  
Legend: 
Yellow: reported values 
Green: main effects and interactions that corroborate reported results 
Blue: means and standard deviations that drive the significant differences 
Purple: alternate possible result that could have been reported 
Noise = level of mutation (ranges from 0.000001 to 0.1) 
Size = population sizes (10x10, 32x32, 100x100) 
Alpha = level of institutional influence (usually between 0.5 and 0.95) 
Alpha_prime = level of agent loyalty (values of 0.05, 0.5 or 0.95) 
 
Diversity differences by democracy/propaganda combined 
For democracy = 1/1000 and all propaganda levels = 1/5, 1/3, 1/1 
Apart from the sensitivity for propaganda after noise >= 0.01, other effects are difficult to 
perceive in Fig.8. This sensitivity is driving the main effect. For noise >= 0.001, we 
observe very little effects. However, we did find a significant difference (ANOVA 3 of 
Test 7), especially when we control for bigger population sizes (>=32x32), and high 
noises (>=0.0001). Although the effects are small, they are very interesting because they 
move in the opposite direction of Propaganda in Experiment E, when Democracy was not 
present; i.e. there is an interaction between propaganda and democracy. 
Test 7 – Three-way ANOVA comparing main effect of propaganda on cultural diversity 
when democracy is rare (1/1000). ANOVA 1 displays results for all noises, propaganda 
frequencies, and populations. ANOVAs 2 and 3 displays results for subsetted data for 
noise levels below 0.0001. ANOVA 3 displays results only for populations 32x32 and 
100x100. 
Anova Tables (Type I tests) 




                        Df Sum Sq Mean Sq   F value               Pr(>F)     
Noise                    5  62.08  12.416  5951.435 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size                     2   0.09   0.046    22.182       0.000000000279 *** 
Propaganda               2  44.89  22.446 10759.077 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise:Size              10   0.25   0.025    11.881 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise:Propaganda        10  96.86   9.686  4642.764 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size:Propaganda          4   0.01   0.002     0.783                0.536     
Noise:Size:Propaganda   20   0.13   0.006     3.068       0.000005245431 *** 
Residuals             2646   5.52   0.002                                    
--- 




Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value               Pr(>F)     
Noise                   1 0.0038 0.00378   1.489               0.2228     
Size                    2 0.2294 0.11472  45.199 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 




Noise:Size              2 0.0045 0.00227   0.896               0.4088     
Noise:Propaganda        2 0.0062 0.00312   1.227               0.2936     
Size:Propaganda         4 0.0203 0.00508   2.002               0.0923 .   
Noise:Size:Propaganda   4 0.0015 0.00038   0.152               0.9623     
Residuals             882 2.2387 0.00254                                  
--- 




                       Df  Sum Sq Mean Sq F value               Pr(>F)     
Noise                   1 0.00788 0.00788  18.563            0.0000193 *** 
Size                    1 0.00682 0.00682  16.070            0.0000689 *** 
Propaganda              2 0.12098 0.06049 142.552 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise:Size              1 0.00008 0.00008   0.198               0.6561     
Noise:Propaganda        2 0.00318 0.00159   3.744               0.0242 *   
Size:Propaganda         2 0.00149 0.00074   1.750               0.1747     
Noise:Size:Propaganda   2 0.00062 0.00031   0.735               0.4802     
Residuals             588 0.24951 0.00042                                  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
 
 
Averages of the compared groups 
10x10: 
    0.000001 0.00001 0.0001  0.001   0.01    0.1 
1/1   0.0860  0.0978 0.0578 0.0216 0.9230 0.9022 
1/3   0.0982  0.0924 0.0584 0.0126 0.1146 0.0394 
1/5   0.1046  0.1052 0.0382 0.0144 0.0578 0.1606 
 
32x32: 
      0.000001    0.00001     0.0001      0.001       0.01        0.1 
1/1 0.03835938 0.04074219 0.03046875 0.01876953 0.94769531 0.92603516 
1/3 0.07048828 0.05957031 0.03685547 0.01375000 0.09410156 0.06259766 
1/5 0.08279297 0.07183594 0.03351562 0.01503906 0.03740234 0.17296875 
 
100x100: 
    0.000001  0.00001   0.0001    0.001     0.01      0.1 
1/1 0.052162 0.047994 0.033640 0.022672 0.949994 0.918334 
1/3 0.075648 0.068164 0.035686 0.013492 0.057712 0.066692 
1/5 0.086306 0.073970 0.029030 0.013694 0.035884 0.189448 
 
 
Standard deviations of the compared groups 
10x10: 
      0.000001    0.00001     0.0001       0.001       0.01        0.1 
1/1 0.06809357 0.10400726 0.04482574 0.023678114 0.06078567 0.03430297 
1/3 0.08100617 0.07075569 0.04896313 0.007507819 0.15868349 0.02024442 
1/5 0.08981182 0.07420985 0.04173238 0.011807988 0.03052533 0.04455723 
 
32x32:  
      0.000001    0.00001     0.0001      0.001        0.01         0.1 
1/1 0.02060112 0.02536458 0.02052157 0.01645530 0.008467996 0.008671598 
1/3 0.03042746 0.02191401 0.02558900 0.01464889 0.149118766 0.013177872 
1/5 0.02856650 0.03017663 0.02040214 0.01200263 0.012138479 0.025101250 
 
100x100:  
      0.000001     0.00001      0.0001       0.001        0.01         0.1 
1/1 0.01041206 0.014719769 0.006935740 0.018619510 0.005588706 0.003508858 
1/3 0.01435031 0.010723097 0.012583533 0.008457260 0.011089279 0.004795229 






Appendix 5. Chapter 1. Stable states of equilibrium. 
Fig. A to Fig. F display convergence in our experiment A models for all 6 different levels of noise 
(Fig. A starting with 0.000001 to Fig. F at 0.1).  Each line displays (as an average over 50 
repetitions) the behavior of the systems as the agents attempt on average 100,000 interactions 
with their neighbors. The end point of each line (at 100,000 interactions) corresponds to one 
single point in Figure 3 in chapter 1. 
To summarize, we can see that some configurations of alpha = 0.5 do not reach an equilibrium, so 
they may further converge towards a monoculture. Less extreme, but similarly the lines at alpha = 
0.95 do not seem to have reached complete stability yet, and some decrease is to be expected. For 
all other values and noise levels, the level of stability is satisfactory.  
Fig. G shows single runs from the same configurations as above. Each run was randomly selected 
out of the 50 repetitions that we performed. Comparing Fig. G to L to Fig. A to F, we can say that 
our averaged lines are good representations of individual lines' behaviors. 
Cultural regions over time at n=0.000001 
 
Fig. A. Average number of cultural regions over time with n=0.000001. The averages 
are calculated out of 50 repetitions. Axis-x represent the iteration number, and Axis-Y the 
cultural diversity (number of cultures divided by population size). From left to right, the 
graph represents 10x10, 32x32 and 100x100 populations. The legend shows the color use 




Cultural regions over time at n=0.00001 
 
Fig. B. Average number of cultural regions over time with n=0.00001. The averages 
are calculated out of 50 repetitions. Axis-x represent the iteration number, and Axis-Y the 
cultural diversity (number of cultures divided by population size). From left to right, the 
graph represents 10x10, 32x32 and 100x100 populations. The legend shows the color use 
for the different values of alpha (institutional influence). 
Cultural regions over time at n=0.0001 
 
Fig. C. Average number of cultural regions over time with n=0.0001. The averages 
are calculated out of 50 repetitions. Axis-x represent the iteration number, and Axis-Y the 
cultural diversity (number of cultures divided by population size). From left to right, the 
graph represents 10x10, 32x32 and 100x100 populations. The legend shows the color use 





Cultural regions over time at n=0.001 
 
Fig. D. Average number of cultural regions over time with n=0.001. The averages are 
calculated out of 50 repetitions. Axis-x represent the iteration number, and Axis-Y the 
cultural diversity (number of cultures divided by population size). From left to right, the 
graph represents 10x10, 32x32 and 100x100 populations. The legend shows the color use 
for the different values of alpha (institutional influence). 
Cultural regions over time at n=0.01 
 
Fig. E. Average number of cultural regions over time with n=0.01. The averages are 
calculated out of 50 repetitions. Axis-x represent the iteration number, and Axis-Y the 
cultural diversity (number of cultures divided by population size). From left to right, the 
graph represents 10x10, 32x32 and 100x100 populations. The legend shows the color use 




Cultural regions over time at n=0.1 
 
Fig. F. Average number of cultural regions over time with n=0.1. The averages are 
calculated out of 50 repetitions. Axis-x represent the iteration number, and Axis-Y the 
cultural diversity (number of cultures divided by population size). From left to right, the 
graph represents 10x10, 32x32 and 100x100 populations. The legend shows the color use 
for the different values of alpha (institutional influence). 
Cultural regions over time for one run at n=0.000001 
 
Fig. G. Number of cultural regions over time for single runs with n=0.000001. Each 
line represent a single run of the simulation. Axis-x represent the iteration number, and 
Axis-Y the cultural diversity (number of cultures divided by population size). From left to 
right, the graph represents 10x10, 32x32 and 100x100 populations. The legend shows the 




Cultural regions over time for one run at n=0.00001 
 
Fig. H. Number of cultural regions over time for single runs with n=0.00001. Each 
line represent a single run of the simulation. Axis-x represent the iteration number, and 
Axis-Y the cultural diversity (number of cultures divided by population size). From left to 
right, the graph represents 10x10, 32x32 and 100x100 populations. The legend shows the 
color use for the different values of alpha (institutional influence). 
Cultural regions over time for one run at n=0.0001 
 
Fig. I. Number of cultural regions over time for single runs with n=0.0001. Each line 
represent a single run of the simulation. Axis-x represent the iteration number, and Axis-
Y the cultural diversity (number of cultures divided by population size). From left to 
right, the graph represents 10x10, 32x32 and 100x100 populations. The legend shows the 




Cultural regions over time for one run at n=0.001 
 
Fig. J. Number of cultural regions over time for single runs with n=0.001. Each line 
represent a single run of the simulation. Axis-x represent the iteration number, and Axis-
Y the cultural diversity (number of cultures divided by population size). From left to 
right, the graph represents 10x10, 32x32 and 100x100 populations. The legend shows the 
color use for the different values of alpha (institutional influence). 
Cultural regions over time for one run at n=0.01 
 
Fig. K.  Number of cultural regions over time for single runs with n=0.01. Each line 
represents a single run of the simulation. Axis-x represent the iteration number, and Axis-
Y the cultural diversity (number of cultures divided by population size). From left to 
right, the graph represents 10x10, 32x32 and 100x100 populations. The legend shows the 




Cultural regions over time for one run at n=0.1 
 
Fig. K. Number of cultural regions over time for single runs with n=0. 1. Each line 
represent a single run of the simulation. Axis-x represent the iteration number, and Axis-
Y the cultural diversity (number of cultures divided by population size). From left to 
right, the graph represents 10x10, 32x32 and 100x100 populations. The legend shows the 





Appendix 6. Chapter 1. Replication of Axelrod/Flache's 
results. 
Legend: 
Yellow: reported values 
Green: main effects and interactions that corroborate reported results 
Blue: means and standard deviations that drive the significant differences 
Purple: alternate possible result that could have been reported 
Noise = level of mutation (ranges from 0.000001 to 0.1) 
Size = population sizes (10x10, 32x32, 100x100) 
Alpha = level of institutional influence (usually between 0.5 and 0.95) 
Alpha_prime = level of agent loyalty (values of 0.05, 0.5 or 0.95) 
We will now present results from a replication of both Axelrod's and Flache's models 
with Flache's implementation comparing them to our own code implementation.  
We decided to re-implement Flache's model because:  
1. we have the intention to integrate our model of institutional influence with Flache's 
model of multilateral social influence in the future 
2. because when we attempted a replication of their model with their code, we had 
computational failures, especially for the biggest population size, which requires a lot 
of computational power  
We optimized the code in several ways:  
1. we do not implement a graphical user interface 
2. we introduce thread management 
3. we use native matrices 
4. we avoid the use of classes, methods and unnecessary initializations (recycling 
structures) 
5. we use buffers to manage the input and output of results  
The replication of their model with our code was qualitatively successful (see continuous 
line in Fig. , where the lines in the plot are almost parallel and converge with higher 
values of noise). However, statistically, we did find a significant difference between the 
two implementations. Test 8 displays the ANOVA with three factors: implementation (i.e. 
two code variations), population size, and noise. The test is limited to only the two 
population sizes 10x10 and 32x32, because as mentioned before, due to computational 
difficulties we could not finish a run with their code for the population 100x100. Finally, 
our replications yields better results for our implementation of Flache et al's model, i.e. 
we manage to produce more diversity for their hypothesis (on their response variable, size 
of the biggest culture) with our code than when implementing theirs. This means that 




Test 8. Anova comparing the two implementations (Implem), Flache's code vs our code, 
population size (N) and noise. The implementations are two replications of the 
multilateral social influence model proposed by Flache et al, one is Flache's code 
implementation, and the other is ours. 
Anova Table (Type I tests) 
Response: Size of the biggest culture 
Factors: Size*Noise*Implem 
                    Df  Sum Sq Mean Sq  F value               Pr(>F)     
Size                 1 2451919 2451919 8856.959 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise                5  626111  125222  452.335 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Implem               1   22283   22283   80.491 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size:Noise           5  346196   69239  250.109 < 0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size:Implem          1   12526   12526   45.247      0.0000000000271 *** 
Noise:Implem         5   14355    2871   10.371      0.0000000009474 *** 
Size:Noise:Implem    5    7693    1539    5.558      0.0000455284940 *** 
Residuals         1176  325558     277 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
 
 
Averages of the compared groups 
Flache's implementation: 
     0.000001 0.00001 0.0001 0.001  0.01    0.1 
100     16.58   16.24  12.18  6.18  2.74  10.36 
1024   130.26  131.36 105.12 65.16 34.14 101.90 
 
Our implementation: 
     0.000001 0.00001 0.0001 0.001  0.01   0.1 
100     22.82    19.3  14.76  7.54  2.40  10.4 
1024   157.84   158.2 131.62 69.88 36.38 104.5 
 
 
Standard deviations of the compared groups 
Flache's implementation: 
     0.000001  0.00001    0.0001     0.001     0.01       0.1 
100  10.45123 10.09457  8.416917  7.702875 2.655837  2.553589 
1024 28.34252 27.02437 26.042070 18.505774 8.111493 10.842565 
 
Our implementation: 
     0.000001   0.00001   0.0001     0.001     0.01       0.1 
100  10.73938  7.442981 10.62642  8.048856 1.428571  3.103652 






Graph of biggest cultural regions comparing Axelrod and 
Flache in Flaches code vs our code 
 
Fig. A Biggest cultural region on different implementation of the same model. The X 
axis shows the different levels of noise, and the Y axis the normalized size of the biggest 
cultural region (size of the biggest cultural region/population size). The results of the two 
different models (Axelrod and Flache), as implement by Flache (blue) vs ours (red) are 
represented in the graph for populations 10x10 and 32x32, while only Flache's code (for 
Axelrod and Flache) is displayed in 100x100. Each point on the line is an average of the 
final cultural diversity of 50 repetitions with 100000 iterations on average per agent. 
Confidence intervals at 0.95 are displayed only when bigger than the identifier symbols. 
For this comparison, we are displaying size of the biggest culture, just as Flache did in his 
original paper. Flache opted for an indirect measurement that allows best for observation 
of the stability of the system against noise, i.e. whether there is a tendency towards 
globalization or anomie. Globalization is reached when the biggest culture absorbs all the 
agents in the population; similarly, anomie is reached when the biggest culture consists of 
one agent. Since we were more interested in the effects of institutions on actual cultural 
diversity rather than the stability of the system, we decided to keep the number of cultural 
regions to denominate cultural diversity as the main response variable across chapter 1. 
However, we are presenting the graphs using their response variable in this Appendix 
section. 
Before that, we also show our implementation of Axelrod's model, and include the two 
noise sources as described by Flache. Fig. A displays our results here in dotted lines. We 
found no significant differences between Axelrod's model with Flache's code and our 
replication, as seen in Test 9. 
Test 9. Anova comparing the two implementations (Implem), Axelrode with Flache's 




replications of the dyadic social influence model proposed by Axelrod, one is Flache's 
code implementation, and the other is ours. 
Anova Table (Type I tests) 
Response: Size of the biggest culture 
                    Df   Sum Sq  Mean Sq   F value              Pr(>F)     
Size                 1 63001127 63001127 13974.324 <0.0000000000000002 *** 
Noise                5 76508238 15301648  3394.069 <0.0000000000000002 *** 
Implem               1       30       30     0.007               0.935     
Size:Noise           5 56680215 11336043  2514.456 <0.0000000000000002 *** 
Size:Implem          1      177      177     0.039               0.843     
Noise:Implem         5     2113      423     0.094               0.993     
Size:Noise:Implem    5     1898      380     0.084               0.995     
Residuals         1176  5301818     4508                                   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1 
 
Averages of the compared groups 
Flache's implementation: 
     0.000001 0.00001 0.0001  0.001    0.01     0.1 
100      1.14    1.06   1.36   7.68   83.18   99.98 
1024     1.00    2.88  80.98 817.08 1022.64 1024.00 
 
Our implementation 
     0.000001 0.00001 0.0001  0.001    0.01     0.1 
100      1.12    1.10   1.84   5.24   87.82   99.98 
1024     1.00    8.18  70.50 815.38 1023.08 1023.92 
 
 
Standard deviations of the compared groups 
Flache's implementation: 
      0.000001   0.00001     0.0001     0.001      0.01       0.1 
100  0.4952839 0.2398979   2.405436  10.02332 20.430759 0.1414214 
1024 0.0000000 9.5096943 117.053187 197.68619  1.224911 0.0000000 
 
Our implementation: 
      0.000001     0.00001      0.0001      0.001       0.01       0.1 
100  0.3282607  0.5802885   3.253632   7.487568 15.8393594 0.1414214 
1024 0.0000000 26.3234899 116.409946 200.599498  0.8533248 0.2740475 
 
Results graphs with response variable "size of biggest 
culture" 
We will now show all our results graphs as presented in chapter 1, adopting Flache's 
chosen variable of "size of the biggest cultural region", to clarify that there were no 
meaningful differences even if we had used that variable instead of the one we chose. Fig. 





Fig. B. Size of the biggest culture for varying levels of institutional influence. X-axis 
displays levels of noise; Y axis displays biggest culture. Each line symbol denotes one 
alpha of institutional influence. 95% confidence intervals are displayed only when 
exceeding the size of the line symbol. Data points are averages of 50 replications per 
territory with 100,000 iterations per agent. 
 
Fig. C. Size of the biggest culture for comparison with Axelrod and Flache. X-axis 
displays levels of noise; Y axis displays biggest culture. Each line symbol denotes the 
models we chose as comparisons. 95% confidence intervals are displayed only when 
exceeding the size of the line symbol. Data points are averages of 50 replications per 





Fig. D. Size of the biggest culture for varying levels of agent loyalty. X-axis displays 
levels of noise; Y axis displays biggest culture. Each line symbol denotes one alpha prime 
of agent loyalty. 95% confidence intervals are displayed only when exceeding the size of 
the line symbol. Data points are averages of 50 replications per territory with 100,000 
iterations per agent. 
 
Fig. E. Size of the biggest culture for varying frequencies of democracy. X-axis 
displays levels of noise; Y axis displays biggest culture. Each line symbol denotes 
frequency of democracy. 95% confidence intervals are displayed only when exceeding 
the size of the line symbol. Data points are averages of 50 replications per territory with 






Fig. F. Size of the biggest culture for varying frequency of propaganda. X-axis 
displays levels of noise; Y axis displays biggest culture. Each line symbol denotes one 
frequency of propaganda. 95% confidence intervals are displayed only when exceeding 
the size of the line symbol. Data points are averages of 50 replications per territory with 
100,000 iterations per agent. 
 
Fig. G. Size of the biggest culture for combined democracy and propaganda 
frequencies. X-axis displays levels of noise; Y axis displays biggest culture. Each line 
symbol denotes one combination of democracy and propaganda frequencies. 95% 
confidence intervals are displayed only when exceeding the size of the line symbol. Data 





Appendix 7. Chapter 1. Number of institutions. 
Fig. A to Fig. D give an overview over the number of institutions that resulted in our 
systems in experiments A (institutional influence), C (agents loyalty), D (democracy) and 
E (propaganda). The results of experiment F (democracy + propaganda) are discussed in 
chapter 1.   
Fig. A (from experiment A) confirms the observations from Table 4 of chapter 1, i.e. the 
number of institution is proportional to the population size (the values in the graph are 
normalized by population), and they are not strongly affected by institutional influence. 
Similarly, Fig. B (from experiment C) shows that the number of institutions does not 
seem to be affected by agent loyalty, except for models 100x100/0.75/0.05, only when 
noise is low (<=0.001).  
Conversely, Fig. C and Fig. D show that increasing democracy and propaganda leads to 
an increase in the number of institutions in either case. These graphs are consistent with 
Figure 9 and its associated discussion in chapter 1, although the effects of propaganda 
seems to be amplified by democracy when the two institutional processes are combined. 
Results graphs with response variable "number of 
institutions" 
Fig. A to Fig. B displays the normalized number of institutions for Experiments A, B, D 
and F. This is to complement the Figure 9 (chapter 1). Fig. A mainly confirm 
observations made in Experiment A regarding to Table 4, however the scale is too small 
to appreciate the effects. Fig. B shows no relevant information for institution loyalty. Fig. 
C shows how democracy promotes the preservation of institutions. Fig. D shows a 
similar, but weaker effect, for propaganda. This results are the same as observed in Figure 





Fig. A. Number institutions for varying levels of institutional influence. X-axis 
displays levels of noise; Y axis displays normalized number of institutions. Each line 
symbol denotes one alpha of institutional influence. 95% confidence intervals are 
displayed only when exceeding the size of the line symbol. Data points are averages of 50 
replications per territory with 100,000 iterations per agent. 
 
Fig. B. Number institutions for varying levels of agent loyalty. X-axis displays levels 
of noise; Y axis displays normalized number of institutions. Each line symbol denotes one 
alpha prime of agent loyalty. 95% confidence intervals are displayed only when 
exceeding the size of the line symbol. Data points are averages of 50 replications per 






Fig. C. Number institutions for varying frequency of democracy. X-axis displays 
levels of noise; Y axis displays normalized number of institutions. Each line symbol 
denotes one frequency of democracy. 95% confidence intervals are displayed only when 
exceeding the size of the line symbol. Data points are averages of 50 replications per 
territory with 100,000 iterations per agent. 
 
 
Fig. D. Number institutions for frequencies of propaganda. X-axis displays levels of 
noise; Y axis displays normalized number of institutions. Each line symbol denotes one 
frequency of institutions. 95% confidence intervals are displayed only when exceeding 
the size of the line symbol. Data points are averages of 50 replications per territory with 






Appendix 8. Chapter 1. Complete results Experiment F 
(inclusion of democracy 1/100). 
Fig. A displays the complete results for Experiment F, i.e. it includes the medium values 
of democracy (1/100). The results are represented with the dashed-dotted lines. We can 
observe that the lines are located between the high (1/10) and low (1/1000) values of 
democracy, with a few exceptions for high values of noise (>= 0.01). The only big effect 
we found for medium democracy (1/100) was at the highest frequency of propaganda 
(1/1).  
In general, the results confirmed the observations in Figure 8 of chapter 1. 
 
Fig. A. Cultural diversity for combinations of democracy and propaganda 
frequencies. X-axis displays levels of noise; Y axis displays normalized cultural 
diversity. Each line symbol denotes one combination of democracy and propaganda. 95% 
confidence intervals are displayed only when exceeding the size of the line symbol. Data 





Appendix 9. Chapter 2. User Manual. 
The Cultural Simulator is an agent-based system that simulates how cultures emerge. 
Individuals are represented by agents that live on a grid. The interface shows the agents in 
colors according to their cultural vector, a list of cultural features with assigned 
cultural traits, e.g. the cultural feature music could have the cultural trait jazz assigned to 
it.  
When two agents (1) have exactly the same cultural features on the cultural vector and (2) 
are adjacent neighbors on the grid, then they belong to the same culture. Over time, 
agents influence each other, transmitting their cultural traits to other neighboring agents 
in a Neumann radius.  
As agents constantly transmit information to each other, do they all end up sharing the 
same culture? This really depends on the rules that are set up regarding how information 
is being shared, and the initial starting conditions. For example, homophily, the principle 
that like attracks like has proven to promote cultural diversity. The size of the grid, the 
size of the cultural vector, the number of traits, and the size of the Neumann neigborhood 
have proven to be important paramaters that affect the final levels of diversity. 
The Cultural Simulator gives the option to modify many of these parameters, plus it 
provides the possibility to use different rule sets - which represent the models as proposed 
by different authors: Axelrod (1997), Flache & Macy (2011), Ulloa, Kacperski & Sancho 
(2016).  
The Cultural Simulator allows for elements such as random changes in the cultural 
vectors (mutation), errors in the selection of similar agents (selection error), 
simultaneous influence by several agents (multilateral social influence), and a second 
layer of information that serves as central repositories for group of agents (institutions). 
Institutions are able to influence agents indirectly - by preventing social influence 
(institutional influence) - or directly through top-down and bottom-up processes 
(propaganda and democracy). 
Finally, the Cultural Simulator includes mechanisms to explore the resilience of 
convergence states. These are called Events. Events introduce (1) changes to the initial 
parameters of the simulation, or (2) changes to the content and structure of agents and 




destruction of a chosen percentage of the agent population. A conversion event allows 
the introduction of foreigners’ traits to the institutions. 
Continue with the Quick Start and start trying your parameters! 
1. Quick Start 
1.1. Execute a simulation and save its state: 
1. Start the Cultural Simulator. 
2. Click the Play Button and let it run until the simulation stops (or press the Stop 
Button to stop it manually if it is taking too long). The resulting cultures are 
displayed in one of the four center square Panels of the interface, specifically in 
the top-left colorful panel (titled Cultural Space). For other panels and more 
details on the panels, please see the section on Cultural Panels. The response 
variables are displayed on the right hand side of the screen in the way of Graphs 
(titled Energy, Cultures etc) and the Status Bar at the bottom of the interface. For 
information on this section of the interface, see the section on Graphs and Status 
Bar: 
 
3. Save the current state of the simulation by clicking the Save State Button . 




this state as a file by clicking on File -> Save Simulation State and, of 
course, recover it (File -> Load Simulation State). 
4. The initial configuration of the simulation can be modified in Simulation -> 
Parameters (See Initial Parameters for more details). 
1.2. Execute Events in the simulation: 
1. Let's continue the simulation by clicking the Play Button again. 
2. Events can be chosen and set on the left hand side of the interface. You can 
introduce any of the events by itself as a Single Event (see the list below) by 
clicking on the Execute Event Button . 
3. Single Events can be configured by clicking the Configure Event Button . For 





4. You can also execute multiple events at the same time by using the Add Event 
Button to add the selected events to the Event Set Panel in the bottom left 
corner of the interface.  
 
5. The Event Set Panel also allows you to Save Composed Events , an important 
feature if you are running big experiments in Batch Mode (See Batch Mode).  
1.3. Restore the simulation state, compare single event with 
initial saved state and compare two events: 
1.3.1. Restore simulation state: 
1. Play the simulation by clicking the Play Button .  
2. Save the current state of the simulation by clicking on the Save State Button . 
You can also save this state as a file by clicking on File -> Save Simulation 
State. 
3. After the simulation runs for some iterations, you can go back to a previously 
saved state, by pressing the Reload Simulation Button (or reload a previously 
saved file with File -> Load Simulation State). 
1.3.2. Compare Single Event with Initial Saved State: 
4. Execute the Single Event called Decimation by clicking the Execute Event 
Button of the Decimation panel (second-last panel on the left hand side of the 
interface). 
5. Click the Play Button , and wait for some iterations. You can now see the 
difference between the Original Run (started from the Saved State, without 
Event) and the Decimation Run (started from the Saved State with Decimation 




6. To compare the difference between the Saved State and the new state at any point 
following the Event, check the Status Bar (the bar at the very bottom of the 
interface, blue font) for detailed information. You can also for example follow the 
trend of the green line in the top-right graph titled Energy (and the example 
graphic below). It shows the Pixel Similarity of the current to the saved state. For 
more information on how to read this graph, see Pixel Similarity.  
7. You can execute more events to see the effects of those particular events on the 
similarity between initial state and new state. 
 
1.3.3. Compare two events: 
8. Go back to your previously saved state, by pressing the Reload Simulation 
Button (or reload a previously saved file with File -> Load Simulation 
State). 
9. Click a different Execute Event Button for example the one called Foreigners 
(Settlement). 
10. Visually compare the effects that executing Decimation and executing 
Foreigners (Settlement) had on the panels and graph outputs. If you notice 
differences (or want to test statistical differences), you can use the Batch Mode 
(see Batch Mode.) You can also run bigger experiments in remote machines (See 
Command Line Interface). 
 
2. Initial Parameters 
In order to change the initial configuration of the simulation, go to Simulation -> 





First, you need to decide which model you would like to use, and then adjust the 
parameters. At the end of the section, a table will give you a starting point of parameters 
that you can use with each model. Below you can find the explanation of models and 
parameters and references that point you to related literature (Flache & Macy (2011) and 
Ulloa (2016) are key readings to understand in detail the implementation details of the 
models): 
 Model: This drop-down menu gives you multiple options for basic model 
implementation for the simulation. Four models are available in this version. 
Identifiers of the models (internally, the name of the class), are the initial letters of 
the descriptions: 
o M1 - Homophily (Axelrod, 1997) including mutation and selection error - 
Experiment 1, Flache & Macy (2011): This implementation is based on 
Axelrod (1997). Homophily, the principle that "like attracts like", is used 
to decide whether an agent can influence another agent. This model also 
includes two noise sources: mutation, where individual traits can change 
randomly (Klemm et al., 2003a, 2003b), and selection error, where 
individuals make a judgment error regarding the homophily of their 
neighbors (Flache & Macy, 2011). This model is equivalent to the model 
used in Experiment 1 of Flache & Macy (2011). 
o M2 - Multilateral social influence without homophily - Experiment 2, 




influence, such that interactions can occur between multiple agents at the 
same time instead of in dyadic formation where only two agents can 
interact with each other at one time (Flache & Macy, 2011). The 
mechanism is also known as frequency bias (Parisi et. al, 2003; Boyd & 
Richerson, 1985). This implementation does not consider homophily. 
Mutation and selection error are included as in M1. 
o M3 - Multilateral social influence with homophily - Experiment 3, Flache 
& Macy (2011): This implementation is an extension of M2, by including 
homophily as presented in M1. 
o M4 - Institutions including homophily Axelrod (1997) - Ulloa et al. 
(2016): This implementation is based on M1, and thus includes 
homophily, mutation and selection error. It additionally introduces 
institutions as described by Ulloa (2016). An institution can influence 
agents that belong to it by making them adopt or keep traits that are 
equivalent to the institution's traits. The table below (taken from the 
original publication) presents all rules inherent in the (institutional) model. 
 





o Random initialization: When selected, the initial traits of the agents' 
cultural vectors (i.e. the list of cultural traits of each agent) are initialized 
randomly with a uniform distribution. When not selected, the initial state 
of the simulation has all agents belonging to one (the same) institution, and 
all cultural vectors contain exactly the same traits (i.e. agents all belong to 
the same culture). This provides an interesting baseline to compare effects 
of events between diverse and not-diverse scenarios.  
o Iterations: Sets number of iterations after which the simulation stops. One 
iteration is defined as the time span after which all agents have had on 
average one opportunity of interaction. Notice that it is on average, so not 
necessarily all agents will participate each turn as the initiator agents of 
interactions are picked randomly. Also notice that the interaction might not 
actually occur (that it is why is called opportunity of interaction), for 
example when the homophily rule prevents an interaction, or due to 
selection errors). A recommended value of number of iterations is 100000, 
however certain parameters might cause the convergence to be slower; you 
can check if the simulation is converging to a value in the interface (See 
Response Variables) or in the progressions folder (See Output Values) 
o Speed: Sets the number of iterations that occur between checkpoints. 
Several important things happen during checkpoints: (1) Results are 
calculated from the current state of the simulation, (2) Current response 
variables are sent to the result output files, (3) Interface is updated with 
current results, and (4) Simulation checks for current queued events and 
executes them, if any. (It is called speed because it affects how fast the 
simulation will run, as calculations of responses variables and output of 
results is costly. Events are always implemented at checkpoints to make 
sure they are visualized properly on the interface). Speed should be a 
multiple of iterations, and, in batch mode, you should be careful with very 
small values as it could produce big files and slow down the simulation. 
o Buffer Size: Controls the size of the file buffer sizes. A larger buffer size 
makes the simulation more efficient, but waiting times to check 
intermediate results in output files are produced at a slower rate. (Buffer 




 World: Sets informational space (vector sizes) of the model. These traits cannot 
be modified after initialization (See Events) 
o Rows: Number of rows of the world grid. 
o Cols: Number of columns of the world grid. So far, studies seems to have 
limited the grid sizes to less than 100 rows and column (100x100) because 
of computational costs. In terms of results, M1 produces fewer cultures the 
bigger the grid (Axelrod, 1997), M2 and M3 produce more cultures with 
bigger grids (Flache & Macy, 2011), and M4 produces a number of 
cultures that is more or less proportional to the size of the grid (Ulloa et 
al., 2016), meaning that the culture sizes are more or less equivalent 
regardless of the grid size. 
o Radius: The radius of the Von Neumann neighborhood is also known as 
the Manhattan distance. A Von Neumann nrighborhood of radius 6 can be 
seen here: 
 
In terms of results, M1 produces fewer cultures as the interaction radius increases (Greig, 
2012) and a value of 1 is recommended. Flache & Macy (2011) used a radius of 6 for M2 
and M3. Ulloa et al. also used also a radius of 6. Preliminary results on M4 also indicate 
that, when democracy and propaganda (see below) are not activated, a smaller radius 
produces fewer cultures, but when (democracy and propaganda) are activated this effect 
is reduced substantially (do not hesitate to drop me a line if you are interested in a 
collaboration to publish this result). 
 Features: Size of the cultural vector. Each feature represents a possible dimension 
of the culture, e.g. music. In M1, the more features the less cultures are obtained 
(Axelrod, 1997). No studies exist for the other models. 
 Traits: Number of possible values that a feature can adopt. Each trait represent a 
possible cultural item for the feature, for example if the feature is music, one 
possible trait can be rock music, another jazz. In M1, the more features the more 
cultures are obtained (Axelrod, 1997). No studies exist for the other models, 
though preliminary results suggest the same effects in M4. 
 Noise: Sources of perturbation inside the simulation. 
o Mutation: Probability of a random trait change in the agent's cultural 




2003a, 2003b). M2-M4 present different degrees of resistance to mutation 
(Flache & Macy, 2011; Ulloa, 2016). Values below 0.1 have been studied 
in the literature. 
o Selection Error: Probability of making a judgement mistake in the 
selection of the agent with which the interaction will happen. M3 and M4 
are the more stable models against selection error (Flache & Macy, 2011; 
Ulloa, 2016). Values below 0.1 have been studied in the literature. 
 Institutions: Set the levels at which institutions can affect agents. These 
parameters only apply to M4. 
o Influence: A value between 0 and 1 that determines the level of 
importance that is given to institutional influence (alpha value in the rule 
table above). Alpha is multiplied by the similarity with the institution, and 
a beta value (1 - alpha) is multiplied by the similarity with the agent 
(homophily). The resulting probability determines whether the interaction 
(an agent accepting the other agent's trait) will be successful. High values 
(>0.6) are necessary to generate diversity, and it is fairly stable across grid 
sizes (Ulloa et al., 2016). Preliminary results suggest that small values of 
influence can be used if democracy and propaganda are activated; e.g. grid 
size=100x100, radius=3, influence=0.35, democracy=10, propaganda=5 
produces ~20-30 cultures (also, replacing radius=6, and influence=0.55). 
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you are interested and willing to 
collaborate to explore this result. 
o Loyalty: A value between 0 and 1 that determines the likehood of an agent 
staying or changing their institution after a successful interaction between 
agents (alpha prime value in the rule table above). Alpha prime is 
multiplied by a value that depends on the similarity with the institution, 
and a beta (1 - alpha) to the similarity with the neighbor's institution. The 
resulting probability determines whether an agent changes its institution to 
adopt the institution of its neighbor. The effect of loyalty is rather small 
compared to the influence (Ulloa et al., 2016); this is likely because there 
is a confounding effect (loyalty depends on the influence). 
o Democracy: Inverse frequency (called period) of a democratic process, 
use 0 to turn it off. A democratic process is a bottom-up process which 




which multiple agents vote to change a trait, increasing similarity with 
their institution. The most voted trait is changed in the institution. 
Democracy by itself has a small effect in cultural diversity but creates 
more institutions; but it prevents (or has a moderator effect) the explosion 
of diversity when propaganda is present (Ulloa et al., 2016). 
o Propaganda: Inverse frequency (called period) of a propagandist process, 
use 0 to turn it off. A propagandist process is a top-down process which 
consists of an institution propagating one of its traits on the agents that 
belong to it. The trait (and corresponding feature) is chosen based on the 
most conflicting trait, i.e. the one that produces most dissimilarity between 
the institution and its agents. Propaganda increases the number of cultures, 
though it can be partially reduced by the presence of democracy (Ulloa et 
al., 2016) . 
The following table provides a guideline for parameter setting. It is possible that many 
other values will provide interesting results (that is the idea of the software), this is just a 
set of values that, according to the literature, will very likely produce diversity.  
Parameter M1 M2 M3 M4 
Rows 10 32 32 32 
Columns 10 32 32 32 
Radius 1 < 6 <= 6 <= 6 
Features 5 6 6 6 
Traits 15 14 14 14 
Mutation 0 < 0.001 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Selection Error 0 < 0.001 < 0.01 < 0.01 
Influence n/a n/a n/a 0.8-0.82 
Loyalty n/a n/a n/a 0.05-0.95 
Democracy n/a n/a n/a 1-100 
Propaganda n/a n/a n/a 1-100 
Finally, there are controls to load and save configuration. Indeed, you will find a preset 
configuration that fits inside the values of the table for each of the models M1-M4 in the 
package. 
 Load and save configurations: This section at the bottom of the dialog helps to 
load pre-set configurations, for example those which are similar to experiments 
previously executed in literature, and others that the users can set up and save 
themselves. 
o Save: The user can save their own configurations. Saving configuration is 




o Load: A user can load a previously saved configuration.  
3. Control the simulation 
The simulation advances in iterations. An iteration has passed when all agents have had 
on average one opportunity of interaction (i.e. an agent transmitting a trait to another 
agent). The number of opportunities to interact is the same as the number of agents in the 
system, however, not necessarily all agents receive an opportunity in each iteration, 
because agents are selected randomly for interaction. Additionally, agents might reject the 
interaction for several possible reasons outlined in the rules of each model (See B. Initial 
Parameters), which is why we call it a number of opportunities, and not a number of 
interactions, per iteration. 
Progress of the simulation is not registered by iteration, instead, there are checkpoints. A 
checkpoint occurs per every s iterations. The parameter for s is Speed. We have also 
covered how to set the value for Speed in the section on B. Initial Parameters).  
3.1. Checkpoints 
During a Checkpoint, all the following steps occur: 
1. Response Variables are calculated according to the current state of the 
simulation. 
2. Response variables are sent to the progression output file(s). 
3. Cultural Panels, Graphs and Status Bar are updated with the current results. 
4. The simulation checks for current queued Events and executes them, if any. 
5. The simulation checks if the simulation has been paused via the Pause Button  
3.2. Main Controls 
The Main Controls of the simulation are in the top-left corner of the interface. Controls 
can also be found in the in the Controls menu. 
 
From this bar, you can start the simulation via the Play Button and stop it via the Stop 
Button or the Pause Button . However, there are a few important things to consider 




 Their actions will take effect only at a checkpoint. Depending on the speed 
parameter, you might have to wait until their effects are processed. 
 The main difference between pausing and stopping the simulation is that stop will 
store final file results. When the Play Button is pressed after you have stopped 
the simulation, a new result folder will be generated in the workspace (see Output 
Files for details). Pause is non-intrusive. It freezes the simulation without further 
implications. Pausing also does not allow saving or reloading simulation states. 
Visually, there is no difference between Pause and Stop. 
The two last buttons (both yellow) in the main control area are straightforward. You can 
save the current state of the simulation by clicking the Save State Button . You can 
also save this state as a file by clicking on File -> Save Simulation State. After the 
simulation runs for some iterations, you can go back to a previously saved state, by 
pressing the Reload Simulation Button (or reload a previously saved file with File -
> Load Simulation State).  
One use of these two buttons is that the Saved State can become the state against which 
the progressing state of the simulation is compared, for example to compare how similar 
the results of Saved State and Current State are at any given moment. You can read 
further on this topic in the section on Response Variables. The response variables of both 
states, saved and current, can also be observed in the Status Bar at the bottom of the 
interface (blue font), while the Graphs are useful to note visual changes in the 
progression. A quick guide for this process is provided at the end of the Quick Start 
section. 
3.3. Simulation states files 
Apart from saving and reloading a state on memory with the Save State Button , it is 
possible to save a state in a file with File -> Save Simulation State and then recover 
it via File -> Load Simulation State. This can be useful for several things: 
 Multiple saved files can be stored and accessed successively to compare many 
different Events. 





 Saved State files can be opened in the parameters dialog (See Setting Up Initial 
Parameters). 
 Saved State files can be used to run simulations in Batch Mode. 
3.4. Controlling Speed 
Right below the Main Controls, you can find the Speed Bar: 
 
The Speed Bar controls the simulation speed via reduction or increase of the frequency of 
updates on the screen. Lower values cause the simulation to run for a longer time span, as 
updates are provided more often. The value next to the Speed label (set at 100 in the 
above figure) shows how many iterations have to pass in order for a checkpoint to occur. 
Review Checkpoints here.  
Events are always added to the simulation at a checkpoint and visualized in the interface. 
When we change the speed via speed bar, updating the variable might take some time. 
The results file for the current simulation will also be affected because results are sent 
during checkpoints. Due to changes in speed, results will not be stored in regular 
intervals. 
4. Events 
4.1. Single Events 
The Event Panels control the events that can be executed inside the simulation. Some 
events are applied to agents, and others to institutions. Events, when initiated, are added 





Any event can be configured, i.e. various parameters can be set for it in order to affect 
only certain parts of the world or only certain agents. This is done with the Configure 
Button of each individual Event panel and will be covered in-depth in the Configure 
Events subsection of this section. For now, we will proceed working with a uniform 
distribution of the event's effects across all parameters.  
There are six event panels in total. Of these six, the first four contain two similar types of 
events. We will now cover all six in-depth: 
 Institutional structure removal affects the associations between agents and 
institutions. There are two types: 
o Apostasy: A number of agents abandon their institutions. Internally, these 
agents will now be assigned institutions with empty traits. A change in the 
distribution parameter of the event affects the agents. 
o Destruction: A number of institutions are destroyed. The agents that 
belonged to them are each assigned a new institution with empty traits. 





 Institutional content removal removes traits inside the institutions. Again, there 
are two types: 
o Partial: Some traits are removed from a number of institutions. A change 
in the distribution parameter of this event affects the institution's traits. 
When a Non Probablistic Distribution (see Configure Events Section) is 
used for this event, then there is no difference between this event (Partial) 
and the next (Full). 
o Full: All traits are removed from a number of institutions. A change in the 
distribution parameter of this event affects all the traits of the institutions. 
 Institutional conversion instroduces foreigner (invader) traits into institutions. 
This invader trait is new to the population and different from any of the previously 
existent traits. This event groups two types: 
o Partial: Some traits from some institutions are converted into foreigner 
(invader) traits. A change in the distribution parameter of the event affects 
some traits of the institutions. When a Non Probablistic Distribution (see 
Configure Events Section) is used for this event, then there is no difference 
between this event (Partial) and the next (Full). 
o Full: All traits from some institutions are converted into foreigner 
(invader) traits. A change in the distribution parameter of the event affects 
all the traits of the institutions. 
 Settlement (called invasion in previous versions): A number of agents such as 
settlers (foreigners with their own institutions) are introduced into the simulation. 
They enter into positions that were occupied by other agents. Settlers have only 
foreigner traits in their cultural vectors, and all of them belong to the same settler 
institution. A change in the distribution parameter of this event affects the 
distribution of agents that will be replaced by settlers. 
 Immigration: A number of agents such as immigrants (foreigners without their 
own institutions) are introduced into the simulation. They enter into positions that 
were occupied by other agents. Immigrants have only foreigner traits in their 
cultural vectors and, in principle, do not belong to any institution until other 
agents persuade them to do so. A change in the distribution parameter of this 
event affects the distribution of agents that will be replaced by settlers. 
 Decimation (called genocide in previous versions): A number of agents are killed 




by a dead trait. A change in the distribution parameter of this event affects the 
distribution of agents to be killed. 
 Parameter Change Event: This event does not affect agents or institutions 
directly. Instead, with it, it is possible to change many of the parameters of the 
simulation that were initially set in Simulation -> Parameters. (see Initial 
Parameters). 
4.2. Configure Events 
The configuration of each event appears in blue font in each Event Panel.  
 
Clicking the Configure Event Button opens the Configuration Distribution Panel, 
which enables you to change the parameters. 
 
Changing the configuration for an event consists (except for Parameter Change Event) 
of adjusting the distribution allocated on the grid. In general, the distribution will indicate 
which agents or institutions are affected by the event. Four types of distributions are 




 Probabilistic Distributions: These distributions use a probabilistic function to 
assign a probability to each agent or institution. This probability is used to decide 
whether the event affects that particular agent or institution.  
o Uniform Distributions: They assign the same probability to all agents or 
institutions. The only parameter in this distribution is the probability of an 
event occurring to an agent or institution. 
o Aprox. Normal Distributions: They assign probabilities to each agent or 
institution according to the normal distribution. The agent in the center of 
the distribution receives a probability of a maximum value, and the other 
agents receive a probability depending on the distance from this center. 
The first two parameters indicate in which row and column the distribution 
will be centered. You can use -1 to select the row and column randomly. 
The third parameter specifies the maximum value. The fourth parameter is 
the standard deviation, to indicated how much the event spreads from its 
center. 
o Est. Normal Distributions: Equivalent to Aprox. Normal Distributions 
except that instead of the standard deviation (as fourth parameter), it 
receives a proportion of cells that will be affected. Internally, CulSim uses 
this proportion to estimate a corresponding standard deviation. The rest 
remains the same. 
 Non Probabilistic Distributions: These distributions select the specific agents or 
institutions that will be affected by the event. The event will occur with a 
probability of 1.0 to the agents or institutions selected. When a Non Probabilistic 
Distribution is used for the Institution Content Remove and Institution 
Conversion there is then no difference between the Partial and Full version of 
their events.  
o Neumann: This distribution uses Von Neuman neighborhoods with a 
distance r to distribute the events, to select the agents or institutions that 
will be affected by the event. The first two parameters indicate in which 
row and column the neighborhood will be centered. Use -1 to select the 
row and column randomly. The third parameter indicates the radius of the 
neighborhood, i.e. how far the event spreads from its center. 
o Rectangular: These distributions use two coordinates (by providing rows 




that fall into this rectangle are the ones that will be affected by the event. 
The first two parameters indicate the first coordinate of the rectangle, and 
the last two parameters the second coordinate of the rectangle. 
4.3. Parameter Change Event 
A special case for the configuration of events is the Parameter Change Event. Select 
new parameters that you want to apply to the simulation here. When the Configure Event 
button [Configure Event Button]() for this event is pressed, the following dialog box is 
shown: 
 
It is possible to change most of the parameters that were set in the Initial Parameter Setup, 
except those that involve changes in static data structures (arrays) such as the size of the 
grid, the cultural vector, or the neighbors.  
4.4. Composed Events 
You can create combinations of events with the Add Event Button . The events are 





The order in which the events are added matters. For example, a decimation after a 
settlement will kill some of the settlers, but this would not happen if the settlement came 
after the decimation. It is also possible to add two events of the same type. This is useful, 
for example to simulate a settlement occurring at two different locations of the grid. You 
can start a new event set by cleaning the list with the Clean Event Set Button . 
The composed events can be saved or loaded to files with the Save Event Button . You 
can apply the same event to different simulation states or configurations. Moreover, saved 
events are essential when using Batch Mode. 
5. Cultural panels 
The cultural panels show the progression and distribution of cultures as the simulation 
advances. There are four panels in total, one representing the agents' belief space. The 
other three represent institutional spaces. The Institutions including homophily Axelrod 
(1997) - Ulloa(2016) model (See B. Initial Parameters) is the only model that includes 
institutions, and therefore the only model available that uses all four panels. The other 





 Cultural Space (top-left): Each agent is represented in its corresponding location 
in the World (grid). The color of the agent reflects its cultural vector, picked 
according to the trait values. The default number of features is 6, and the number 
of traits is 15, plus 1 foreigner trait (See B. Initial Parameters). They have been 
selected in order to use the maximum spectrum of computer screen colors (i.e. 6 
hexadecimal values), higher values might make interpretation of the panels 
difficult due to repeated colors. In general, the cultural space provides an idea of 
the simulation state. A more reliable way to supervise the progress of the 
simulation are the graph panels (See Response Variables). 
 Corresponding Institutional Cultural Space (top-right): Each agent belongs to 
an institution, and this institution also has a cultural vector. Therefore, an 
interesting way to represent the relationship between an agent and its institution is 
by showing the corresponding color of the institutional cultural vector, along with 




(grid), but the institutional cultural space shows the color of the institution's 
cultural vector to which the agent belongs to. 
 Institutions: This panel shows every institution's "location" as an average position 
of all the agents that belong to it, i.e. the "center". Internally, institutions do not 
have a pre-defined "location". Additionally, each location dot is also denoted by 
the color associated with the institutional cultural vector. 
 Existent Institutions: This panel shows only the location of the existent 
institutions, and changes the color to white. This panel is a visualization help to 
spot institutions that have been assigned a darker color that might be hard to see 
on the black background of the panel. The Existent Institutions panel makes it 
easier to detect those institutions. 
There is also a Output text panel below the cultural panels. This panel (shown below) 
reports important occurrences in the simulation, e.g. initializations, errors, final states, etc. 
 
6. Responsive Variables 
The simulation keeps a record of an extensive amount of response variables, which will 
be explained in depth in this section. These variables can be accessed in several ways: 
through the graph panels, the status bar, and the output files. These are briefly introduced 
here, but have their own sections. 
 Graph Panels show the progression of the response variables (See Graphs and 
Status Bar) 
 Status Bar displays the exact values of the response variables of the current and 
saved state (See Graphs and Status Bar) 
 Output Files contain the values saved over the progression of the simulation (set 
according to the Checkpoints), and the final results of the simulation (See Output 
Files).  




6.1. Simulation counters: 
 Epoch: passes every time the current state of the simulation is saved to memory 
(with the Save State button or into a file (File -> Save Simulation State) 
 Generation: is the total number of iterations of all epochs. 
 Iteration: is the current iteration in the current epoch. 
6.2. Simulation measurements: 
 Energy: is an abstract response variable that measures how culturally different 
agents are from their immediate neighbors. Each agent's cultural vector is 
compared to its' adjacent neighbors' vector. The energy counts each differing trait, 
every time it exists. For normalization purposes, the maximum value that a 
simulation could have is set by the adjacent features (((Rows*(Rows-
1)+(Columns*(Columns-1))*Features). 
 Pixel Similarity: directly compares the cultural vector of each agent in the current 
state against the agent in the same position from the world grid before, in the 
saved state. As explained in the Main Controls, a saved simulation state can be 
generated by pressing the Save State Button , saving the current state in a file 
(File -> Save Simulation State) or loading a state from a file (File -> 
Load Simulation State). 
6.3. Cultural measurements: 
These measurements involve calculations that are made with cultures. Two agents belong 
to the same culture when they are adjacent neighbors (immediate top, left, right, bottom 
neighbors) and when they share the same traits in their cultural vector. 
 Cultures: Number of cultures in the system.  
 Cultures with at least 3 agents: Number of cultures of with three agents or more 
(N > 2) 
 Biggest culture: The culture that contains the most agents. 
 Cultural similarities: The current cultures of the simulation can always be 
compared with the cultures of last saved state of the simulation, either via the 
Save State Button , or by saving them in a file (File -> Save Simulation 




o Position similarity: First, the average centers of all the cultures in the 
current and saved simulation states are calculated (and normalized 
according to the total rows and columns in the world grid). Second, each 
center of the cultures of the current simulation state is matched with the 
center of the culture that proved to be the most similar in terms of Full 
Similarity (see below) among the cultures of the saved simulation state. 
Third, the inverse difference (i.e. 1 - difference) between these two 
centers is added to the similarity. Fourth, the second and third steps are 
repeated in the other direction, from the saved state to the current state. 
Fifth, the similarity is normalized by dividing the amount of cultures on 
both the current and the saved state. 
o Size similarity: First, the size (amount of agents that belong to a culture) 
of all the cultures in the current and saved simulation states are calculated 
(and normalized according to the total agents in the world). Second, each 
size of the cultures of the current simulation state is matched with the 
size of the culture that proved to be the most similar in terms of Full 
Similarity (see below) among the cultures of the saved simulation state. 
Third, the inverse difference (1 - difference) between these two sizes is 
added to the similarity. Fourth, the second and third steps are repeated in 
the other direction, from the saved state to the current state. Fifth, the 
similarity is normalized by dividing the number of cultures in both the 
current and the saved state. 
o Traits similarity: First, the cultural vectors (number of agents that belong 
to a culture) of all the cultures in the current and saved simulation states 
are stored in lists. Second, each cultural vector of the cultures of the 
current simulation state is matched with the cultural vector of the culture 
that proved to be the most similar in terms of Full Similarity (as defined 
below) among the cultures of the saved simulation state. Third, the 
similarity between these two cultural vectors is calculated and normalized 
by dividing the number of features that the vectors have, and then added to 
the similarity. Fourth, the second and third steps are repeated in the other 
direction, from the saved state to the current state. Fifth, the similarity is 





o Full similarity: This similarity measurement combines the previous three 
into one. First, the position, size and cultural vectors of all the cultures in 
the current and saved simulation states are calculated. Second, each culture 
in the current simulation is matched with the most similar culture in all 
these three criteria; the similarity between the three values (position, size 
and cultural traits) is calculated by multiplying each individual similarity. 
Third, the similarity of the matched cultures is added to the full similarity. 
Fourth, the second and third steps are repeated in the other direction, from 
the saved state to the current state. Fifth, the similarity is normalized, 
divided by the amount of cultures on both the current and the saved state. 
6.4. Von Neumann cultural measurements: 
This set of response variables is equivalent to the cultural measurements, with the 
difference that the definition of "culture" changes: two agents belong to the same 
Neumann culture if they are von Neumann neighbors (of the same radius that the 
simulation uses, See B. Initial Parameters), and they share the same traits in their cultural 
vector. When the radius is bigger, then the cultures can contain members that are visually 
apart, but near each other. All the following responses use the same definition as their 
analogous responses in the previous section: 
 Neumann cultures: Number of Neumann cultures in the system. 
 Neumann cultures with at least 3 agents: Number of Neumann cultures of with 
three agents or more (N > 2) 
 Neumann biggest culture: The Neumann culture that contains the most agents. 
 Neumann cultural similarities: See the cultural similarities above and replace 
cultures by Neumann cultures. The explanation are analogous. 
6.5. Institutional measurements: 
 Institutions: Number of institutions existing in the simulation. 
 Biggest institution: Number of agents belonging to the biggest institution. 
 Institution similarity: The institution similarity is calculated by comparing the 
traits of the institutions in the current state with the corresponding institutions in 
the saved states. A saved simulation state can be generated by pressing the Save 
State Button , saving the current state in a file (File -> Save Simulation 




6.6. Event-related measurements: 
These response variables are related to events that were executed in the simulation (See 
D. Events for details of event types) 
 Alive: Number of alive traits. This is related to Decimation events, in which a 
dead agent is represented by changing all the traits in its cultural vector to a 
special dead trait 
 Foreign: Number of foreign traits. Foreign traits in the population are introduced 
directly during the settlement or immigration events, and indirectly during 
institutional conversion events. This measurement shows the dispersion of foreign 
traits in the population 
 Destroyed institutions: Number of destroyed institutions caused by Destroy 
Institution Events 
 Stateless: Number of agents that go into stateless state because their institutions 
were destroyed in Institutional Destruction Events 
 Apostates: Number of agents that abandon their institutions in Apostasy Events 
 Removed institutions: Number of institutions whose traits were removed entirely 
in Full Remove Content Events 
 Removed traits: Number of traits that were removed in Partial Remove Content 
Events 
 Converted institutions: Number of institutions whose traits were Converted 
entirely in Full Conversion Events 
 Converted traits: Number of traits that were converted in Partial Conversion 
Events 
 Settlers: Number of settlers that were introduced in Settlement Events 
 Immigrants: Number of immigrants that were introduced in Immigration Events 
 Casualties: Number of agents that were killed in Decimation Events 
7. Graphs and status bar 
The Graphs Panel and Status Bar display the values of the response variables. The Graph 
Panels show how the normalized response variable progresses over time whereas the 




7.1. Graph Panels 
There are seven Graph Panels, each of them displays up to 3 response variables, which 
are represented by 3 different colors: (1) blue, (2) red and (3) green. 
 
The response variables are always normalized in order to be comparable within the same 
graph. The following list gives an overview of the graphs with the corresponding 
response variables that they display; the graph panel is identified by its title above each 
graph. See F. Response variables for details about each of the response variable 




Cultures Cultures Biggest Culture Full similarity 
















Institutions Institutions Biggest Institution Institution Similarity 
Traits Alive Foreign 
 
Each graph panel also displays the corresponding normalized values on the top-right (in 
the same color as the display lines that are associated with them). If you hover over these 
values, a tooltip text will display the response variable name according to its color. 
7.2. Status Bar 
The Status Bar on the bottom displays most of the initialization parameters and response 
variables of the saved (first line indicated with S:) and current states (second line 
indicated with C:) of the simulation.  
 
Starting from the left, initials are provided that refer to response variables. The following 
table gives an overview: 
Initials Response Variable 
S|C  (S)aved or (C)urrent state 
M1|M2|M3|M4  Identifier of the model, see B. Initial Parameters  
R|S  (R)andom or (S)tatic (non-random) initialization, see B. Initial 
Parameters  
#x#(#) Rows x Columns (Radius), e.g. 32x32(6) 
F/T Features / Traits 
M/S Mutation / Selection error 
a/a' Institutional Influence / Agent Loyalty 
D/P Democracy / Propaganda 
`@ #/#/# Epoch / Generation / Iteration 
E Energy 
PS Pixel Similarity 
Cultures:#/#/#=#*#*# Cultures (Cultures with at least 3 agents) / Biggest culture / Full 
similarity = Position similarity * Size similarity * Traits similarity 
Neumann's:#/#/#=#*#*# Neumann cultures (Neumann Cultures with at least 3 agents) / 
Neumann biggest culture / Neumann full similarity = Neumann 
position similarity * Neumann size similarity * Neumann traits 
similarity 
Inst.:#/#/# Institutions / Biggest institution / Institution similarity 
Traits: #/# Foreigners / Alife 
A tooltip text is also provided and serves as a reminder of the parameter names and 




8. Output Files 
The Cultural Simulator graphical interfaces uses a workspace directory, which is the 
directory that will contain the results directories and files. When using the Command Line 
Interface, the results will be stored in the folder where the command is executed.  
An execution could be composed of one simulation, which is the case when the main 
controls of the simulation are used (See C. Control the simulation), or by several 
simulations (either repetitions of the same, or different configurations) which is common 
when using the Batch Mode or the Command Line Interface. In all these cases, however, 
the output structure inside a result folder is the same. 
When using the main interface or the Batch Mode, the results folder name is results, 
however if there is already a folder with that name then a number is added after the name, 
e.g. results0. This happens quite often, so you will always find the results of your last 
execution in the folder with the highest number. 
The following is the structure inside a result folder for all cases: 
 progressions: a directory containing csv files. Each file contains the response 
variables (and parameters) for each Checkpoint of each executed simulation. The 
information contained here can be used to recreate and analyze the Graph Panels 
in any statistical software that accepts csv files. The csv file name consist of an 
internal unique identifier (a numeric sequence), an identifier of the used model, 
and the rows and columns of the simulation.  
 simulations: a directory containing the final state of the each executed 
simulation. These files can be opened with File->Load Simulation State to 
visualize the state at the end of the execution. More importantly, these files can be 
used to build experimental designs, in which the effects of different events are 
compared against the same set of simulation states (see Batch Mode or Command 
Line Interface) 
 Results file (results.csv): a csv file that collects all the response variables and 
parameters at the end of the simulation. The results.csv file name will vary if 
an ID is used in the Command Line Interface 
 events.txt: a folder that contains a description of the executed events inside the 




Apart from the results directory (and its internal structure), another directory, called 
resultSet, is generated in the work space. This directory will contain a copy of the 
results.csv file, adding the folder name to the file name (e.g. results0-
results.csv). When several experiments are executed, the resultSet directory will 
contain all the results files, which is practical when you want to open all results with a 
statistical program or you simply want to take (zip, send, or backup) the main results all 
together. Going to each result folder to collect the results is not necessary. 
When the Batch Mode or the Command Line Interface are used to execute simulations 
from a results directory (e.g. to execute two different types of Events in the same 
simulation state sets), the input folder that contains the simulations folder becomes the 
workspace folder. From this moment on, all the previous rules of the internal structure 
remain valid. 
The following tables show the names of the columns of the csv files (the result files, and 
the files in the progression folder). 
8.1. Identifiers and timestamps: 
Column Description 
id Unique identifier for a simulation inside an experiment 
timestamp The timestamp where this line was printed 
duration The diferrence between the current timestamp and when the experiment was 
started 
8.2. Parameters of the simulation 
Column Parameter 
model Model 

















8.3. Simulation counters 




8.4. Simulation measurements 
Column Simulation measurement 
energy Energy 
pixel_similarity Pixel Similarity 
8.5. Cultural measurements 
Column Cultural measurement 
cultures Cultures 
cultures_at_least_3 Cultures with at least 3 agents 
biggest_culture Biggest Culture 
full_sim Full similarity 
pos_sim Position similarity 
size_sim Size similarity 
traits_sim Traits similarity 
8.6. Von Neumann cultural measurements 
Column Von Neumann cultural measurement 
neumann_cultures Neumann cultures 
neumann_cultures_at_least_3 Neumann cultures with at least 3 agents 
biggest_neumann_culture Neumann biggest culture 
neumann_full_sim Full similarity 
neumann_pos_sim Position similarity 
neumann_size_sim Size similarity 
neumann_traits_sim Traits similarity 
8.7. Institutional measurements 
Column Institutional measurement 
institutions Institutions 
biggest_institution Biggest institution 
institution_similarity Institution similarity 
8.8. Event-related measurements 
Column Event-related measurement 
alive Alive 
foreign Foreign 
destroyed_institutions Destroyed Institutions 
stateless Stateless 
apostates Apostates 




removed_traits Removed traits 
converted_institutions Converted institutions 




9. Batch Mode 
The Batch Mode and the Command Line Interface are useful to run repetitions of 
interesting observations of particular simulation configurations that need to be further 
explored. The output files of the repetitions from this method can be analyzed with any 
statistical tool that reads csv. 
As opposed to the Command Line Interface, the Batch Mode offers a graphical user 
interface to easily run the experiments. In order to access the Batch Mode, you click on 
Simulation -> Batch Mode. There are two general tests that can be performed in Batch 
Mode: 
9.1.  Testing convergence states of simulations (From 
Configuration Files): 
Which is the ("average") final state (measured in any response variable , e.g. cultures, i.e. 
cultural diversity) that is produced given one or several initial configurations of the 






All you need to do is add the configuration files that you want to test with the Add Files 
button . 
You should then decide on the number of times you want to repeat the simulation with the 
Repetitions selector. To be sure, each repetition will initialize the simulation from scratch 
(e.g. it will randomly choose new initial cultural traits). Once this is ready, you can start 
the simulation . This does not resume from the stored state, however, the states of the 
simulations are stored in the simulations folder. If you wish, you can resume these states 
by indicating the corresponding Results Folder in the From Results Folder tab. 
9.2. Testing the effect of an event in simulation sets (From 
Results Folder): 
Let's assume that you would like to test the effect (measured in any response variable, e.g. 




in the previous state. The second tab (From Results Folder) of the Batch Mode provides 
this functionality. 
 
The input will be a result folder. Usually the selected folder will be the one generated 
with the first tab (From Configuration Files). This results folder contains the final states 
of the simulations that will be tested against a particular singular or composed [event] that 
was previously stored in the main interface (See 4. Events).  
In order to select the events, you load the saved file with the Load Button . 
You then decide on the number of times you want to repeat the event in each simulation 
state. You do this with the Event Repetitions selector. Note that the event will be executed 
in each simulation state, so if you previously ran 10 repetitions from the Configuration 
Files tab, and now you are repeating an event 10 times, you will be executing 100 
simulations.  
Repeating events is useful when the event is not deterministic, for example for Uniform 




sense to select the center of the event randomly (i.e. set the row and col parameters at -1). 
If you do not select an event, you are basically resuming the simulation set from the saved 
simulation state. 
10. Command Line Interface 
The command line offers the same functionality as the Batch Mode, but is meant to be 
used with servers and without a graphical user interface. It might also be preferred by 
individuals who prefer the keyboard over the mouse. After the introductory learning 
phase with the GUI, the command line is the fastest way to interact with the Cultural 
Simulator. It is also more flexible than Batch Mode, as creating configuration files is not 
necessary. Instead, the main input is a csv file, a results folder), or event files (and the 
language is parsed from the parameters in the command line). 
In order to use the command line, you open a terminal and go to the directory on your 
computer that contains the culsim.jar, a Java executable. You can execute this file 
directly with java -jar culsim.jar $ARGS, but you will also find two executables, 
culsim.bat for Windows and culsim.sh for Unix/Linux (and iOS - note that this is not 
tested). If no arguments ($ARGS) are provided, then the Graphical User Interface will 
appear. As with Batch Mode, the are two general tests that can be performed with the 
Command Line: 
10.1. Testing convergence states of simulations (from a csv 
file): 
Here is an example of how to test the convergence state of different simulation 
configurations in Unix/Linux (for Windows, use culsim.bat): 
./culsim.sh -id sample_experiment -ef sample.csv  
The -id parameter is optional; it sets a name for the results folder and final results file 
(See H. Output Files) that are stored in the current directory; the directory where the 
command is executed. If no -id is provided, results will be used by default. 
The -ef parameter indicates the csv file that contains the configurations of the 
simulations that are going to be executed. The file sample.csv is provided in the same 
folder as an example (the two rows are equivalent except for the institutional influence). 




Initial Parameters (with the exception of REPETITIONS, which indicate the number of 
times the configuration will be repeated): 
CSV Column Parameter 
REPETIONS Repetitions 
MODEL Model 
RANDOM_INITIALIZATION Random initialization 
ITERATIONS Iterations 
SPEED Speed 







SELECTION_ERROR Selection error 
INST_INFLUENCE Institutional influence 
AGENT_LOYALTY Agent loyalty 
DEMOCRACY Democracy 
PROPAGANDA Propaganda 
10.2. Testing the effect of an event in simulation sets (from 
Results Folder): 
There are two ways of inputting events in the batch mode. One is configuring the event(s) 
directly in the command line. The other requires the use of the interface, first, to define 
and save the event(s) into a file and, then, to use the file to execute the event. 
10.2.1. Configuring events directly in the command line 
Here is an example of a (composed) event in the simulation, set in Unix/Linux (for 
Windows, use culsim.bat): 
./culsim.bat -r -id sample_event_experiment -rd ./sample_experiment/ -r 
1  -evs G@U,0.1 I@N,0.5,0.5,0.2 P@iterations,1000  
The -id parameter is optional; it sets a name for the results folder and final results file 
(See H. Output Files), so that, instead of the current directory, they are stored inside the 
results folder (see -rd parameter). If no -id is provided, results will be used by default. 
The -rd parameter indicates the results directory that will be used to test the (simple or 
composed) event. In this case we are assuming that you executed the previous step with 




The -r is optional; it indicates the number of times the (simple or composed) event will 
be executed, for each simulation state (repetitions). Repetitions make more sense when 
the events depend on a probabilistic distribution, e.g. a uniform distribution of the event, 
or there is an element of probability, e.g. when the (non-probabilistic) Neumann 
distribution has a center that is selected randomly, by using -1 in the rows and/or 
columns. 
The -evs parameter indicates the events which will be executed in the provided 
simulation sets. A special syntax (instead of events files) has been provided to define 
events. It basically follows the format Event_type@Distribution for events that affect 
institutions or agents, and P@parameter,value for parameter change event. The first 
letter(s) before the @ indicates the event type according to the following table: 
Id Event 
A Apostasy 
D Institutional destruction 
RP Content removal (Partial) 
RF Content removal (Full) 
CP Conversion (Partial) 




P Parameter Change Event 
The part after the @ defines a distribution for events that affect agents or institutions. The 
table below explains the meaning of each parameter for each distribution (the first 
parameter identifies the distribution, and the rest its parameters): 
Parameters Distribution 
U,p (U)niform distribution with probability p 
N,row,col,max,sd (N)ormal distribution centered at (row,col) with maximum 
value of max and standard deviation sd. The center can be 
chosen randomly by using -1 in the rows and/or columns. 
E,row,col,max,p Normal (E)stimated distribution centered at (row,col) with 
maximum value of max and proportion p. The center can be 
chosen randomly by using -1 in the rows and/or columns. 
W,row,col,r Neumann (not ne(W) man) distribution center at (row,col) with 
radius r. The center can be chosen randomly by using -1 in the 
rows and/or columns. 
R,row1,col1,row2,col2 (R)ectangular distribution with the initial position at 
(row1,col1), and final position at (row2,col2) 
For the Parameter Change Event, instead of a distribution, the part after the @ defines 




change the number of iterations to 1000. The following table shows the list of arguments 





selection Selection error 
influence Institutional influence 
loyalty Agent loyalty 
democracy Democracy 
propaganda Propaganda 
10.2.2. Using pre-configured file event 
Alternatively, you can create event files with the interface (see D. Events), and use -
evs_file to specify the path of the file. An equivalent to the previous command would be: 
./culsim.bat -r -id sample_event_experiment -rd ./sample_experiment/ -r 







Appendix 10. Chapter 3. Study 1: Theories of the Maya 
Collapse 
Some 88 different theories or variations of theories attempting to explain the Classic 
Maya Collapse have been identified. From climate change to deforestation to lack of 
action by Maya kings, there is no universally accepted collapse theory, although drought 
is gaining momentum as the leading explanation. (Gill, 2000) 
“Like most things, collapse explanations are subject to fashion, and the one most in the 
limelight today is climatic change, or more specifically, megadrought.” Quote is from 
(Webster, 2002, p. 239) see also article by (Diamond, 2003) 
The dynasty is believed to have collapsed entirely shortly thereafter. In Quirigua, twenty 
miles north of Copán, the last king Jade Sky began his rule between 895 and 900, and 
throughout the Maya area all kingdoms similarly fell around that time (Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2013, pp. 143–149) 
Between 400 and 450, the population was estimated at a peak of twenty-eight thousand between 
750 and 800 - larger than London at the time. Population then began to steadily decline. By 900 
the population had fallen to fifteen thousand, and by 1200 the population was again less than 1000 
(Webster, 2002; Webster, Freter, & Gonlin, 2000) 
References Table 1. Simulation events and references for different theories of the Maya collapse. 
References Event 
The archaeological evidence of the Toltec intrusion into Seibal, Peten, 






As life became more burdensome, work began to undermine the religious 
development and collective enterprise of ordinary people. For it was the 
strength of Mayan religions that historians believe allowed the Mayans to 
build such great monuments and temples. The increased burden of work is 
what many believe caused Mayan people to abandon their values and revolt 
against the elite of society. This would explain the abrupt collapse of elite 
functions as well as unfinished buildings, and ceremonial centers. Peasant 
revolt also explains the evidence of the burning of temples and smashing of 
thrones. It is believed that once the elite lost ceremonial centers they no longer 
had the power to sway people with religion through demonstrations and 
sacrifices. (Thompson, 1954) 
 
the population should have increased because of the lack of elite power. 
Further, it is not understood why the governmental institutions were not 





Teotihuacan was believed to have fallen during 700–750, forcing the 






Gulf Coast" (Webster, 2002, p. 231) This remaking of relationships between 




Widespread disease could explain some rapid depopulation, both directly 
through the spread of infection itself and indirectly as an inhibition to recovery 
over the long run. According to Dunn (1968) and Shimkin (1973), infectious 
diseases spread by parasites are common in tropical rainforest regions, such as 
the Maya lowlands. (Dunn, 1968; Shimkin, 1973)  
 
The Maya may have encountered endemic infections related to American 
trypanosomiasis, Ascaris, and some enteropathogens that cause acute diarrheal 
illness. Through development of their civilization (that is, development of 
agriculture and settlements), the Maya could have created a "disturbed 
environment," in which parasitic and pathogen-carrying insects often thrive. 
those that cause the acute diarrheal illnesses would have been the most 
devastating to the Maya population. (Anderson & May, 1982; Santley, Killion, 
& Lycett, 1986) 
Diseases / 
Decimation 
Mega-droughts hit the Yucatán Peninsula and Petén Basin areas with 
particular ferocity (Gill, 2000, p. 311; Webster, 2002, p. 239) 
 
Gill analyzes an array of research from different sources (climatic, historical, 
hydrologic, tree ring, volcanic, geologic, lake bed, and archeological research) 
and demonstrates that a prolonged series of droughts probably caused the 
Classic Maya Collapse (Gill, 2000) 
 
"Many lines of evidence now point to climate forcing as the primary agent in 
repeated social collapse. (Weiss, 1997, 2001) 
 
“Within the past five years new tools and new data for archaeologists, 
climatologists, and historians have brought us to the edge of a new era in the 
study of global and hemispheric climate change and its cultural impacts. The 
climate of the Holocene, previously assumed static, now displays a surprising 
dynamism, which has affected the agricultural bases of pre-industrial societies. 
The list of Holocene climate alterations and their socio-economic effects has 
rapidly become too complex for brief summary” 
[Studies of] Yucatecan lake sediment cores ... provide unambiguous evidence 
for a severe 200-year drought from AD 800 to 1000 ... the most severe in the 
last 7,000 years ... precisely at the time of the Maya Collapse. (Gill, 2000, p. 
276) 
 
“Given this precarious balance of wet and dry conditions, even a slight shift in 
the distribution of annual precipitation can have serious consequences.” 
(Webster, 2002, p. 239) 
LSU archaeologist Heather McKillop found a significant rise in sea level 
along the coast nearest the southern Maya lowlands, coinciding with the end 
of the Classic period, and indicating climate change. (McKillop, 2006, p. 312) 
 
A study published in Science in 2012 found that modest rainfall reductions, 
amounting to only 25 to 40 percent of annual rainfall, may have been the 
tipping point to the Mayan collapse. Based on samples of lake and cave 
sediments in the areas surrounding major Mayan cities, the researchers were 
able to determine the amount of annual rainfall in the region. The mild 
droughts that took place between 800-950 would therefore be enough to 
rapidly deplete seasonal water supplies in the Yucatán lowlands, where there 
are no rivers.(Medina-Elizalde & Rohling, 2012; “Mild drought caused Maya 







Hypothesis of soil exhaustion  (Culbert, 1977, pp. 23–24) based on (Cook, 
1919) 
Similar soil exhaustion assumptions are associated with erosion, intensive 
agricultural, and savanna grass competition. Systemic ecological collapse is 
said to be evidenced by deforestation, siltation, and the decline of biological 





development of and the declining marginal returns from the increasing social 
complexity of the competing Mayan city-states (Tainter, 2011, pp. 152–177) 
 
Failure in the social control systems of religion and political authority, due to 
increasing socioeconomic complexity that overwhelmed the power of 
traditional rituals and the king's authority to compel obedience. 
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Appendix 11. Chapter 3. Study 2: Complementary graphs 
Fig. A and Fig. B show an analogous graph to Figure 23 and Figure 25 (Chapter 4), but 
for populations of 32x32. Fig. C present a separated analysis for Colonization and 
Damages (similar to Figure 23) for each of the combinations of democracy and 
propaganda on Figure 26. Fig. D is analogous to Figure 26, but for populations of 32x23. 
Fig. E is analogous to Fig. C, but for populations of 32x32. Fig. D and Fig. E just show 
results of scenarios with both, propaganda and democracy. 
 
Fig. A. Effects of Damages and Colonization on the similarity of diverse scenarios 
(populations of 32x32). The purple bars present the results for cases in which the event 
set contained the Damages event, whereas the green, the results for cases that did not. The 
left graph presents the results with Colonization event-set, whereas the right graph the 
ones without Colonization. The Y-axis shows the similarity between the state just before 
the event (1000000th iteration), and 100000 iterations after the event. The X-axis shows 
the results for two scenarios in the format S(G): NxN/R/I: S is the identifier; G, average 
number of cultural groups; NxN, number of rows and column; R, distance of 








Fig. B. Effects of Damages with Conversion, Settlement, Centralized and Uniform 
Colonization on the similarity of variations of scenario D. The purple bars present the 
results for cases in which the event set contained the Damages event-set, whereas the 
green the results for cases that did not. All cases contain a version of the Colonization 
event-set: the top-left graph, Conversion Colonization; the top-right, Settlement 
Colonization; the bottom-left, Centralized Colonization, and the bottom-right, Uniform 
Colonization. The Y-axis indicates the similarity between the state just before the event 
(1000000th iteration), and 100000 iterations after the event. The X-axis presents the 
results for four extensions of scenario D in the format S(G): NxN/R, where S is the 
identifier; G, average number of cultural groups; NxN, number of rows and column; R, 





Fig. C. Effects of Damages and Colonization on the similarity of diverse scenarios 
(populations of 100x100) for different values of Propaganda and Democracy. The 
purple bars present the results for cases in which the event set contained the Damages 
event, whereas the green, the results for cases that did not. The left graphs present the 
results with Colonization event-set, whereas the right graphs the ones without 
Colonization. Each row of graps present different values of propaganda and democracy. 
The Y-axis shows the similarity between the state just before the event (1000000th 
iteration), and 100000 iterations after the event. The X-axis shows the results for two 
scenarios in the format S(G): NxN/R/I: S is the identifier; G, average number of cultural 






Fig. D Effects of invasion (Damages and Colonization) in scenarios with Democracy 
and/or Propaganda (32x32). The yellow and blue bars present results for the scenarios C 
and D with the extensions presented in the X-axis. Each extension is a combination of 
Democracy and Propaganda showed in the parenthesis of X-axis labels. The Y-axis 
indicates the similarity between the state just before the event (1000000th iteration), and 
100000 iterations after the event. 
 
Fig. E Effects of Damages and Colonization on the similarity of diverse scenarios 
(populations of 32x32) for different values of Propaganda and Democracy. The 
purple bars present the results for cases in which the event set contained the Damages 
event, whereas the green, the results for cases that did not. The left graphs present the 




Colonization. Each row of graps present different values of propaganda and democracy. 
The Y-axis shows the similarity between the state just before the event (1000000th 
iteration), and 100000 iterations after the event. The X-axis shows the results for two 
scenarios in the format S(G): NxN/R/I: S is the identifier; G, average number of cultural 





Appendix 12. Chapter 3. Study 2: Events related to the Spanish Invasion 
References Table 2. References that support the distributions of the events 
Event References Distribution Comments 
Decimation In the course of the fifth year the pestilence began, O my children. First there was a 
cough, then the blood was corrupted, and the urine became yellow. The number of 
deaths at this time was truly terrible. The Chief Vakaki Ahmak died, and we ourselves 
were plunged in great darkness and great grief, our fathers and ancestors having 
contracted the plague, O my children. (Annals of the Kaqchikel, p.171) 
 
“There was a locust plague in 1513, a bad fire that swept through Iximche’ in 1514, and 
in 1519 a devastating plague that did not end until 1521. It was likely the first 
appearance of small pox, which had ravaged Yukatan a few years early” (Schele & 
Mathews, 1999, p. 297) 
 
“First, and foremost were epidemic diseases previously unknown in the New World, 
such as smallpox, influenza, and measles. It is generally agreed among scholars that 
these produced a holocaust unparalleled in the new world’s history: within a century, 
90% of the native population had been killed off, including that of the Maya area.” 
(Coe & Houston, 2015, p. 289)  
 
“… one-third to one-half of the Indian population of highland Guatemala must have 
perished as a consequence of this pestilence” (Lovell, 2005, p. 71) 
 
Los dominios de los K’iche’ probablemente alcanzaron su máxima extensión a 
mediados del siglo XV, cuando se extendían desde lo que sería el Soconusco, en las 
tierras bajas del Pacífico, hasta las tierras altas de lo que después fueron las Verapaces. 
Durante esa época, los K’iche’ habrían ejercido dominio sobre una región de unos 
25,000 kilómetros cuadrados y una población aproximada de un millón de habitantes. 
(Informe Nacional de Desarrollo Humano, 2005, p. 27)  
 
Pedro de Alvarado described their actions: “We surrounded a bare mountain where they 
had take refuge, and pursued them to the top, and took al that hado gone up there. That 
day we killed and imprisoned many people, many of whom were captains and chiefs 




casualties of plagues 
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with this and it is 
that it occurred a 
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simulation and it 






The 90% is across 
all the century, so 
33 to 50% seems a 
more plausible 
figure in this 
case… to be sure, 
the simulation is 
able to resist 
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“At dawn the following morning, the Spaniards were about to march on 
Huehuetenango, only three kilometres away, when they were confronted by a Mam 
army, reported as five thousand strong,10 from the neighbouring town of Malacatin 
(now Malacatancito). Already in battle formation, the Malacatecos approached the 
Spaniards over an open plain. Alvarado immediately ordered his cavalry into action. 
Those Indians not killed by Spanish lances or trampled to death beneath the horses' 
hooves were soon dispatched by the infantry who followed in the cavalry's wake.”  
(Lovell, 2005, p. 61)  
 
“Inside the stronghold, Caibil Balam had gathered an estimated six thousand warriors, 
drawn not only from Huehuetenango and Zaculeu, but also from the Mam communities 
of Cuilco and Ixtahuacan (...) A batallion of two thousand warriors was dispatched from 
Zaculeu to rejuvenate the Mam defence, but still the Spaniards lost no ground. Soon the 
battlefield was strewn with green crests covered in Mam blood (...) Alvarado declared 
victory, and consolidated his position by laying siege to the stronghold.  
(...)Shortly after initiating the siege, the Spaniards were forced to return to the field of 
battle by a massive Mam army descending on the beleaguered Zaculeu from the 
mountains to the north. This army, reported as eight thousand strong,16 came from the 
heart of the Cuchumatanes and was composed of warriors drawn from towns politically 
aligned with the Mam of Zaculeu. Communities such as San Martin, Todos Santos, 
Santiago Chimaltenango, and San Juan Atitan probably all contributed a supply of 
warriors. Leaving a command of men under Antonio de Salazar to maintain the siege of 
the fortress (…) Once again the Indians were more than a match for the Spanish 
infantry, but collapsed under the assault of the cavalry. (…) 
The siege of Zaculeu, begun in early September, lasted until the middle of October 
before the Mam showed signs of capitulation(...) A lack of provisions and a falling 
morale left the Mam weak, sick, and hungry. (…) When the weeping Caibil Balam 
finally surrendered, itwas not until the Mam of Zaculeu had reached the point of 
starvation.” (Lovell, 2005, pp. 63–64)  
 
“On reaching the upper slopes, Castellanos's troops came upon an army of between four 
and five thousand "rebellious and ferocious" warriors from Nebaj and other 
neighbouring towns (…) Ixil warriors who were not killed during the fighting were 
rounded up.” (Lovell, 2005, p. 65)  
 
“Following the capture of Nebaj and the capitulation of Chajul, Spanish forces, rested 




troops arrived at the town to find an estimated ten thousand Indian warriors, drawn 
from Uspantan, Cunen, Cotzal, Sacapulas, and Verapaz, waiting in hostile 
confrontation. castellanos's strategic deployment of cavalry, plus the firearm superiority 
of his foot soldiers, finally won the day for the Spaniards. Uspantan was seized; and, as 
at Nebaj, those warriors not slaughtered on the field of battle were taken prisoner and 
branded as slaves.” (Lovell, 2005, p. 66) 
 
“The ability of Indian communities to raise strong armies to oppose the entradas of 
1525 to 1530 is an important indication that the Cuchumatan region at the time of 




Cortés decided to despatch Pedro de Alvarado with 120 cavalry (with 50 spare horses), 
300 infantry, crossbows, musketeers, 4 field pieces (cannons), large amounts of 
ammunition and gunpowder, and an unespicified (hundreds or thousands) number of 
allied Mexican warriors from Tlaxcala, Cholula and other cities in central Mexico 
(Lovell, 2005, pp. 59–65; Recinos, Adrián, 1952, p. 19; Schele & Mathews, 1999, p. 




represents one event 
(of size 5%) divided 
in two; one, the 
colonizers settling 
in the center, and 
two, the foreigners 
controlling 
territories 
The figure is 
inflated as the 
Maya population 
never recover until 
very late in 
history. 
Apostasy “At the instigation of a priest, the outraged Kaqchikels abandoned their capitalon 7 
Ahmak (August 28, 1524) and retreated to the hills and forests, expecting their gods to 
destroy the Spaniards. The destruction never came, and the Spaniards began their war 
against the Kaqchikels ten days later.” (Schele & Mathews, 1999, p. 298) 
 
“Bernal Díaz reported returning to Iximche’ and spending the night “in the site of the 
old city of Guatemala where once lived the caciques called Sinakan and Saqachul.” He 
said that the rooms and houses were still in good shape, but this is the last known 
description of Iximche as a habitable city.” (Recinos, 1998, p. 19; Schele & Mathews, 
1999, p. 298) 
 
“The Indians of Malacatan fought bravely; but when their leader, Canil Acab, fell to a 
blow from the lance of Gonzalo de Alvarado, the courage of the Malacatecos quickly 
waned. Native resistance collapsed and the remaining Indians fled from the field of 
Uniform (50%): 
represents survivors 
that escaped and 
found refuge in the 
mountains, leaving 
behind institutions 
The Maya run 





battle into the surrounding hills. Alvarado then marched unopposed into Malacatan, 
where only the aged and the sick remained. Delegates of the community later arrived 
from the mountains with offerings of peace. Alvarado accepted their unconditional 
surrender and declared them subjects of the King of Spain. The campaign against the 
Mam had successfully begun. After a few days' rest, the Spaniards marched into 
Huehuetenango, only to find it completely deserted. Having already received reports of 
the Spaniards' approach, Caibil Balam had ordered the evacuation of Huehuetenango 




On 9 February 1526, a group of sixteen (or sixty) Spanish deserters burnt the palace of 
the Ahpo Xahil, sacked the temples and kidnapped a priest, acts that the Kaqchikel 
blamed on Pedro de Alvarado. (Recinos, Adrián, 1952, pp. 21–22; Schele & Mathews, 
1999, p. 298,310,386n19) 
 
Alvarado decided to have the captured K'iche' lords burnt to death, and then proceeded 
to burn the entire city. (Schele & Mathews, 1999, p. 297; Sharer & Traxler, 2006, p. 
765) 
 
“Alvarado then ordered his soldiers to fall on the Quiché without mercy. Utatlán was 
laid to waste, and the rulers responsible for conspiring against the Spaniards burned to 
death. In complete disarray, the Quiché nation collapsed” (Lovell, 2005, p. 61) 
 
“The march continued until the invaders reached the plain where 
the Mam town of Mazatenango stood, near the present settlement of San Lorenzo. The 
Spaniards attacked, and in less than four hours Mazatenango was taken.” (Lovell, 2005, 
p. 59) 
 
“The failure of the Ixil to defend adequately all sides of the Nebaj fortress enabled 
several Indian auxiliaries to scramble over the ravine, scale the stronghold's walls, and 
gain entry. Once inside, they set the town on fire.” (Lovell, 2005, p. 65) 
 
5 x Centralized 
(10%): represents 
destructive events to 
various cities across 
the country, one in 
the center and one 
in each corner 
The destruction of 






“On March 9 [1524], he [Pedro de Alvarado] burned the defian K’iche’ kings at the 
stake…” (Schele & Mathews, 1999, p. 297) 
 
Pedro de Alvarado “advanced killing, ravaging, burning, robbing, and destroying all the 
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Pedro de Alvarado described their actions: “We surrounded a bare mountain where they 
had take refuge, and pursued them to the top, and took al that hado gone up there. That 
day we killed and imprisoned many people, many of whom were captains and chiefs 
and people of importance” (Sharer & Traxler, 2006, p. 764) 




“After accepting Caibil Balam's surrender, Alvarado ordered a reconnaissance to be 
made of all the towns subject to Zaculeu, and established a Spanish garrison in nearby 
Huehuetenango under the command of Gonzalo de Solis.” (Lovell, 2005, pp. 63–64) 
 
“Se impuso un nuevo tipo de asentamiento territorial, cuya base la constituyó el sistema 
de “pueblos de indios” establecido hacia mediados del siglo XVI; formados muchas 
veces con indígenas pertenecientes a distintas etnias. Así se rompería el sentido de la 
antigua pertenencia étnica y territorial. Los nuevos referentes del poder y la identidad 
serían la Corona de Castilla, Santiago de los Caballerros, España, la ciudad de 
Guatemala, las parroquias y gobernaciones, con sus distintas instituciones y 
funcionarios, y la Iglesia. 
(…) 
En cuanto a su asentamiento territorial, el indígena, en su mayoría, fue confinado en los 
pueblos creados en el área rural hacia mediados del siglo XVI, en cuya jurisdicción 
tenían prohibido el asentamiento españoles, criollos y mestizos, lo que trató de 
mantenerse en mayor o menor medida hasta finales del periodo colonial. Desde este 
núcleo poblacional se organizó todo el sistema económico de exacción, con base en 
tributos y trabajo forzado de la población que vivía en ellos; y de él se desprende el 
sistema de pueblos y localidades indígenas prevaleciente hasta la actualidad en 
Guatemala. En menores proporciones existió también una población indígena urbana, 
sobre todo en los barrios de la capital del Reino, en la ciudad de Santiago de los 
Caballeros de Guatemala, la hoy ciudad de Antigua. 
En el área rural se conformaron con el tiempo centros de población indígena que 
lograron sustraerse al control colonial, en lugares apartados y remotos, conocidos como 
“pajuides”. Sus dimensiones nunca fueron mayores, pues existió el interés y la 
preocupación general de los demás sectores, incluyendo a la Iglesia, de su control, 
dominación, explotación y lucro. Con el tiempo, se dio también el indígena adscrito 
como mano de obra laboral a las fincas, un fenómeno menor, pues el terrateniente 
lograba la mano de obra a través de los repartimientos indígenas de los mencionados 
pueblos. En la medida de lo posible, la población indígena debía vivir rigurosamente 
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Appendix 13. Chapter 3. Study 3: References and citations related to the civil war 
References Table 3. Supporting reference for a Decimation event  
Quote Text  Summary Simulated 
distribution 
Comments  
“In Guatemala, the (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a) – as 
the Truth Commission is officially called – was created in June 1994 as part of 
the Oslo Accords between the Guatemalan government and the umbrella group 
of insurgent forces, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG). 
[…] In a stunning judgement, the CEH charged the Guatemalan military with 
genocide; ‘[T]he CEH concludes that agents of the State of Guatemala, within 
the framework of counterinsurgency operations carried out between 1981 and 
1983, committed acts of genocide against groups of Mayan people’ (Historical 
Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999b, p. 41). According to its findings, 83 
percent of the victims were Maya.” (Historical Clarification Commission 
(CEH), 1999a; Manz, 2002, p. 293) 
 
“También se notó que la relación entre ejecutados y desaparecidos en las 
violaciones documentadas por la CEH es aproximadamente 4:1. La cifra de 
40,000 desaparecidos resulta completamente coherente con esta proporción. 
Una vez expuesta, la CEH estima que en términos muy aproximados tuvieron 
lugar más de 160,000 ejecuciones y 40,000 desapariciones.” (Historical 
Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 73 Vol I) 
 
“751. Este Informe demuestra que el recurso a las armas no mejoró la vida de 
los guatemaltecos, sino que condujo a una espiral de violencia fratricida que, 
según las estimaciones de la CEH, dejó un saldo de aproximadamente 200,000 









A centralized massacre 
equivalent to 10% of 
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part of the 
casualties since 
geographically they 
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cultural tissue that 




occurred in many 
different parts of 
Guatemala, they 
were concentrated 
in Quiche, in 
particular Ixil 
Region opposed 
some resistance.  
 
A new parameter, 
ceiling of the 
normal distribution, 
might be necessary, 
so the distribution 
does not always 
reach 1 in the 
center. 
 
“The CIIDH database records nearly 18,000 state killings in 1982 alone.” 
(Ball, Kobrak, & Spirer, 1999, p. 24; Ball, Spirer, Spirer, & American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, 2000) 
 
“After Ríos Montt took over, the level of violence increased (…) The number 
of state killings and disappearances rose even higher in April 1982, Ríos 
Montt’s first full month in office. The 3,330 documented deaths and 













month total number of documented violations of the right to life for the entire 
armed conflict (the actual total is higher).” (Ball et al., 1999, p. 40) 
 
“The database documents over 800 killings and disappearances per month 
during Ríos Montt’s 17-month occupation of the National Palace. The actual 
numbers must include tens of thousands of murders not documented by any 
database project, certainly higher than those reported here.” (Ball et al., 1999, 
p. 38)  
“and 1813 killings per month during the first four months of the Ríos Montt 
regime” (Ball et al., 1999, p. 60) 
 
See graph on Fig.  1 for a distribution disappearances and executions by dates. 
(Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 407 Vol II) 
 
“This concentration of energies and forces resulted in the most closely 
coordinated, intensive massacre campaign in Guatemalan history, killing 
75,000 in 18 months (most in the first eight months, between April and 
November 1982, primarily in the departments of Chimaltenango, Quiché, 





“The army’s brutal and targeted repression, especially in the province of El 
Quiché (...) went far beyond the threat posed by the armed insurgency. In El 
Quiché, 344 massacres took place, representing more than half of the total 
deaths and over 45 percent of the human rights violations in the country.” 
(Manz, 2002, p. 294) 
 
“The murder of one hundred fifty Kekchí Indians took place in the 
northeastern village of Panzós only twenty-nine days after (the May 1st 
demonstration 1978), shaking ‘the highlands, indicating to what point the 
regime would go in response to the legal claims and demands of the 
campesinos’ (Arias, 1990, p. 250) 
 
See map on Fig. 2 for a distribution of the massacres by department. 
(Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 519 Vol II) and graph 
on Fig.  3. for a distribution of the massacres by department and dates 













“as many as 1.5 million people were internally displaced or had to flee the 
country, including about 150,000 who sought refuge in Mexico” (Manz, 2002, 
p. 294)  
 
“Las tareas y plazos del movimiento revolucionario en su conjunto están 
determinados ahora por 35,000 muertos, 900,000 organizados en PAC, más de 
18,000 concentrados en polos militarizados, más de 45,000 refugiados en el 
exterior, 1,200,000 desplazados internos, más de 200,000 huérfanos por la 
represión, más de 40,000 viudas. En pocas palabras, el costo humano más 
grande del país después de la conquista” (Historical Clarification Commission 
(CEH), 1999a, p. 285 Vol II)  
 
“The Inter-American Commission also described the serious situation of 
displaced persons inside Guatemala, who, according to church sources, were 
estimated to number between 250,000 and 1 million people. (…) in four areas 
of northern Guatemala alone – Huehuetenango, El Quiché, western Péten, and 
Playa Grande – there were at least 150,000 people who had fled and were in 
Mexico and another 250,000 people (representing 50,000 families) who were 
internally displaced…” (Davis, 1992, pp. 10–11) 







Fig.  1. Total of forced disappearances and arbitrary 
executions, Guatemala (1962-1966). Original image is from 






Fig.  3. Total of massacres per department (5 most 
frequent), Guatemala (1979-1985). Original image is from 






Fig. 2. Number of massacres per department committed by state forces. Source: CEH, 
database. It was not possible to identify the one masacre. Original image is from (Historical 




References Table 4. Supporting reference for an Invasion event  
Quote Text Summary Simulated 
distribution 
Comments 
“From 1980 to 1984, the size of the Guatemalan armed forces expanded from 
fifteen to forty thousand” (Hall, 1994; Historical Clarification Commission 
(CEH), 1999a, p. 87 Vol III) 
 
“Guatemala’s military almost doubled in just one year, from 1983-84 (21,560) to 
1984-85 (40,000)” (Coerver & Hall, 1999, p. 155) 
Around 50 000 A uniform 
distribution seems to 
be the best 
approximation in 
this case as the 
invaders were 
distributed across all 
the territory. 
 





it is not clear 




were forced to 
participate as part 
of the government 
forces in the forms 
of civil patrols and 
military 
commissioners, 
most of the crimes 
were committed 
by the official 
army forces, or in 





forces are the only 
ones counted as 





“The army began Operación Ceniza in November 1981 and continued in 1982. 
The name “Operation Ashes” clearly stated the campaign’s intent, suggesting 
how the army planned to deal with villages in the guerrilla zone of activity. The 
army first committed mass killings and burned villages to take control of the 
Pan-American Highway running through Chimaltenango and southern Quiché. 
Then some 15,000 troops participated in a slow sweep through the department of 
El Quiché, into Huehuetenango, and all the way to the border with Mexico” 
(Ball et al., 1999, pp. 26–27) 
 
"Operación Ceniza" ("Operation Ash"). In a strategy developed jointly by 
Benedicto Lucas Garcia and Lieutenant Col. George Maynes (U.S. Defense 
Attache and Chief of the U.S. MilGroup in Guatemala), [Report on Guatemala, 
Guatemala News and Information Bureau, 1986, p. 24] some 15,000 troops were 
deployed on a gradual sweep through the highlands. (Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo, 
1996, p. 42) 
15000 troops 
“1291. Las referencias que se tienen con relación al número de patrulleros 
civiles en todo el país, inician en 1981 con aproximadamente 25,000 hombres. 
Según cifras oficiales del Ejército, “en el año de 1982 se contaba con un millón 
de patrulleros civiles”. Desde el reinicio de los gobiernos civiles en 1986 es que 
empiezan a disminuir: “en 1996 habían menos de 40,000 organizados”; según el 
Ejército, para ese año tenían registrados 270,906 en 15 departamentos del país.” 
(Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 190 Vol II) 
 
See graph on Fig. 4 for a distribution disappearances and executions by dates. 
(Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 168 Vol II) 
 
The army forced 
the population 
to help them in 







“In the CIIDH database, for cases in which the perpetrator is known, testimonies 
and documentary sources attribute the greater share of killings and 
disappearances to army personnel. Other types of government perpetrators 
include civil patrollers (PACs), military commissioners, clandestine death 
squads, the National Police and even the Treasury Police” (Ball et al., 1999, p. 
96)  
See graph on Fig. 5 for an overview of the involvement of the different parts in 
the disappearances and killings.  (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 
1999a, p. 337 Vol II) 
“858. La evolución de las operaciones contrainsurgentes y la regionalización del 
enfrentamiento armado fueron factores determinantes para el despliegue 
territorial de las unidades militares. La doctrina del Ejército en la década de los 
sesenta fue, básicamente, de protección de sus fronteras ante una agresión militar 
externa para enfrentar operaciones de índole convencional. Sin embargo, 
después de los inicios del enfrentamiento armado, la importancia estratégica de 
las diferentes regiones en que se dividió el país en esta década, obedeció a una 
distribución con carácter geopolítico militar y estuvo puntualizada 
principalmente en la región del Oriente del país, donde se focalizó la acción de 
la guerrilla.” (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 47 Vol II)  
See left map on Fig. 6 for a territorial distribution of the military zones before 
1961 (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 524 Vol II) 
 
“859. Hacia finales de la década de los setenta y principios de la década de los 
ochenta, con el resurgimiento de las acciones militares por parte de la guerrilla, 
el Ejército empleó dos conceptos y objetivos estratégicos: uno, el control físico 
del terreno ocupado por efectivos militares; y dos, la utilización de las Patrullas 
de Autodefensa Civil (PAC). Estas últimas consolidaron el control territorial, 
cubriendo el espacio físico que el Ejército no ocupaba y ejerciendo labores de 
control sobre la población civil.” (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 
1999a, p. 47 Vol II) 
 
“860. En 1983 el Ejército alcanzó el objetivo estratégico territorial a través de la 
creación de nuevas zonas y bases militares. Esta organización territorial en el 
interior del país se realizó desplegando una o más unidades militares por 
departamento, que coincidieron con los límites políticos administrativos. En la 
ciudad capital siguieron existiendo varias unidades militares, en proporción al 












número de población y al concepto de despliegue militar urbano.” (Historical 
Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 47 Vol II)  
See maps on Fig. 6 for a territorial distribution of the military zones after 1983 
(Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 524 Vol II)  
 
“861. Las zonas militares, por su distribución geográfica y número de miembros, 
recibieron a las unidades más preparadas durante el enfrentamiento. Estas 
instalaciones militares conformaron la base estructural del Ejército y en ellas 
prestaron su servicio la mayoría de los oficiales. Al ser instalaciones militares 
fijas y permanentes, permitieron al Ejército tener una o más bases de 
operaciones centralizadas en cada región del enfrentamiento, las que podía crear, 
reunificar o replegar cada vez que fuese necesario. La permanencia de estas 
unidades dentro de las zonas, significó la continuidad operativa en el terreno, a 
diferencia de las Fuerzas de Tarea, que se articulaban para una operación 
determinada y se desactivaban una vez cumplida la misión. Las tropas 
especiales, como los paracaidistas y kaibiles, estaban constituidas para dar apoyo 
a las operaciones de estas unidades militares.” (Historical Clarification 
Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 47–48 Vol II)  
 
“862. De la totalidad de violaciones de los derechos humanos atribuidas al 
Ejército durante el enfrentamiento, el 89.99% corresponde a las unidades 
regulares desplegadas en las zonas y bases militares.” (Historical Clarification 






Fig. 4. Total of military commissioners by date, Guatemala (1962-1995). Original image 
taken from (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 168 Vol II) 
 
Fig. 5. Percentage of participation of responsible forces in arbitrary killings.  
Percentages are calculated without considering if the force performed on its own, or together 
with another force, so percentages do not add up 100%. Original image taken from 







Fig. 6. Territorial distribution of the military zones in 1961 (left) and 1983. Original images taken from (Historical 





References Table 5. Supporting reference for an Apostasy event  
Quote Text Summary Simulated distribution Comments 
’Marxists,’ a word used derogatorily by (orthodox indigenistas) to 
refer to Indian campesinos who resented both ethnic-cultural and 
class oppression” (Arias, 1990, p. 255) 
 
“in October 1981, when the president’s brother, Benedicto Lucas 
García, took command of the counterinsurgency campaign in the 
highlands, the president of the National Institute of Cooperatives 
(INACOOP), a government agency created with US funds, declared 
250 cooperatives illegal because of their supposed ‘Marxist 
inspiration’ (Davis, 1992, p. 22) 
 
“59. As well as repression and exile, the weakening and 
fragmentation of social organisations were largely due to the various 
mechanisms activated during the armed confrontation by the State to 
destroy them. These mechanisms continue to be present in the 
collective memory. Stigmatisation, fear, mistrust and the 
perception in some sectors that the signing of the peace accords 
has not yet changed the repressive State, are still obstacles which 
prevent the full participation of society, even though the process of 
peace and national reconciliation indicates an encouraging reversal of 
this tendency.  
60. The participation by members of insurgent groups in social 
organisations also affected them, not only because it created one more 
reason for their repression, but also because in many cases it led to 
division, polarisation and serious in-fighting in the organisations, 
inevitably weakening them. The vertical structure that the 
insurgency brought to the social organisations in which it participated 
curtailed their freedom to make their own decisions, suffocating their 
autonomy and exacerbating the effects of the State's repressive 
policies of dismantling the country's social and political 
opposition. 
 (…) 
62. The CEH concludes that the Mayan communities also became a 
military objective during the bloodiest years of the confrontation. In 
some regions and years, because of the terror and persecution, 
People had to hide their 




between Marxism and 
indigenous people 
made it dangerous to 
show strong affiliation 
with the Maya identity. 
 
Many people were 
forced to join the 
armies in the PAC and 
military 
commissioners, at least 
temporarily 
Uniformly distributed 
all across Guatemala. 
There is very little 
point to assume that 
the distribution was 
concentrated in Quiche 
because everybody 
would have been 
scared specially toward 
in the Rios Montt 
period. 
 
An arbitrary value of 
50% is picked for the 
uniform distribution. 
People where 
prosecuted as part 
of the communism 
movement, we can 
then assume that a 
lot of people 
stopped being 






Mayans were obliged to conceal their ethnic identity, manifested 
externally in their language and dress.  
63. Beginning in 1982, traditional Mayan authorities were generally 
substituted by delegates from the armed forces, such as military 
commissioners and PAC commanders. In other cases, the Army tried 
to control, co-opt and infiltrate the traditional Mayan authority 
structures. This strategy caused the rupture of both community 
mechanisms and the oral transmission of knowledge of their own 
culture, likewise damaging Mayan norms and values of respect and 
service to the com-munity. In their stead, authoritarian practices and 
the arbitrary use of power were introduced.”” (Historical Clarification 
Commission (CEH), 1999b, pp. 29–30)  
 
“4188. El discurso persuasivo usado en las constantes campañas 
para estigmatizar a las organizaciones del movimiento social las 
presentaba como el brazo político de la insurgencia, mensaje que 
fue interiorizado por importantes sectores de la sociedad. Por lo 
tanto, aparte de la eliminación física de gran cantidad de sus 
miembros, también se vulneró en la población la confianza hacia 
las organizaciones sociales y sus miembros.” (Historical 
Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 119 Vol IV) 
 
“4295. Igualmente, la pérdida de cuadros del movimiento social que 
durante décadas habían intentado obtener espacios para actuar 
políticamente en el país, significó un importante rezago en la 
formación de futuros dirigentes de la sociedad guatemalteca. En el 
caso de las comunidades mayas, la pérdida de los ancianos en las 
masacres, pero también, en los rigores del desplazamiento, 
impuso la ausencia de las cabezas de la comunidad, de la sabiduría y 
del conocimiento acumulados.” (Historical Clarification Commission 
(CEH), 1999a, pp. 153–154 Vol IV)  
 
“4412. Por el terror y la persecución los pueblos mayas se vieron 
obligados, en ciertas regiones y durante años, a ocultar su 
identidad expresada en su idioma y en su traje. Con la 
militarización se perturbó el ciclo de fiestas y ceremonias y se 
afirmó en la clandestinidad el conjunto de las prácticas 




que poseen profundos contenidos simbólicos para la cultura maya, 
como fue la destrucción del maíz y el asesinato de ancianos. Estos 
hechos vulneraron elementos de la identidad de los mayas y alteraron 
la transmisión intergeneracional de la misma.” (Historical 
Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 191 Vol IV) 
References Table 6. Supporting reference for an Institutional Destruction event  
Quote Text Summary Simulated 
distribution 
Comments 
“in October 1981, when the president’s brother, Benedicto Lucas García, 
took command of the counterinsurgency campaign in the highlands, the 
president of the National Institute of Cooperatives (INACOOP), a 
government agency created with US funds, declared 250 cooperatives illegal 
because of their supposed ‘Marxist inspiration’” (Davis, 1992, p. 22) 
 
“By the fall of 1975 nearly 20% of Highland Maya participated in some form 
of cooperatives (Handy, 1984, p. 240) and after the 1976 earthquake and the 
influx of additional international lenders, Guatemala boasted 510 
cooperatives, 57% of them in the Highlands with more than 132,000 












events in Quiché. 
 
Based on the amount 
of cooperatives that 
were destroyed 
(250) and the 
amount existing in 
1976 (510) we could 
estimate a 




cooperatives seem to 
have been the 
primary targets, and 
since there are many 
others forms of 
organizations 
(institutions) that 









In order for an 
institution to be 
destroyed, its content 
has to be removed as 
well as its leaders. 
This means that the 
mere destruction of 
the physical space 
doesn´t mean the 
immediate 
destruction of the 
institution as an 
abstract entity. For 
example, people 
could still find more 
meaning in the 
leaders of the 
institutions, than in 
The following appendices of the CEH report tabulates reported damages and 
destruction of cooperatives, farms, infrastructure and civil records. 
- Destrucción y daños a las cooperativas (Historical Clarification 
Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 266–268 Vol IV)  
- Destrucción y daños a fincas, 1978-1994 (Historical Clarification 
Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 269–271 Vol IV)  
- Infraestructura destruida, 1981-1995 (Historical Clarification Commission 
(CEH), 1999a, pp. 272–274 Vol IV)  
- Registros civiles destruidos por causa del enfrentamiento armado 
(Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 275 Vol IV) 
A summary of the economic costs in terms of cooperatives, farms and 
infrastructure can be found in (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 








The geographical distribution of the costs reflect that the attacks where 
centralized in Quiché (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, 





The following sections of the CEH report qualitatively describes the effects 
in terms of institutional destructions: 
- La desestructuración de los sistemas de autoridad y organización 
comunitarias (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 167–
172 Vol IV)   
- Persecución y muerte de autoridades indígenas (Historical Clarification 
Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 172–174 Vol IV)  
- Ruptura de estructuras de solidaridad (Historical Clarification Commission 
(CEH), 1999a, pp. 182–183 Vol IV) 






were not explicitly 
targeted as a military 
strategy, 50% is a 




happen all over the 
Guatemalan territory 
but still concentrated 
in the quiche, a low 
ceiling of 50% will 
be used. 
its physical assets. In 
this case, it is 
considering content 




would be almost 
impossible to destroy 
because even if all 
the content is lost, 
the connection 
towards the abstract 
institution is so 
strong that the 
institution gain 
content just by its 
name. For example, 
the connection to 
myths such as the 
relation with land 
and specifically with 
corn would not be 
easily destroyed, not 
even burning down 
all corn fields. 
  
“58. The CEH has confirmed that during the armed confrontation, 
social organisations were an important target of the State's repressive 
action. Considered as part of the "internal enemy", hundreds of leaders 
and grassroots members of a wide spectrum of groups were eliminated. 
These actions left civil society weakened and still affect its full participation 
in Guatemala's political and economic debates. The loss of professionals, 
academics and researchers, the "creative powers" who died or went into 
exile, not only created a vacuum during a specific period of political and 
cultural history, but also resulted in the loss of an important part of the 
pedagogic and intellectual capacity to educate several future generations in 
Guatemala 
59. As well as repression and exile, the weakening and fragmentation of 
social organisations were largely due to the various mechanisms 
activated during the armed confrontation by the State to destroy them. 
(…) 
64. The presence of the guerrillas also led to the displacement of traditional 
authorities and to a reduction of their power, especially through the 
establishment of their own authority structures, such as the Local 
Irregular Forces and the Local Clandestine Committees, which 
generated new leadership within the communities” (Historical 
Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999b, pp. 29–30) 
 
4187. A lo largo del enfrentamiento armado, la organización social fue un 
objetivo primordial para el Estado, un objetivo que debía 
desestructurarse en tanto fuera considerada una amenaza para la 
seguridad nacional. De ahí que la represión eliminara a gran cantidad de 
líderes, así como a cuadros medios y a miembros de base, dejando como 
saldo la discontinuidad en el trabajo organizativo de las diferentes 








vacío de formadores de futuros dirigentes. (Historical Clarification 
Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 118–119 Vol IV)  
 
“4409. En los años de exacerbación del enfrentamiento y la violencia, entre 
1979 y 1984, con la ampliación del campo de operaciones de la guerrilla, el 
Ejército identificó a los indígenas como guerrilleros, sin la individualización 
pertinente. La consecuencia de ello fue la agresión masiva e indiscriminada 
contra las comunidades mayas, con independencia de que estuvieran o no 
colaborando con la guerrilla. Con las masacres, la política de tierra arrasada, 
el secuestro y la ejecución de autoridades, líderes mayas y guías espirituales, 
no sólo se buscaba quebrar las bases sociales de la insurgencia, sino 
también desestructurar los mecanismos de identidad y de cohesión social que 
facilitaban las acciones colectivas de las comunidades 
(…) 
4412. Por el terror y la persecución los pueblos mayas se vieron obligados, 
en ciertas regiones y durante años, a ocultar su identidad expresada en su 
idioma y en su traje. Con la militarización se perturbó el ciclo de fiestas y 
ceremonias y se afirmó en la clandestinidad el conjunto de las prácticas 
ceremoniales mayas. La agresión estuvo dirigida a dañar elementos que 
poseen profundos contenidos simbólicos para la cultura maya, como fue 
la destrucción del maíz y el asesinato de ancianos. Estos hechos 
vulneraron elementos de la identidad de los mayas y alteraron la 
transmisión intergeneracional de la misma.” (Historical Clarification 
Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 190–191 Vol IV)  
References Table 7. Supporting reference for an Institutional Content Removal event  
Quote Text Summary Simulated 
distribution 
Comments 
On 7 July 1975, one month to the date after the assassination of 
Arenas, a contingent of army paratroopers arrived in the marketplace 
of Ixcán Grande. There they seized 30 men who were members of the 
Xalbal cooperative and took them away in helicopters; all were 
subsequently "disappeared". (Amnesty International, 1976, p. 9; 
McClintock, 1985, p. 133) 
 
A total of 60 cooperative leaders were murdered or "disappeared" in 








buildings or sacred 




when the institutions 
Two types of content 
removals can be 
distinguished, the ones 
in which all the content 
of some institutions is 
wiped out, and others in 
which only partial 
information is removed. 




cooperative and village leaders were assassinated by death squads 
between 1976 and 1978. Believing that the Catholic Church 
constituted a major part of the social base of the EGP, the regime also 
began singling out targets among the catechists. Between November 
1976 and December 1977, death squads murdered 143 Catholic 
Action catechists of the 'Diocese of El Quiche.' (Hayes & Tombs, 
2001) 
 
511. En Quiché el Ejército realizó acciones represivas, asesinando a 
68 líderes de cooperativas en Ixcán, 40 en Chajul, 28 en Cotzal y 32 
en Nebaj entre febrero de 1976 y noviembre de 1977, según el IGE. 
(Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 162 Vol I)  
were damaged but 
some content survived 
 
Uniform (~16%): 
most of the damage 
was in the central 
region but this 
percentage reflects a 
general damage on all 
the territory 
to simulate with the 
tool. 
 
The examples of the 
first case (full content) 
are better illustrated in 
the previous table of 
institutional destruction. 
As argued there, the 
elimination of the 
whole physical space 
doesn´t immediately 
imply the loss of the 
link to an abstract 
(empty institutions). It 
is, though, impossible 
to clearly distinguish 
the proportion of the 
cases that belongs to 
institutional destruction 
or to full content 
removal. However, I 
would argue that losing 
the connection with an 
institution is much 
harder, so the 
institutional destruction 
will be much lower that 
the full-content 
removal. It also seems 
that a full-content 
removal is pre-requisite 
for the institutional 
destruction. This is to 
say that an institution 
will continue existing if 
there is content 
associated to it.  A 
The following sections of the CEH report qualitatively describes the 
effects in terms of institutional content removal: 
- Persecución y muerte de autoridades indígenas (Historical 
Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 172–174 Vol IV)  
- Pérdida de valores, normas, costumbres (Historical Clarification 
Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 179–182 Vol IV) 
- La identidad maya y expresiones religiosas (Historical Clarification 
Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 183–186 Vol IV) 
- Ocupación y destrucción de lugares sagrados (Historical 
Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 186–187 Vol IV) 
- Uso de los idiomas y trajes mayas (Historical Clarification 





“58. (…) The loss of professionals, academics and researchers, the 
"creative powers" who died or went into exile, not only created a 
vacuum during a specific period of political and cultural history, but 
also resulted in the loss of an important part of the pedagogic and 
intellectual capacity to educate several future generations in 
Guatemala” (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999b, p. 
29) 
 
62. (…) Militarization of the communities disturbed the cycle of 
celebrations and ceremonies, and concealment of their rituals 
became progressively more widespread. Aggression was directed 
against elements of profound symbolic significance for the Mayan 
culture, as in the case of the destruction of corn and the killing of 
With the 
elimination of the 
leaders, many 
values and ideals 




their elders. These events had a serious impact on certain elements 
of Mayan identity and disturbed the transmission of their culture from 
generation to generation. Similarly, the culture was degraded through 
the use of Mayan names and symbols for task forces and other 
military structures. structures. (Historical Clarification Commission 
(CEH), 1999b, p. 29)  
 
63. Beginning in 1982, traditional Mayan authorities were generally 
substituted by delegates from the armed forces, such as military 
commissioners and PAC commanders. In other cases, the Army tried 
to control, co-opt and infiltrate the traditional Mayan authority 
structures. This strategy caused the rupture of both community 
mechanisms and the oral transmission of knowledge of their own 
culture, likewise damaging Mayan norms and values of respect 
and service to the community. In their stead, authoritarian practices 
and the arbitrary use of power were introduced. (Historical 
Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999b, p. 30) 
 
64. The presence of the guerrillas also led to the displacement of 
traditional authorities and to a reduction of their power 
(Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999b, p. 30) 
 
4187. A lo largo del enfrentamiento armado, la organización social 
fue un objetivo primordial para el Estado, un objetivo que debía 
desestructurarse en tanto fuera considerada una amenaza para la 
seguridad nacional. De ahí que la represión eliminara a gran cantidad 
de líderes, así como a cuadros medios y a miembros de base, dejando 
como saldo la discontinuidad en el trabajo organizativo de las 
diferentes entidades de la sociedad civil, la pérdida de su 
experiencia acumulada y el vacío de formadores de futuros 
dirigentes. (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 
118–119 Vol IV) 
 
“4409. En los años de exacerbación del enfrentamiento y la violencia, 
entre 1979 y 1984, con la ampliación del campo de operaciones de la 
guerrilla, el Ejército identificó a los indígenas como guerrilleros, sin 
la individualización pertinente. La consecuencia de ello fue la 
agresión masiva e indiscriminada contra las comunidades mayas, con 
different consequence is 
that the members might 
quit the institution 
given its lack of 
content. In this case the 
agents in the simulation 
possess the mechanisms 
to move to another 
simulation, also some of 
this institutional 
abandonment is 
contained in the 
apostasy. 
 
A less controversial 
topic is the partial 
content removal. To 
better reflect this across 
the grid, two partial 
removal events are 
superposed, a uniform 
event with low 
probability to make sure 
all the grid gets 
affected. Then a 
centralized event is 
created to reflect the 





independencia de que estuvieran o no colaborando con la guerrilla. 
Con las masacres, la política de tierra arrasada, el secuestro y la 
ejecución de autoridades, líderes mayas y guías espirituales, no sólo 
se buscaba quebrar las bases sociales de la insurgencia, sino también 
desestructurar los mecanismos de identidad y de cohesión social 
que facilitaban las acciones colectivas de las comunidades.” 
(Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 190–191 Vol 
IV) 
References Table 8. Supporting reference for an Institutional Conversion event  
Quote Text Summary Simulated 
distribution 
Comments 
“63. Beginning in 1982, traditional Mayan authorities were generally 
substituted by delegates from the armed forces, such as military 
commissioners and PAC commanders. In other cases, the Army tried to 
control, co-opt and infiltrate the traditional Mayan authority 
structures. This strategy caused the rupture of both community 
mechanisms and the oral transmission of knowledge of their own culture, 
likewise damaging Mayan norms and values of respect and service to the 
com-munity. In their stead, authoritarian practices and the arbitrary 
use of power were introduced. (Historical Clarification Commission 
(CEH), 1999a, pp. 118–119 Vol IV) 
Violent substitution 










(.75,.25%): if an 
institutions was not 
completely taken, it 
was at least partially 
changed. 
In this case, the 
militarization is 
happening across all 
the territory. It is 
important to highlight 
that some of this 
occupation was 
temporal, but some 
stick with the 
institutions. The most 
important are the 
permanent changes. 
 
Considering that the 
transformation was 
merely military, e.g. 
there was no religious 
evangelization, a low 
partial conversion as 
starting point is 
enough (20%)  
 
Some of the 
institutions were 
transformed 
The following sections of the CEH report qualitatively describes the effects 
in terms of institutional conversion: 
- Sustitución de autoridades mayas y sus funciones por autoridades militares 
(Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 174–177 Vol IV) 
- Control, cooptación e infiltración de las estructuras de autoridad indígena 
(Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 177–179 Vol IV) 
- Pérdida de valores, normas, costumbres (Historical Clarification 
Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 179–182 Vol IV) 
- Ocupación y destrucción de lugares sagrados (Historical Clarification 
Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 186–187 Vol IV) 
Norms were 
replaced at an 
institutional level. 
Sacred placed were 
taken by the police.  
 
“4380. La mayor parte de jóvenes indígenas difícilmente se escapaba de la 
experiencia castrense. Muchos jóvenes, después de estar en el Ejército, 
abandonaban sus comunidades. Otros, al regresar, se convertían en un 
elemento perturbador dentro de la misma. Haber servido en el Ejército era 
valorado positivamente por los militares al nombrar a los jefes de las 
Most of the (male) 
young people 
become part of the 




patrullas o a los comisionados militares. Así, la experiencia violenta del 
Ejército se trasladaba e implantaba en el seno de las comunidades.” 





example, a lot of 




tradition.  A full-
conversion of 20% is 
introduced to model 
this. 
 
The 20% is not 
completely arbitrary. 
In the partial-
conversion case, the 
value tries to only 
reflect the military 
values that infiltrated 
the institutions, as 
others sectors (e.g. 
religion, economy, 
justice values) might 
have not been 
converted, at least 
directly. 
 
The other 20% tries 
to reflect a sector of 
the population that 
were militarized. The 
value might seem low 
but we need to 
consider that a lot of 
the militarized people 
actually migrated out 
of their communities.  
 
“63. Beginning in 1982, traditional Mayan authorities were generally 
substituted by delegates from the armed forces, such as military 
commissioners and PAC commanders. In other cases, the Army tried to 
control, co-opt and infiltrate the traditional Mayan authority 
structures. This strategy caused the rupture of both community 
mechanisms and the oral transmission of knowledge of their own culture, 
likewise damaging Mayan norms and values of respect and service to the 
com-munity. In their stead, authoritarian practices and the arbitrary 
use of power were introduced. (Historical Clarification Commission 
(CEH), 1999b, p. 30) 
 
“4022. No es posible analizar las consecuencias del debilitamiento del 
Estado y la falta de confianza en la administración de justicia enfocando el 
problema sólo en las instituciones formales. Para grandes sectores de la 
población guatemalteca, sus autoridades y su sistema normativo 
provienen de otras fuentes culturales vinculadas a su propia evaluación 
como pueblo, preexistente incluso a la conquista española. Al tradicional 
racismo y menosprecio por este antiguo orden de autoridades y formas de 
resolver conflictos, es decir el sistema de derecho maya, con la represión y 
militarización de sus comunidades, se sumó una nueva y más intensa 
política de agresión y sometimiento cultural.  
4023. Históricamente, el poder central permitió las modalidades 
organizativas propias de las comunidades indígenas en sus espacios locales, 
siempre y cuando no afectaran los intereses de otros sectores. Esta relación 
de relativa tolerancia, cuando no abandono o ignorancia de parte del Estado 
hacia las comunidades, se modificó profundamente durante el 
enfrentamiento armado. Intervenir en la vida del pueblo maya, en particular 
a través de los comisionados militares y las PAC, se convirtió en un 
elemento central de la estrategia contrainsurgente y del terrorismo de 
Estado. Esta intromisión militar afectó las relaciones de poder legítimo 
dentro de las comunidades, con enormes consecuencias en los patrones 
legales que regían las mismas. El cambio de un modelo de resolución de 
conflictos y de convivencia comunitaria por otro centrado en la 
arbitrariedad, el autoritarismo y el castigo cruel, afectó toda la 
This seems to have 
happened across all 
the territory. There is 
no indication that the 
conversion was 
stronger in the most 






estructura de normas de la comunidad y las relaciones sociales que 
éstas pretenden regular. 
4024. Esta sustitución violenta de las autoridades y formas judiciales 
propias de las comunidades mayas y el debilitamiento consiguiente de 
su sistema normativo y judicial, realizados por el Ejército y sus agentes, 
avalados por el sistema judicial y propiciados por el conjunto del 
Estado, se convirtió, entonces, en otra de las consistentes razones que tiene 
el ciudadano guatemalteco para desconfiar en las leyes” (Historical 
Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 65–55 Vol IV) 
 
“4191. La intervención de miembros de la insurgencia en las organizaciones 
sociales también afectó a éstas, no sólo porque la participación insurgente 
fue un factor más para que fueran reprimidas, sino también porque en 
muchos casos provocó divisiones, polarización y fuertes luchas en el seno 
de las propias organizaciones que al final resultaron muy debilitadas.” 
(Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 119 Vol IV)  
 
“4410. A las estrategias referidas se sumaron la sustitución de 
autoridades mayas por mandos o delegados militares, la imposición de 
elementos militarizados como los comisionados militares y los 
patrulleros civiles, el control, la cooptación y la infiltración de las 
estructuras de autoridad indígenas. El conjunto de estas medidas tuvo 
como consecuencia la ruptura de los mecanismos comunitarios de 
reproducción de la vida social, de la transmisión del conocimiento oral 
de la propia cultura, así como la vulneración de las estructuras de 
autoridad, las normas y los valores mayas de respeto y de servicio a la 
comunidad. En su lugar se introdujeron prácticas de autoritarismo, 
desprecio por la vida humana y uso arbitrario del poder.” (Historical 
Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 191 Vol IV) 
  
References Table 9. Other references excluded from the simulation  
Quote Text Comments 
 “61. Freedom of speech goes hand in hand with the free exercise of civil rights. When opportunities 
for social and political participation are closed, then, implicitly, so are opportunities for freedom of 
speech. During the long period of armed confrontation, even thinking critically was a dangerous act 
in Guatemala, and to write about political and social realities, events or ideas, meant running the risk 
of threats, torture, disappearance and death. In exercising freedom of speech, citizens, writers, artists, 
Since democracy is not used in the 
simulation, certain circumstances 




poets, politicians and journalists were subject to the risks that repression and ideological polarisation 
imposed upon them. Although there were people who spoke out despite the risks, the large news 
agencies, in general, supported the authoritarian regimes through self-censorship and distortion of the 
facts. The price was very high, not only in the number of Iives lost, but also because Guatemala 
became a country silenced, a country incommunicado.”(Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 
1999b, p. 29) 
“the Inter-American Commission, in its discussion of the right to freedom of religion and conscience, 
expressed concern about threats to the integrity of the Roman Catholic church in rural areas of 
Guatemala, especially given the previous human rights violations against church personnel and the 
espoused Protestant fundamentalism of the then president of Guatemala. Although the commission 
noted that there were no new reports of priests being assassinated, kid-napped, or tortured, as had 
occurred with great regularity during the previous regime of Gen. Romero Lucas García, it did 
describe how an Indian catechist was murdered during the visit of Pope John Paul II to Guatemala in 
march 1983. It also described how Roman Catholic clergy feared reopening more than seventy social-
action centers that had been closed during the previous regime, how religious polarization has 
increased since Gen. Ríos Montt had assumed power, and how Catholic lay leaders were being 
harassed by local military commanders.” (Davis, 1992, pp. 7–8) 
 
The CEH report describes the role that the catholic church played in the community and the 
consequences of the attacks against its members (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, 
pp. 109–155 Vol IV) 
The role of the catholic church is 
entangled.  
 
Christianity on the ladino is very 
different from the indigenous 
Christianity.  
 
Although the catholic church tries to 
project itself as a unique institution, it 
is clear that there exist divisions, 
Guatemalan syncretism is just another 
example. Therefore, the simulation 
captures attacks to members of the 
clergy. 
“4324. La experiencia de resistencia, que manifestó una diversidad de modalidades a través de los 
esfuerzos de la gente por preservar su identidad, provocó igualmente importantes cambios 
precisamente en ésta. La interacción con otros grupos étnicos, con gente de las áreas urbanas, con 
ciudadanos de otros países, con otros sistemas educativos, con diferentes entornos naturales, y la 
misma experiencia de la persecución y muerte, transformaron ese elemento relacional que es la 
identidad para producir una sociedad guatemalteca marcada por el conflicto, pero también fortalecida 
potencialmente en la experiencia de la diversidad.” (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 
1999a, p. 163 Vol IV) 
 
The CEH report describes many implications of the internal and external displacement (Historical 
Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, pp. 119–163 Vol IV), among them the cultural re-
composition of the society: “4324. La experiencia de resistencia, que manifestó una diversidad de 
modalidades a través de los esfuerzos de la gente por preservar su identidad, provocó igualmente 
importantes cambios precisamente en ésta. La interacción con otros grupos étnicos, con gente de las 
áreas urbanas, con ciudadanos de otros países, con otros sistemas educativos, con diferentes entornos 
naturales, y la misma experiencia de la persecución y muerte, transformaron ese elemento relacional 
The internal displacement of people is 
not covered in the simulation. Future 




que es la identidad para producir una sociedad guatemalteca marcada por el conflicto, pero también 
fortalecida potencialmente en la experiencia de la diversidad.” (Historical Clarification Commission 
(CEH), 1999a, p. 163’ Vol IV)  
“4411. Con la introducción de las Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil, comisionados militares, confidentes 
del Ejército y la aculturación violenta de los jóvenes a través de reclutamiento militar forzado, se 
trastocaron las relaciones sociales, socavando la confianza y los lazos comunitarios de solidaridad. 
Lo grave del fenómeno radica en que estos mecanismos de violencia y delación tenían lugar en el 
interior de las comunidades y las familias, por lo cual sus efectos han sido más profundos y 
duraderos.” (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 1999a, p. 191 Vol IV)  
According to this, some individuals 
where converted to follow a military 
tradition. This situation escapes the 
simulation possibilities. It would be 
equivalent to an individual partial 
conversion; a full conversion is still 
possible by introducing more 
invaders. 
“In 1979 it changed its methods of struggle, and began implementing actions such as sabotage, 
propaganda bombs, blocking highways and barricades.” (Historical Clarification Commission (CEH), 
1999a, p. 252 Vol IV) 
This also suggests changes in the 
institutional mechanisms, in this case 
propaganda. Propaganda has not been 
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